



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS PACIFIC-MCB CAMP BUTLER  
UNIT 35001  
FPO AP 96373-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

CG

3 Oct 19

(b)(3)(A)  
(ii), (b) (6),  
(b) (7)(C)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 's ltr of 5830 of 3 Oct 19

From: Commanding General  
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING  
ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ABOARD CAMP MUJUK, KOREA

Ref: (f) MCO 5354.1E (PAC Order)

1. This investigation was reviewed in accordance with paragraph 0209 of reference (a). I have carefully considered the Investigating Officer's findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations.

2. As a result of this investigation, I have lost trust and confidence in Colonel Karega's ability to command, and in (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7) 's abilities to discharge his duties as a Senior Enlisted Leader.  
(C)

3. To be clear, the root causes of the problematic behavior revealed in this Command Investigation stem from leadership failures. Nevertheless, the investigation highlights the challenges inherent in the extant incongruent command structure: a post-command Colonel serving as commander with a new First Sergeant (straight from the drill field) who has never led a company of Marines before. A forthcoming decision memorandum will recommend designation of Camp Mujuk as a slated Colonel/Sergeant Major command.

4. The Equal Opportunity Advisor, MCIPAC, will review this investigation in accordance with reference (f).

5. I will take appropriate steps to address the substantiated misconduct and failures of leadership detailed in this investigation. No further investigation is warranted at this time.

6. The point of contact for this matter is the MCIPAC (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or  
(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (A) (A)(ii), (b) (7) (ii) (C)

W. J. BOWERS

Copy to:  
IO  
EOA, MCIPAC  
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS PACIFIC-MCB CAMP BUTLER  
UNIT 35001  
FPO AP 96373-5001

(b) (6), (b) (7)  
(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
CGOF  
3 Oct 19

(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: EDIPI: USMC  
To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations Pacific

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ABOARD CAMP  
MUJUK, KOREA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter II  
(b) United States Navy Regulations  
(c) MCO 6100.13A  
(d) OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A  
(e) MCO 1500.60 Force Preservation Council Program

Encl: (1) Appointing order  
(2) Extension Request 5830/IO of 20 Sep 19  
(3) Extension Approval 5830/CG of 25 Sep 19  
(4) Screen Capture of Camp Mujuk Web Site  
(5) Camp Mujuk Welcome Aboard Brief pp 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 22, 70, 71  
(6) Military Biography of Colonel Sekou S. Karega  
(7) Military Biography of First Sergeant Eric J. Thompson  
(8) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(9) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(10) E-mail from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), MCIPAC IG  
(11) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(12) Inspector General Complaint prepared by (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(13) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(14) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(15) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(16) (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) written statement and pictures provided to (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(17) Camp Mujuk Phone Roster  
(18) Investigating Officer (IO) Memorandum for the Record (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(19) Pages X,X,X,X, from Cellebrite Extraction Report Call Log from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 's phone  
(20) Pages XXXXXX from Cellebrite Extraction Report SMS Log from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 's phone  
(21) Pages XXXXXX from Cellebrite Extraction Report MMS Log from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) s phone (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(22) Timeline of communication between (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(23) Screenshot from Ciroc™ Vodka web site  
(24) Travel Voucher from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) trip to Camp Pendleton  
(25) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(26) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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- (27) Summary of Interview with former (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (28) Summary of Interview with former (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (29) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (30) List of all Non-judicial Punishment (NJP) conducted at Camp Mujuk since 2017
- (31) E-mail from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (32) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (33) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (34) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (35) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (36) III MEF-MCIPAC Holiday Calendar CY 19
- (37) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (38) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (39) Scanned Pages from Camp Mujuk Liberty Log Book
- (40) Scanned Pages from Camp Mujuk Command Duty Officer Log Book
- (41) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (42) Military Biography of (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (43) E-mail exchange between IO and (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (44) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (45) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (46) Executive Summary Report: Camp Mujuk Focus Group Results
- (47) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)
- (48) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (49) E-mails provided by (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) documenting his efforts  
to bring the Camp Mujuk IDC program into compliance with OPNAVINST  
6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A
- (50) (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DA Form 3349 dtd 20190421
- (51) Screenshot of (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MCTIMS Record (NAVMC) NAVMC  
11622 forms dtd 20190308 and 20190422
- (52) Excerpt from MCO 6100.13A
- (53) E-mail from Force Fitness Division, HQMC
- (54) NAVMC 11622 Forms from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PFTs
- (55) Request for correction of (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PFT record
- (56) Personal Statement of (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (57) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (58) (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Basic Training Record
- (59) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (60) Documentation Pertaining to (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PFT
- (61) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (62) (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Page 13 Rebuttal
- (63) Memorandum Authorizing (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Prescribe  
Medications
- (64) Force Preservation Council (FPC) Assignment Letters ICO (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6),  
(b) (7)(C)
- (65) Camp Mujuk Order 1500.1 Force Preservation Council Order
- (66) Marine Corps Installation Camp Mujuk Bulletin 1050.1B
- (67) Liberty Risk Order ico (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- (68) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(69) Summary of Interview with

(70) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(71) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(72) Camp Mujuk Command Duty Officer Morning Report 21 July 2019

(73) FPC Assignment Letters for (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(74) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(75) Camp Mujuk Order 1601.2E Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Command Duty  
Non-commissioned Officer (CDNCO) Order

(76) E-mail from (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(77) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(78) Summary of Interview with (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**Preliminary Statement**

1. In accordance with reference (a) and as directed by enclosure (1), a command investigation was conducted to inquire into the circumstances surrounding allegations of abuse of authority at Camp Mujuk, Korea. The directives and special requirements stated in enclosure (1) were met.

2. In August of 2019, the Marine Corps Installations Pacific (MCIPAC) Inspector General (IG) received a complaint from an anonymous Marine. While investigating that complaint, the IG discovered that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was compiling information to submit a complaint to the IG of the Marine Corps (IGMC). The MCIPAC IG determined the anonymous Marine's and

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) concerns exceeded the IG mandate to investigate fraud, waste, involved both a commanding officer and senior enlisted leader.

He referred this information to the MCIPAC CG who initiated this command investigation.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) identified multiple issues with the command climate at Camp Mujuk, Republic of Korea (ROK). Among his concerns were:

a. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

discovered allegations of inappropriate communications from

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

This communication consisted of in-person, text message and phone call invitations for the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to join the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), for

drinks. This information was provided to the (b)(3)(A)(ii) who looked into the matter and forwarded the allegations to the Commanding Officer (CO) but no formal investigation was conducted.

b. Several Marines and the Camp Mujuk Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC) brought

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

concerns that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

annual Physical Fitness

Test (PFT) was fraudulently conducted. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

record showed partial PFT

scores for 8 March 19 and 22 April 19 and complete PFT scores for 15 March 19 and 12 April 19. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

was TAD on 15 March 19 and observed the PFT in the Marine

Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) on 12 April. To the concerned Marines' knowledge,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

was not on light duty during the partial PFTs.



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

c. Following a liberty incident early in the morning of 21 July 19 and several other Marines were each given a letter assigning them to a Force Preservation Council high risk status. The letter also notified them that they were restricted from off-base liberty and could not consume alcohol for a period of 30 days. In addition, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and two other Marines, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were assigned weekend duty every weekend for a period of four weeks.

d. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) expressed concern that Colonel Karega, the Commanding Officer (CO), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) have no regard for troop welfare and have created a “toxic command climate.”

3. The deadline for this investigation has not been met. An extension was submitted on 23 Sep 19 and approved on 25 Sep 19.

4. The IO conducted over 30 individual interviews with current and former Marines and Sailors assigned to Camp Mujuk. During the course of those interviews, witnesses provide multiple concerns and allegations of improper or hostile behavior by the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii). The IO made every attempt to validate or refute those claims. Two claims against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) are not covered in detail in this report:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (5)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (5)

5. The MCIPAC Regional Trial Investigator conducted Cellebrite extractions on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) government-issued Samsung Galaxy and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) government-issued LG flip phone. The LG flip phone’s software was out of date and was incompatible with the Cellebrite software, so no data were retrieved from it. The Samsung Galaxy provided a much richer, yet still incomplete data set. The IO determined this was not a critical deficiency in evidence available to complete this investigation. The extraction reports totaled over 700 pages. Appropriate excerpts were used as enclosures to this report; the full reports are stored on the IO’s MCEN Laptop and available by CD or e-mail. Additional phone records can be obtained from the cell phone provider in the ROK, however the phones must physically be present in the ROK in order to receive a text message verification to allow the Camp Mujuk S-6 to receive the data. Both phones are currently secured in the IO’s office on Okinawa, Japan pending the completion of this investigation.

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6. Colonel Karega invoked his Article 31B rights and did not make a statement or allow the IO to interview him.
7. In several instances, Marines have been promoted or demoted during the timespan that this investigation covers. In order to minimize confusion, the Marine's rank at the time of the investigation will be used. Of particular note, <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup>, the recipient of alleged inappropriate communication from <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup>, was a <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup> during the primary period when the alleged communication occurred. She was promoted to her current rank on <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>
8. Most interview summaries have been signed by the interviewee but in a few cases, leave, TAD or PCS transfer prevented a final signature. In those cases, the investigating officer has signed verifying that the summary is accurate.
9. Most interviews were recorded. A few interviews were not recorded due to technical difficulties, operator error or the very short nature of the interview. All interview recordings are stored on the hard drive of the investigator's MCEN laptop and available for transfer via Department of Defense Secure Access File Exchange (DoD SAFE) due to file size. They are also available on a DVD submitted with this investigation.

**Findings of Fact**

1. Camp Mujuk is the only United States Marine Corps Installation in South Korea. It is located about an hour east of Daegu, just outside of Pohang, and near the eastern shoreline. [encl (4)]
2. Colonel Sekou S. Karega has been the Commanding Officer (CO) of Camp Mujuk since 10 Aug 18. [encls (4), (5) and (6)]
3. <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup> has been the <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup> at Camp Mujuk since <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>. [encls (4), (5) and (7)]
4. Camp Mujuk falls under the operational control (OPCON) of MCIPAC during peacetime operations and under OPCON of Marine Forces Korea (MARFORK) during contingency operations. [encls (4), (5), (8) and (9)]
5. Camp Mujuk's mission is to "Operate, maintain, and sustain the installation and outlying Cooperative Security Locations in support of Marine Corps Forces Pacific and follow-on joint and combined forces, in order to enable force projection and contingency response in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). Enhance combat readiness across the range of military operations for transient and tenant organizations, by providing facilities, facilities maintenance, materiel and services, community engagement, and coordination of combined training with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps and other military units." [encl (5)]
6. There are approximately <sup>(b)(3)(A)(i)</sup> Marines and Sailors, <sup>(b)(3)(A)(i)</sup> US Civil Service employees, <sup>(b)(3)(A)(i)</sup> contractors and <sup>(b)(3)(A)(i)</sup> non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees as well as just over <sup>(b)(3)(A)(i)</sup> local national employees assigned to Camp Mujuk. [encl (9)]

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7. The MCIPAC IG received a complaint from a Marine who wished to remain anonymous. The complaint identified multiple issues with the command climate at Camp Mujuk. [encl (10)]

8. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been assigned to Camp Mujuk as the (b)(3)(A)(ii) since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[encl (11)]

9. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated he had only been in the unit for a short period of time but felt there were serious issues at the command, especially with the way (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) treated SNCOs. He was planning to submit a complaint about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to the IG of the Marine Corps (IGMC) with three concerns: There was a belief among many SNCOs that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had not properly completed the PFT and his scores were fraudulently entered for him, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) used the FPC as a punishment to restrict Marines' liberty and assigned weekend duty as a punishment, and the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had no regard for troop welfare and created a toxic command climate. [encls (11) and (12)]

10. Just prior to submitting his original IGMC complaint, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was approached by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) with concerns that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was attempting to engage in an inappropriate relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) in the S-1. [encls (11), (12), (13) and (14)]

11. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) is the (b)(3)(A)(ii), Camp Mujuk. He arrived at Camp Mujuk on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). [encl (13)]

12. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) is currently assigned to the S-4 as a (b)(3)(A)(ii). He was previously assigned to Aviation Ordnance but was reassigned after he received NJP and lost his ordnance handling qualification. He has been at Camp Mujuk for over a year. [encl (14)]

13. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) were the third group or individual to express concerns to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) communication with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encl (11)]

14. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about the allegations and she told him that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had invited her to have drinks with him on multiple occasions. [encls (9), (11), (12) and (15)]

15. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) added the allegations against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to his pending IGMC complaint. [encls (11) and (12)]

16. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was contacted by an investigator from the MCIPAC IG's office looking into a complaint submitted by a Marine from Camp Mujuk. He provided the investigator with the complaint he had compiled to submit to IGMC. [encl (11)]

17. The MCIPAC (b)(3)(A)(ii) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) determined the concerns raised in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) complaint fell outside the scope of the IG's jurisdiction and referred it to the MCIPAC CG for action. [encl (10)]

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Inappropriate Communication/Attempted Inappropriate Relationship

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

18. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the (b)(3)(A)(ii) since  
She was promoted to her current rank on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). [encl (15)]

19. Marine Forces Korea (MARFORK) hosted Marines and Sailors from Camp Mujuk at a mess night at Camp Humphreys on 2 May 2019. The following service members attended: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

[encls (8), (11), (13), (14) and (16)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

20. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) bought several Marines from Camp Mujuk, including  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii), a round of drinks at the beginning of the Mess Night. [encls (8), (14), (15) and (22)]

21. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) states he saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) buy (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) but no other Marines additional drinks at the mess night. [encl (14)]

22. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said she had been drinking prior to the mess night and couldn't remember but thought maybe (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) bought her one more beer at the mess night. [encl (15)]

23. The Camp Mujuk Marines who attended the Mess Night stayed at the Army barracks on Camp Humphreys where the MARFORK Marines live. [encls (8), (14) and (15)]

24. When they returned to the barracks, several of the Camp Mujuk Marines played pool in barracks lounge. [encls (14) and (15)]  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

25. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a text from  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) while they were playing pool inviting her to join him for drinks. She does not recall receiving such a text. [encl (14)]

26. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) denies texting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) after the Mess Night.  
[encl (8)]

27. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has a government issued LG Flip phone. This is not unusual, most of the Marines and Sailors assigned to Camp Mujuk have government issued cell phones. [encl (17)]

28. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has a government issued Samsung Galaxy phone. [encl (17)]

29. On 30 August 2019, the IO seized both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) government-issued phones. [encl (18)]

30. The MCIPAC Regional Trial Investigator conducted a Cellebrite extraction on both phones.  
[encl (18)]



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31. The software on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone was not compatible with the Cellebrite extraction program so no data were recovered from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone. [encl (18)]

32. The Cellebrite extraction conducted on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone produced three reports: a log of phone calls made and received, a log of Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) messages sent and received, and a log of Short Message Service (SMS) messages sent and received. [encls (18), (19), (20) and (21)]

33. There are gaps in the data extracted from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone. Notably there appear to be no deleted SMS messages extracted. There is also a gap in phone calls between 24 May 2019 at 1349 and 1 Aug 2019 at 1744. The report shows only one call on 10 June 2019 at 0625 during that period. [encls (18), (19), (20) and (21)]

34. The Cellebrite extraction call log shows almost all calls on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone made or received prior to 5 Aug 2019 as having been deleted. [encls (18) and (19)]

35. There is no record in either the MMS log or SMS log of a text message sent from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) on 2 May 2019 or 3 May 2019. [encls (20) and (21)]

36. On 3 May 2019, the Camp Mujuk Marines stopped at the Camp Humphreys mini-mart to pick up drinks and snacks for the three-hour drive back to Camp Mujuk. [encls (8), (15) and (22)]

37. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) pick up two bottles of Cîroc™ Summer Colada and observed “I didn’t even know you drink, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii).” He replied that he didn’t really drink but he’d heard Summer Colada was good but had never found the right Cîroc™ before and wanted to try it. [encls (8) and (15)]

38. Cîroc™ Summer Colada is a limited edition release of Cîroc™ vodka. [encl (23)]

39. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) then told her she should stop by some day and he would make her some. Not wanting to be rude, she replied “Yeah, maybe one day I’ll stop by.” [encl (15)]

40. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) denied offering to make drinks for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) or inviting her over for drinks. [encl (8)]

41. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said a few days after the Mess Night, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) commented to her while she was turning in the morning report, “You never came by for those Summer Coladas, they’re still waiting for you.” She once again answered vaguely that “one day maybe I’ll stop by,” but still did not go to have drinks with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encl (15)]

42. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated on or about 10 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invited her to join him for Summer Coladas. [encls (12) and (16)]

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43. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) to Camp Pendleton from 5 – 11 May 2019. [encl (24)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

44. On 17 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a text message at 1836 from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) that says, “Good evening. give me a call when you get the chance.” [encls (15), (16) and (20)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

45. On 17 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a text at 1901 from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) No text is shown in the message body portion of the Cellebrite SMS log. [encl (20)]

46. On 17 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at 1902. The call lasted one minute and 20 seconds. [encl (19)]

47. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invited her to have drinks with him on the call on 17 May. [encl (11) and (16)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

48. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated on 24 May 2019 while turning in the morning report (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told her she needed to come by to try the Summer Coladas. She replied she couldn’t because she was going to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) going away that night. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) responded that the going away “wouldn’t last all day, so you could come by after.” She replied, “Maybe if I’m not already drinking.” [encl (15)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

49. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) from approximately (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encl (25)]

50. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) farewell was held on Friday, 24 May 2019 at a gazebo between the gym and the barracks on Camp Mujuk. It started at 1800 and moved to a nearby fire pit at approximately 2200. [encl (25)]

51. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) attended the farewell but returned to the office shortly after it started. Neither of them consumed alcohol. [encl (25)]

52. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) attended the farewell and departed sometime after it moved to the fire pit. [encl (15) and (25)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

53. On 24 May 2019 at 1943 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a text message from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) asking “Are you going to come?” [encl (9), (11), (15) and (16)]

54. The Cellebrite extraction report shows no text messages sent from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) phone after 1845 on 24 May 2019. [encl (20)]

55. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated when she returned to her room that evening, she had two missed calls from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) on her phone. [encl (15) and (26)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

56. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) roommate. She is a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and has been at Camp Mujuk since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (15) and (26)]

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57. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated one day (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had left her government phone in her room and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) saw it had incoming phone calls. When she checked the phone, she saw the calls were from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). She figured it was not something she should answer so she let (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) know about the calls when she returned to the room. [encl (26)]

58. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had been calling her and inviting her to join him for drinks. [encl (15) and (26)]

59. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was making a tropical drink and wanted her to try it. [encl (26)]

60. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated she told her roommate about the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invitations because she wasn't sure how to feel about the situation. She said she didn't think of it as bad, but knew that it wasn't right. [encl (11)] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

61. Shortly after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invitations, she told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about the two texts she received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and explained the situation to him. [encl(15) and (27)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp Mujuk for 22 months. He departed Camp Mujuk on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and separated from the Marine Corps at his end of active service (EAS) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and is currently living in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He had a clean record with no history of disciplinary action. [encl (27)]

63. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated she was concerned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was not going to stop inviting her to have drinks with him or was going to get angry if she continued to avoid his invitations. [encl (15)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) offered to go with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) if she wanted to get drinks with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) did not want to go. [encl (15)] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said he was with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at one point when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called her and invited her to have drinks with him. He couldn't recall the exact date but thought it was near the Memorial Day weekend in May 2019. [encl (27)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) specifically mentioned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) wanted to make "Summer Coladas" for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encl (27)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) approached him as an NCO who had served in another unit before to ask him if had seen anything like (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) contacting her about getting drinks. He told her he had not and that it was not right. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) seemed a little shocked by the situation and not sure how to react. [encl (27)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) discussed the allegations regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) contacting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) with his roommate, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (27)]

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was a (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp Mujuk from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) He separated from the Marine Corps at his EAS on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) He had a clean record  
with no history of disciplinary action. [encl (28)]

70. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had served together at 7<sup>th</sup> Engineer Support Battalion  
(ESB). They both agreed it was inappropriate for a (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to be contacting a (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), to have drinks. [encls (27) and (28)] (C)

71. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated they were never contacted directly by the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) If he needed something from them, he used the chain of command. [encls (27) and  
(28)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated that sometime in May 2019 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him  
directly about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) texting and calling her to invite her to have drinks with  
him. [encl (28)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said he encouraged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to report the communication  
from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) but she did not want to. She also asked him not to report it. He  
honored her request. [encl (28)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told the IO she didn't want to make a big deal about the  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) inviting her to have drinks with him. At first she didn't see anything wrong with what  
he asked and didn't want to start feeling uncomfortable around him. [encl (15)]

75. Neither (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) nor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) reported any negative interaction with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encls (27) and (28)]

76. When asked if he had texted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) "Are you going to come?"  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) replied: "I was in the office completing administrative tasks that Friday  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) evening and attempted to call the SNCO. I wasn't able to get in touch with the SNCO so I called  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at the time and told him that, him or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) needed to come to my office and  
ome documents that I recall were for a NJP package that I was correcting because of it  
having major errors. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called me back a few minutes later and informed that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) would be coming to my office because she had the documents saved on her desktop or  
knew where to find them on the share drive. After 15-20 minutes had passed, I tried calling her  
twice with no answer and at that time, I texted her and asked 'Are you coming.'" [encl (8)]

77. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mujuk since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). His predecessor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) departed Camp Mujuk on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [encl (29)]

78. The Camp Mujuk Commanding Officer held NJP for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both were reduced to the rank of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encls (30), (31) and (32)]

79. The Unit Diary entry for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) NJP was run on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(30)] [encl



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80. There were no subsequent NJPs until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received NJP and was reduced to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . [encl (30)]

81. On 12 May, 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at 0910. The call lasted 31 seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

82. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) is the former (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp Mujuk. As the (b)(3)(A)(ii), she reported to the S-4 Officer. [encls (8), (25), (33) and (34)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) works in the S-4 as a (b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encl (17)]

84. On 12 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at 0911. The call lasted 26 seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

85. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the Provost Marshall's Office (PMO) (b)(3)(A)(ii) since 26 Mar 19. [encl (35)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) works in PMO as a (b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encl (17)]

87. On 12 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called the Duty Non-commissioned Officer (DNCO) at 0915. The call lasted 22 seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

88. On 12 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) at 0918. The call lasted 25 seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

89. On 12 May 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at 0934. The call lasted three minutes and three seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

90. 12 May 2019 was a Sunday. [encl (36)]

91. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated she only received a few texts from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) The first was prior to the Camp Humphreys Mess Night asking about meal choices. The other two were noted above on 17 May 2019 and 24 May 2019. [encl (15)]

92. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) texted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and several other Marines on 30 April 2019 asking about meal choices for the Mess Night. [encls (20) and (22)]

93. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated she had called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) once when she found his wallet near the Camp Mujuk main gate. He told her to turn it in to PMO. [encl (15)]

94. On 22 May 2019 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) at 2038. The call lasted 38 seconds. [encls (19) and (22)]

95. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) originally stated she had not received any work-related calls from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) or called him for work-related purposes. [encl (15)]

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96. When asked if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had contacted her at some point to go in after hours to work on an NJP package, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) reported that he had. She didn't recall exactly when that was but thought it had been coordinated through her previous NCOIC, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (18)]

97. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) estimated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invited her to join him for Summer Coladas six times. She thought it was roughly every weekend from the Mess Night until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) went on leave. [encl (15)]

98. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) reports that before he went on leave, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) commented to her that she never got to try his Summer Coladas and he was about to go on leave. He told her she would have to try them when he got back. She gave him a non-committal response. [encls (11), (15) and (16)]

99. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was on leave from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . [encl (22)]

100. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) , started hearing rumors that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was hitting on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and sending her text messages. On 10 July 2019 he sent her a text message asking her about it. She said she didn't know what he was talking about. [encls (11) and (29)]

101. A few days later, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invitations, text messages and phone calls. [encls (11) and (29)]

102. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the acting (b)(3)(A)(ii) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [encl (37)]

103. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) approached (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) in May regarding rumors about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) inappropriate communication from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) . (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) recommended that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) ask her about it; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) didn't think she would be comfortable talking to him since he had just arrived. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) later reported he spoke with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and she did not share any information with him. [encl (37)]

104. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated approximately two weeks before he left Camp Muiuk, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) approached him and told him about the situation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (37)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was texting her, asking her to hang and to come to his room to drink. [encl (37)]

106. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) thought the last time (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) invited (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to hang out with him was just before the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) departed on 30 days of leave. [encl (37)]

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

107. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) did not personally see the text messages or ask

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to show them to him. [encl (37)]

108. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) what she wanted to do – did she want him elevate the issue up the chain of command. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him she did not want the command to find out; she didn't want anybody to look at her differently. [encl (37)]

109. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) didn't want any problems and felt uncomfortable with the idea of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) or someone else in the chain of command bringing it up. [encl (37)]

110. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) honored (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) request not to elevate the issue. [encl (37)]

111. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) were some of the best Marines he had ever worked with. [encl (37)]

112. By this point, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had checked in to take over from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) as the (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encls (11), (12) and (29)]

113. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) shared his concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about the rumors he'd heard regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). Since he was new and this was still in the "rumor" category (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) filed it away to look into later. [encls (11) and (29)]

114. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) approached (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) with concerns about allegations of inappropriate communication from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (38)]

115. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the at Camp Mujuk for approximately one and a half years. [encl (38)]

116. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated two of his Marines, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) FAS'd At their farewell in late May or early June, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) called or texted to her on multiple occasions asking her to come to at 2100 or 2200 on a Friday night to drink with him. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) vouched that they had been present for some of the phone calls or texts. [encl (38)]

117. Shortly after hearing this information from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) took 30 days of leave. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had checked in while he was on leave and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) wanted to make sure (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was aware of the issue as her SNCOIC. [encl (38)]

118. On Friday, 19 July 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was notified she had been selected to have lunch with a general officer (GO) who was scheduled to visit on Monday, 22 July 19. She was tasked to develop two questions to ask the GO and turn them into (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encls (15) and (29)]

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119. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was off base picking up a plaque for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) when she found out about the lunch so she had to return to the office after hours to draft and submit her questions. [encls (15), (29) and (39)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the Command Duty Officer (CDO) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He states (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) office for four hours that evening. [encls (13) and (40)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said she went by the CDO and then into her office where she typed up her questions. That took about 10-15 minutes. She then dropped them off with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). She thinks she was in his office for 20-25 minutes. [encl (15)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) talked about Black Belt training or kick boxing; she was tired and really wanted to get out of there. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) also mentioned Summer Coladas to her again. [encl (15)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

123. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said she had received some small gifts from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) including hot cocoa and chocolate. She did not think much of them at the time, just thought she was in the right place at the right time. She shared the treats with the S-1 shop. [encl (15)]

124. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) from the S-4 told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) that she should not accept gifts from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encl (15)]

125. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said he kept chocolate in his office that he shares with anyone who goes in there. He said he brought the hot cocoa back with him from leave along with some gifts for the local national employees. He was walking around offering the hot cocoa and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the first to take it. [encl (8)]

126. The USFK liberty policy changed while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was on leave and Camp Muiuk made some adjustments to their policy as a result. When he returned from leave, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) discovered NCOs and SNCOs using junior Marines as “sober liberty buddies” (this will be covered in more detail later in this report.) The command held training or notified the Marines at a weekly liberty briefing that it was not appropriate for NCO’s to be hanging out with junior Marines. [encls (8) and (41)]

127. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said she responded to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) Summer Colada offer by saying, she “can’t really hang out with you because I am a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and you’re a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)” citing the recent training she just had. He replied with a comment along the lines of “Yeah, yeah, you’re right.” [encl (15)] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

128. The extended time (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) spent in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) office prompted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to let (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) know about the event. [encl (13)]

129. As noted earlier, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) confronted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and she gave him the details of the invitations, texts and phone calls she had received from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)



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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

He told her he had to report it up the chain of command. [encls (11), (12), (15) and (16)]

130. In addition to adding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) information about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to his IG complaint, on 31 July 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) notified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) the Camp Mujuk (b)(3)(A)(ii) of the allegations against (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encls (9), (11), (12), (15), (16) , (29) and (38)] (b)(3)(A)(ii)

131. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) since late (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) He was previously the (b)(3)(A)(ii) for Marine Corps Base Quantico. [encl (9)]

132. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) brought the allegations to Colonel Karega's attention. Colonel Karega asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to look into the allegations calling it an (b)(3)(A)(ii) Inquiry." [encls (9), (11), (12), (15), (16), (29) and (32)] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

133. On 2 August 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) , took pictures of text messages on her phone from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and asked her to prepare a written statement. [encls (9), (11), (12), (15), (16) and (29)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

planned to interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and drafted up a series of questions for the interview. [encl (9)]

135. On 3 Aug 2019, prior to interviewing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) shared what he had learned to date with Colonel Karega. [encl (9)]

136. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) did not type up formal results of the (b)(3)(A)(ii) inquiry" that he conducted. [encl (9)]

137. Colonel Karega told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) he would contact the MCIPAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to determine the next steps. [encl (9)]

138. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the MCIPAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [encl (42)]

139. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) does not recall receiving a call from Colonel Karega regarding concerns about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and he has no entries in his logbook regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (43)] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

140. Colonel Karega told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) he had received the information regarding (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) from (b)(3)(A)(ii) that he had discussed the matter with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) would provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) with a back brief on that conversation. [encls (11) and (29)]

141. Colonel Karega told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) he was going to counsel (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) about the allegations of inappropriate communication but did not provide any details about the conversation or direction to back brief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encl (9)]

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142. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated Colonel Karega had counseled him and told him he was going to document the counseling with a non-punitive letter of caution (NPLOC), but as of 30 Aug 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had not received one. [encl (8)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated "In this incident the only two individuals who I believe had firsthand information was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). I found (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) statement to be compelling and detailed. Her statement was corroborated with the text messages she showed me on her phone." [encl (9)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated "Based upon the details of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) statement and the screen shots of the texts I showed [Colonel Karega], as well as him stating he was going to talk to the MCIPAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) I believed he had enough information to make a decision on what he wanted to do. I had a battalion commander who immediately relieved his SgtMaj after corroborated allegations he allowed underage Marines to drink at a mess night." [encl (9)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) has been the (b)(3)(A)(ii) since (b) (7)(C), (b) (6). He is also the (b)(3)(A)(ii) as a collateral duty. [encl (32)]

146. Camp Mujuk has conducted 11 Preliminary Inquiries and 1 Command Investigation so far this year for incidents as simple as a government vehicle backing into a telephone pole. [encls (9) and (32)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was conducting some sort of investigation into the allegations that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was improperly communicating with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and offered his assistance as the (b)(3)(A)(ii) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him he didn't need any help. [encl (32)]

148. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) did not draft a letter appointing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) as an IO or any paperwork initiating a preliminary inquiry or command investigation. [encl (32)]

149. Of 33 individuals interviewed in the conduct of this investigation, 18 told the IO they had heard about allegations of inappropriate communication from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encls (8), (9), (11), (13), (14), (15), (26), (27), (28), (38), (29), (37), (32), (34), (35), (41) (44), and (45)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) thought some of the officers knew of the allegations but felt all of the SNCOs and junior Marines knew about them. [encl (34)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said word of the allegations spread, including through "the lance corporal underground." [encl (37)]

152. Multiple personnel in the command expressed concern that the allegations of inappropriate communication from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) were not fully investigated. [encls (11), (29), (32), and (46)]

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Physical Fitness Test

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

and

conducted a PFT on 8 March 2019;

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

failed to complete the run portion of the test. [encls (8), (11), (12),

(38), (41), (47) and (48)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

stated he injured (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

and now has

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. [encl (8)]

155. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

injury has (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. [encl (8)]

156. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

said running puts pressure on his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

which causes his

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[encl (8)]

157. During the run on 8 March 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

about a

half mile into the run. He pushed through it until he no longer could, just short of the half-way point of the run course. [encls (8), (38), (41), (47) and (48)]

158. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

to let the attending corpsman and

course monitor know he wouldn't be able to complete the run then walked back to the starting line. [encls (8), (38), (47) and (48)]

159. The run portion of the Camp Mujuk PFT is conducted off base at a local walking trail.

Marines are driven to the start area from Camp Mujuk via Government Owned Vehicle (GOV).

There is not vehicle support on the course. [encls (8), (47), and (48)]

160. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

felt

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

completed the course with a failing time even though he declared he was injured and could not complete the run. [encls (38) and (47)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

161. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

checked into Camp Mujuk to replace

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

as the IDC on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. [encl (47)]

162. Shortly after checking in, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

discovered that the Camp

Mujuk IDC Program was not in compliance with OPNAV 6400.1, preventing him from treating patients as an IDC. [encls (47) and (49)]

163. Without an IDC Program, personnel from Camp Mujuk had to travel to Camp Walker for medical treatment. [encls (8) and (47)]

164. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

did not seek medical treatment for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[encl (50)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

entered a partial PFT score for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

into the Marine Corps

Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) on 8 March 2019. [encls (8), (41) and (48)]

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(b)(3)(A)  
(ii)

166. The MCIPAC IG Inspection Team told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) the should have waited for medical documentation from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) before running a score for a partial PFT in MCTIMS. [encl (41)]

167. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told the IO that the Marine Corps order governing the PFT does not require medical documentation at the time that a partial PFT is run. He said the appropriate paperwork needs to be in place by the end of the semi-annual period. [encl (8)]

168. According to Marine Corps Order (MCO) 6100.13A, “Marines will perform a PPFT/PCFT [Partial Physical Fitness Test/Partial Combat Fitness Test] when a PHCP [Privileged Health Care Provider] determines they are physically incapable of performing a particular event of the PFT/CFT. The PHCP will document the medical condition, expiration date, exercise limitations, and PPFT/PCFT events a Marine can perform during the light/limited duty period.” [encl (52)]

169. According to MCO 6100.13A, “Marines injured during the course of a PFT/CFT may be given credit for a PPFT if two out of three events were completed...A Marine injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT, may be afforded the opportunity to retake a PFT/CFT once returned to full duty by a PHCP. For Marines who elect to retake the PFT/CFT, their new score will replace the previous score and is final. Only COs/OICs can authorize PPFT/PCFT credit or a retest for Marines injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT.” [encl (52)]

170. Marine Corps Order 6100.13A does not explicitly state a Marine must seek medical treatment after being injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT in order to receive PPFT/PCFT credit. Headquarters Marine Corps Force Fitness Division stated it is the CO’s discretion to grant PPFT/PCFT credit. [encl (53)]

171. When (b)(3)(A)(ii) entered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) score on 8 March 2019, they incorrectly switched (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) scores for the crunches portion of the PFT. [encls (8), (41), (48), (54), and (55)]

172. (b)(3)(A)(ii) tried to correct the error but inadvertently entered two incorrect complete PFT scores for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii), one on 15 March 2019 and one on 12 April 2019. [encls (41) and (55)]

173. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) to Iwakuni from 13 March 2019 to 15 March 2019. [encl (12)]

174. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) monitored the PFT in the Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) on 12 April 2019. [encls (12), (38) and (47)]

175. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was seen at Camp Walker Wood Medical Clinic on 21 April 2019. He received a Department of the Army (DA) Form 3349 Physical Profile Sheet (equivalent to a light duty chit) that did NOT explicitly state he could take a PPFT as required by MCO 6100.13A. [encl (50)]



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176. The DA Form 3349 that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received was marked all “NO” for Army PFT (APFT) 2 mile run, APFT sit-ups and APFT push-ups. It is also marked all “NO” for APFT walk, APFT swim and APFT bike. Functional limitations are listed as “30 days run/walk/ruck at own pace/distance/weight.” [encl (50)]

177. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) attempted another PFT on 22 Apr 2019. He successfully completed the pull-ups and crunches but once again failed to complete the run. [encls (8), (11), (12), (41) and (47)]

178. On 29 April 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was issued a DD Form 689 Light Duty Chit for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ” The form is partially cut off but remarks list “run at own pace and distance... aerobic event for PFT.” [encl (50)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

entered a partial PFT Score for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) into MCTIMS for his 22 April PFT attempt. [encls (8), (11), (12), (38), (41), and (55)]

180. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii), the former (b)(3)(A)(ii), noticed now four scores in MCTIMS for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) two of which were on days the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) did not take a PFT, and submitted an IG complaint alleging fraudulent PFT entries for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encls (11), (12), (47) and (56)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

181. On 30 April 2019 and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) submitted a request signed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) in an “Acting” capacity to have (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) PFT record corrected. [encls (41), (55) and (57)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

182. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was the (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp Mujuk from 2019. [encl (57)]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

183. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated he was not closely tracking the (b)(3)(A)(ii) PFT issues; he knew Colonel Karega was aware of and actively working with (b)(3)(A)(ii) on the problem. [encl (57)]

184. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) said he spent most of his time on (b)(3)(A)(ii) duties and relied on the (b)(3)(A)(ii) and his (b)(3)(A)(ii) (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) to cover Operations. [encl (57)]

185. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) admitted he did not get along very well with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) and did not want to appear to be targeting or singling him out by digging too deeply into the PFT issue. [encl (57)]

186. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated he coordinated closely with Colonel Karega before signing the records corrections request “Acting.” [encl (57)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

187. Due to a series of errors and misunderstandings of how MCTIMS works, (b)(3)(A)(ii) had to submit a second request to correct (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) PFT record. This one was dated 27 June 2019 and was signed by Colonel Karega. [encls (41) and (55)]

188. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) PFT record was eventually corrected to read a PPFT on 8 March 2019 and a PPFT on 22 April 2019. [encls (41), (51), and (58)]

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

189. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A) has been the (b)(3)(A)(ii) at Camp Mujuk since  
[encl (59)]

190. In late March or early April 2018, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), hurt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) . [encl (59)]

191. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), attempted an inventory PFT but could not complete the pull-ups so he went  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) to Wood Army Medical Clinic and received a DD Form 689 Individual Sick Slip. [encls (59)  
and (60)]

192. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) light duty chit did not explicitly state he could take a PPFT. It read: “No  
(3)(A)(ii) push-ups/pull-ups, no weight bearing > 35 lbs, x 21 days, Physical Fitness Test on or after 1 Jul  
19.” [encl (60)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

193. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), felt he was capable of running a PPFT but despite repeated requests to the  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) was told he could not run a PPFT. (b)(3)(A) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), he had run a full PFT once he  
(ii) was off light duty. [encls (33) and (59)]

194. Marine Corps Order 6100.13A requires a Marine to take a PFT no less than 30 days and no  
more than 90 days after returning to full duty. [encl (52)]

195. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) light duty chit expired on 1 July 2019. [encls (59) and (60)]  
(3)(A)(ii)

196. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), ran a full PFT on 9 August 2019. [encls (59) and (60)]  
(b)(3)(A)(ii)

197. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), continued to have shoulder pain and on 19 August 2019 was issued a DA  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) Form 3349 Profile sheet and placed on 30 days light duty. His physician scheduled an MRI and  
has told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), that he should expect to go on limited duty. [encls (59) and (60)]  
(b)(3)(A)(ii)

198. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), stated he was aware that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had been allowed to take  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) a partial PFT when he (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . [encl (59)]

Independent Duty Corpsman

199. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) was on limited duty (LIMDU) and did not expect to  
return to full duty until April 2019. [encl (18)]

200. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) returned to full duty earlier than expected and  
received short-notice orders to report to Camp Mujuk. [encls (18) and (47)]

201. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) received orders to report to Camp Mujuk for duty as  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the IDC on approximately (b) (6), (b) (7) with a report date of no later than (NLT) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[encl (47)]

202. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) had medical certifications that had were going to  
expire shortly, the soonest of which expired in March 2019. He attempted to get recertified in  
January 2019 but all training classes were filled. [encls (18) and (47)]

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203. OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A is the governing directive for IDC Programs. It is common practice for IDC program managers to allow IDC's at remote locations to get a waiver or extension on training certifications. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) planned to utilize that provision at Camp Mujuk until he could attend the required training. [encls (18) and (47)]

204. The most recent version of OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A was released on 24 Jan 2019. It added a new training requirement for IDCs, Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS). Because this requirement was added in January 2019, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) ACLS certification was not current. [encl (47)]

205. OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A allows Navy IDC to practice under indirect supervision and be assigned the title of senior medical department representative (SMDR). [encl (47)]

206. According to OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A, the ability of a Navy IDC to provide primary health care under indirect supervision requires assignment of an IDC NEC code, certification by a clinical supervisor, participation in a command sponsored IDC program and the highest level of ethical standards in the provision of health care. [encl (47)]

207. The IDC supervision program must be directed and managed by a program director, who is a licensed, credentialed and privileged physician. [encl (47)]

208. IDCs participating in the program must be assigned a clinical supervisor, in writing, by the program director. [encl (47)]

209. IDCs assigned to commands that do not have an IDC supervision program will be assigned to a supervision program of the medical department: a local immediate superior in command (ISIC), nearest Navy medical treatment facility (MTF)(preferably, or a Department of Defense (DoD) MTF. [encl (47)]

210. Upon arrival at a new command, the IDC must be assigned a clinical supervisor and an assistant program manager by the unit's designated program director or program manager. [encl (47)]

211. MCIPAC does not have an IDC supervision program. [encls (47) and (49)]

212. The IDC Program at Camp Mujuk was supervised by US Naval Hospital Yokosuka (USNHY), through the Branch Health Clinic Chinhae (BHCC). This agreement was documented by a memorandum of understanding (MOU). [encls (47) and (49)]

213. Around 4-5 March 2019 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) predecessor, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) told him the MOU had expired in February 2018. [encl (47)]

214. Because the MOU was expired, USNHY and BHCC were unwilling to assign (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) a physician clinical supervisor without a new MOU. [encls (47) and (49)]

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

215. Because a new MOU was required, USNHY wanted  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) certifications to be valid through his entire time at Camp Mujuk. [encls (18) and (47)]

216. On 7 March 2019 at 1703 (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) contacte (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) the USNHY IDC Program Manager to explain the situation and determine  
d MOU in place. He was told they were still looking into, the same  
response (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had received for two months [encl (49)]

217. On 7 March 2019 at 1928 (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) notified Colonel Karega  
via e-mail that he could not provide any medical provider capabilities until the physician  
supervisor issue was resolved. Those capabilities included sick call; prescribing medication;  
periodic health assessments; explosive handler physicals; arms, ammunition and explosives  
(AA&E) screenings; and placing orders for x-rays, consults and readiness items such as labs.  
[encl (49)]

218. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) explained in his e-mail to Colonel Karega the  
conditions required for an IDC to provide primary health care under indirect supervision, as  
listed in OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A and outlined above. [encl (49)]

219. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated the command was pretty “pissed off” that the IDC program was not in  
compliance with OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A. [encl (57)]

220. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said the command felt the issue came out of nowhere and wondered why  
(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) didn’t bring it  
to the command’s attention until well after the fact. [encl (57)]

221. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) brought the issue up over a  
month after he arrived. [encl (57)]

222. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said the command was upset with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
because he showed up to Camp Mujuk with expired certifications and hadn’t gotten them  
updated enroute to Camp Mujuk or made the command aware of the issue prior to arriving at the  
command. [encl (57)]

223. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said the command “begrudgingly” supported (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) efforts to bring the IDC program back into compliance with OPNAVINST  
6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A. [encl (57)]

224. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) did not feel the command was supportive at all of his  
efforts to bring the IDC program back online. [encl (47)]

225. Colonel Karega was unwilling to pay for (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) travel to  
attend the training he needed to update his certifications in order to bring the IDC program back  
into compliance with OPNAVINST 6400.1D/ MCO 6400.1A. He said it shouldn’t be Camp  
Mujuk’s responsibility to keep (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) certified. [encls (47) and  
(57)]

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226. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated the command was upset about how (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) showed up and felt he was dictating the training; the command wanted to send him back to III MEF to get a replacement. [encl (57)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) at MCIPAC, was aware of and assisting with the issues with the IDC program at Camp Mujuk. [encls (47)]

228. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) eventually found a way to get travel funding through the Navy Medicine Professional Development Center (NMPDC) to support (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) required training. [encls (47) and (57)]

229. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was involved in an on-base liberty incident (which will be covered in detail later in this report) known as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Incident.” [encls (8), (38), (47), (57), and (61),]

230. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) did not think (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) involvement in the Incident was tied to the command’s concerns surrounding the IDC program. The IDC issue arose first and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) felt (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) involvement in that event probably just reaffirmed the command’s negative perception of him. [encl (57)] (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

231. As a result of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Incident, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was told by (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) he would receive a Page 13 entry, the Navy equivalent to a USMC 6105 counseling, for Article 92, violation of a written order. [encls (8), (47) and (62)]

232. At some point while (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was not in a compliant IDC program operating under a credentialed, privileged physician, Colonel Karega directed him to see patients. [encls (47) and (57)]

233. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) showed Colonel Karega the OPNAV instruction; Colonel Karega told him he didn’t care what the instruction said. [encl (47)]

234. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) requested Colonel Karega to sign a memorandum stating he was ordering (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to see patients without proper credentials but Colonel Karega refused to do so. [encl (47)]

235. After the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Incident, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) did not want to disobey another order from Colonel Karega or receive another Page 13 or NJP. [encl (47)]

236. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) contacted the Judge Advocate General (JAG) at USNHY who referred him to the JAG at US Naval Hospital Okinawa (USNHO). [encls (47) and (49)]

237. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), the USNHO JAG, told (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) that he could not be forced to see patients without a proper, certified IDC program in place and



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appropriate physician supervision. This advice was provided by telephone not by e-mail. [encls (18) and (49)]

238. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated the first three Months at Camp Mujuk were very challenging. He said he was called a liar several times and called “fucking worthless.” Things improved after he was able to see patients. [encl (47)]

239. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) efforts to get recertified and bring the IDC program into compliance lasted until he was authorized to prescribe medications on 21 Jun 2019. [encl (63)]

Inappropriate Punishment

240. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) has received NJP twice since he has been assigned to Camp Mujuk. [encls (14), (34) and (38)]

241. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) first offense was underage drinking and a curfew violation. He was a <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> at the time and received the maximum punishment from the CO at the time, LtCol Bly. [encl (14)]

242. The command at the time did not have a Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO) so (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had to refer himself to the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) at Camp Walker. [encl (14)]

243. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated the command was initially not supportive of his efforts to get alcohol treatment eventually let him enroll in outpatient counseling. [encl (14)]

244. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) completed most of the ASAP counseling sessions but couldn’t make the last session so his counselor graduated him early. The command currently has two SACOs but he does not interact with them regularly. [encl (14)]

245. When Colonel Karega arrived, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was in the process of routing a reenlistment request. [encl (14)]

246. According to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), his reenlistment request sat in the CO’s office for approximately a month and a half. [encl (14)]

247. As the deadline for (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) reenlistment approached, Colonel Karega called him into the office. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated Colonel Karega told him “There is no place in the Marine Corps for Marines like you,” and the only way that he would positively endorse his reenlistment request was if (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) agreed to not get in trouble and that if he did then the CO would take it personally to administratively separate <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> [encl (14)]

248. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was permitted to reenlist under a two-year for further observation (FFO) contract. [encl (14)]

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249. In (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) caught (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) improperly using a GOV. He had stopped at a local off-base bar/restaurant for some food prior to picking up an inbound Marine at the airport. [encl (14)]

250. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received his second NJP for this offense. He was reduced to his current rank. [encl (14)]

251. The command attempted to process (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) for administrative separation (ADSEP) under a pattern of misconduct basis. The command determined it could not use pattern of misconduct as a basis because (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) NJPs were in two different enlistments. [encl (14)]

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

252. The command changed the basis of separation to commission of a serious offense. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) attempted to force (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to sign his ADSEP paperwork. [encl (14)]

253. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) lawyer advised him not to sign the paperwork because there were errors that needed to be corrected. [encl (14)]

254. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) brought the changes to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) attention; according to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) yelled at him that he needed to sign it anyways because it was going to be submitted that day. [encl (14)]

255. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) submitted a rebuttal to the ADSEP but as of 28 August 2019 had not received an update the status of his ADSEP. [encl (14)]

256. Since his first incident, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) has been assigned to the Force Preservation Council (FPC) in some form. [encls (14), (34), and (38)]

257. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b)(3)(A)(ii) and briefs him monthly at the FPC. He does not see that changing while (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is at Camp Mujuk. [encl (14)]

258. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) has received a series of FPC assignment letters that outline various restrictions on his liberty. [encl (14)]

259. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was assigned FPC High Risk Status in a letter that stated: "You are not authorized liberty off installation without a liberty buddy (E-5 or higher). Also, you are not allowed to consume alcohol until further notice. A copy of the reference will be provided to you." [encls (14), (34), (38), and (64)]

260. The reference noted above is Camp Mujuk Order (CMO) 1500.1, the Camp Mujuk Force Preservation Council Order. [encls (64) and (65)]

261. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is typically presented letters like the one above in (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)'s office. They are not signed by the CO and are usually back dated. He has asked multiple times for a copy of the letter but has been told he can't have one. [encl (14) and (38)]

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

262. The signed copy of the letter dated 20 March 2019 was obtained by the IO through (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b)(3)(A)(ii). [encl (18)]

263. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was assigned FPC High Risk Status in a letter that stated: "You are authorized liberty off installation until 0100 with a liberty buddy (E-5 or higher). Also, you are not allowed to consume alcohol until further notice. A copy of the reference has been provided to you." [encl (64)]

264. On 17 June 2019, USFK temporarily suspended their standard 0100 curfew for all hands in the ROK. [encl (66)]

265. Both the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) letter and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) letter state "...you are hereby assigned to the Force Preservation Program as a High-Risk Marine for a minimum of 30 days. Your Chain of Command will re-evaluate your assignment at the end of 30 days to determine whether to decrease your risk level to Medium or to maintain your risk level as High." [encl (64)]

266. Both letters also included the following paragraph: "3. If you do not comply with the rules governing your assignment to the Force Preservation Program, you may be subject to formal counseling (page 11 entry/6105), having further conditions placed upon your liberty, disciplinary action, competency review board, or administrative separation." [encl (64)]

267. No letters were provided for April, May or July 2019. [encls (18) and (64)]

268. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was involved in a liberty incident sometime in late (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). There was an alleged altercation and damage to some property at a night club in Seoul. [encl (14)]

269. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) questioned (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). According to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said something to the effect that "It's going to come out anyways and if you're guilty and you know it, then you should just make a statement, you're going to have to make a statement at some point in time." [encl (14)]

270. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) he didn't want to make a statement based on the advice of a lawyer but (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) kept trying to get (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to make a statement. [encl (14)]

271. The command scheduled NJP for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). After consulting with an attorney, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) refused NJP. [encls (14) and (38)]

272. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was assigned FPC High Risk Status in a letter that stated: "You are authorized liberty off installation until 2200 with a liberty buddy (E-7 or higher). Also, you are not allowed to consume alcohol until further notice. A copy of the reference has been provided to you." [encl (64)]

273. In contrast to prior letters, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) letter assigns (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) as a High Risk Marine indefinitely. [encl (64)]

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274. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) letter is not signed by Colonel Karega. [encl (64)]

275. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was verbally assigned a new FPC status that stated his liberty was totally secured. In order to leave base, he needed a letter signed by the CO and had to be escorted by an E-7 or higher. [encls (14), (34), and (38)]

276. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received a Liberty Risk Order. The letter states "In light of your persistent pattern of off-base and alcohol-related misconduct and the risk it poses to the standing and presence of Marine Corps units and personnel in the ROK, I have determined that additional restraint on your liberty is 'essential for the protection of the foreign relation of the United States.' Accordingly, you are hereby restricted to the confines of Camp Mujuk and you are prohibited from consuming alcohol." [encl (67)]

277. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) declined to sign the Liberty Risk Order but he verbally acknowledged it which was witnessed by his (b)(3) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (A)(ii). [encls (14) and (67)]

278. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is currently pending court martial. [encl (14)]

279. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) on the night of his most recent incident. For her role she received NJP, was reduced to her current rank and assigned to 30 days Correctional Custody. [encl (14)]

280. While awaiting NJP, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was verbally told she had an early curfew by (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), her (b)(3) (A)(ii) was never consulted on that decision nor was he consulted on the decision to take her to NJP. [encl (32)]

281. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was denied permission to go to medical at Camp Walker because he did not have a letter from the CO authorizing him to leave base. After saying he was going to contact the IG, he was allowed to go on 18 September 2019. [encl (14)]

282. On (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), several Marines including (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) went out to eat at a local restaurant to say farewell to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encls (11), (15), (29), (37), (39) and (68)]

283. Camp Mujuk expected to go into Tropical Cyclone Condition of Readiness (TCCOR) 1C that evening so there was a 2100 curfew. When the Marines returned to base, they learned the weather had improved and the curfew had been lifted. [encls (11), (15), (29), (37) and (68)]

284. Since it was (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) last night, they decided to go out to a local bar/night club. [encls (11), (15), (29), (37) and (68)]

285. The group did not sign into the liberty log book and then back out again. [encls (11), (15), (29), (37), (39) and (68)]

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286. Camp Mujuk has an unwritten policy that Marines or Sailors must sign in the liberty log book anytime they return to Camp Mujuk from liberty, even if they intend to depart on liberty again shortly. This is not listed in CMO 1050.1B, Camp Mujuk Leave and Liberty Policy or CMO 1601.2E, Camp Mujuk Command Duty Officer and Command Duty Non-commissioned Officer Order. [encls (9) and (11)]

287. A few other Marines joined the group including (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were sober liberty buddies. [encls (11), (15), (29), (37), (45), (61) and (68)]

288. When USFK lifted the 0100 curfew, Camp Mujuk modified the Camp liberty policy stipulating:

1. A liberty buddy is mandatory for all military personnel for off-base liberty during the hours of 2200-0500.

2. If consuming alcohol off-installation, between 2200-0500, when conducting unofficial off-installation activities, or during periods of heightened vulnerabilities, a designated liberty buddy that will not consume alcohol before, during, or at any time during the liberty event is required. [encls (8), (9), (11), (41) and (66)]

289. The command made slight modifications to the published policy but only passed the changes verbally at weekly pre-liberty safety briefs. [encls (8), (9), (11), (13), (14), (37), (41), (32), (33), (34), (35), (38), (68), (69), and (70)]

290. Since he had an early flight the next day, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) departed the bar shortly after midnight with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encls (11), (15), (29), (37), (39), (45), (61), and (68)]

291. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated he notified the Marines he was with that he was departing. [encl (37)]

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

292. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and said they were unaware (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had left. [encls (11), (29) and (61)]

293. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) linked up with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) who was not drinking and volunteered to be the sober liberty buddy. As it got late the group decided to return to base, arriving at approximately 0425. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was intoxicated so the group helped get him back to base. [encls (29), (39), (45), and (68)]

294. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were the last to leave the bar. They arrived at Camp Mujuk at approximately 0450 without a sober liberty buddy. [encls (11), (39) and (61)]

295. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was the CDO on 20 Jul 2019. [encl (71)]  
(b)(3)(A)(ii) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

296. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) has been the Camp Mujuk ince  
He also holds collateral duties of (b)(3)(A)(ii) and (b)(3)(A)(ii) [encl (71)]



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297. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) noted two violations of the liberty policy in his CDO morning report to the CO the next day. First, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) group used a junior marine as a sober liberty buddy for NCOs and a SNCO. Second, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) returned to base without a sober liberty buddy. [encls (71) and (72)]

298. On the morning of 21 Jul 2019, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) held a meeting to discuss the incidents. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) attended (as (b)(3)(A)(ii) but (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) ran the meeting. [encl (71)]

299. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) ranted about doing the right thing and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) recommended that the Marines' liberty be secured for 30 days. [encl (71)]

300. At 0800 on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the group of Marines involved in the two liberty violations were woken up and told to meet (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) at the Mission Support Center (MSC). [encls (11), (15), (29) and (45) ]

301. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) went to the MSC as directed but when she arrived, she was told she did not need to be there. [encl (15)]

302. According to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) berated the group and got upset because their sober liberty buddy left them and they didn't check in off of liberty when they returned to base between the restaurant and the bar. [encl (29)]

303. On Monday, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the group was called to the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) office where (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) administered Article 31B rights. [encls (11), (45), and (68)]

304. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) expressed concerns with how (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) questioned them about the events. The Article 31B rights did not identify a specific UCMJ article they were suspected of violating. After administering Article 31B rights, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said "We can just throw this all away and go to NJP because already happened." [encl (11)]

305. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) recommended they make statement after he administered Article 31B rights. He said something to the effect of "We already know." When a Marine explained what happened, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) replied "well, you're a liar then, because I already saw the footage." He then added "I really recommend you guys make statements." [encl (45)]

306. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) inferred from (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) that they were "making a statement or getting charged with Article 92." (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) felt he had nothing to hide so he made a statement. [encl (45)]

307. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had a history of other liberty violations; he was taken to NJP as a result of this incident. He was placed on a high risk status on the FPC but did not have any liberty restrictions as a result. [encl (61)]

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

308. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) <sup>(b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup>, was not consulted on the decision to take (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to NJP. He found out about the NJP by a calendar invitation from the command deck. [encl (32)]

309. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) verbally told (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) he had a 2200 curfew while he was pending NJP. That was never put in writing and <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> was never consulted on that decision. [encl (32)]

310. During the 22 July 2019 meetings with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were verbally told by the <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> they were being placed on the Force Preservation Council as high risk for a period of 30 days. They were told they couldn't leave base for 30 days and couldn't consume alcohol for 30 days. [encls (11), (12), (15), (29), (45), and (68)]

311. In addition to the above liberty restrictions, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were assigned weekend duty every weekend for one month. [encls (11), (12), (15), (29) and (68)]

312. <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> stated (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) referred to the above restrictions as punishment. <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> further elaborated that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) told him approximately three times if he didn't like this punishment he could take it NJP. [encl (29)]

313. On Saturday, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) called (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) into his office and gave them letters assigning them to the FPC in a high risk status and listing the above restrictions. [encls (11), (15), (29) and (68)]

314. These letters were from the Commanding Officer but had not been signed by Colonel <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> Karega. [encls (11) and (29)]

315. The IO acquired copies of these letters from <sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup>. There had been stored in (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) office and were signed by Colonel Karega. They are back dated to 22 Jul 2019. [encls (18) and (73)]

316. Camp Mujuk Order 1500.1 Force Preservation Council Order, enclosure (1) paragraph 6.a identifies "High Risk" as "Unit FPC will classify individuals as "High Risk" when they pose immediate risk to self, others, or the unit. Examples include, personnel identified as suicidal, severely depressed, are known to have substance abuse issues, manifest violent tendencies, are pending court martial, or have committed serious violations of civil law or UCMJ. For individuals deemed "High Risk," the Commander will ensure that individuals receive all proper care, treatment, and assistance." [encl (65)]

317. Camp Mujuk Order 1500.1 enclosure (1), paragraph 6.a.1 reads "If the command concludes that a Marine/Sailor's risk needs to be increased to "High Risk" prior to the monthly unit FPC, an "Emergency FPC" shall be convened for those cases considered "High Risk" to ensure the commander has the benefit of the appropriate subject matter experts (SMEs) in the development of the at-risk Marine/Sailor's immediate mitigation plan. OIC's are encouraged to involve unit

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and installation resources in the development of the at-risk Marine/Sailor's mitigation plan to ensure comprehensive outreach and support. A commander's SMEs include unit Chaplain, medical officer, prevention staff, Family Readiness Officer, unit Military Family and Life Counselors, Substance Abuse Control Officer, Family Advocacy Program and/or Community Counseling Program representative." [encl (65)]

318. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were both unaware of the existence of an "Emergency FPC" and had never seen it used. [encls (9) and (57)]

(b)(3)(A)(ii)

319. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), the Camp Mujuk (b)(3)(A)(ii) stated he had not seen liberty restrictions placed on Marines at an FPC meeting unless there was a substance abuse issue and then Marines were usually required to go on liberty with a more senior liberty buddy. [encl (74)]

320. Paragraph two of (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) letters reads: "You will meet (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), each workday at 1600 and communicate all liberty plans during the work week. Each Friday prior to liberty being sounded you will communicate all liberty plans with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). While on weekend liberty, you will contact (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) at 1700 and 1900 for check in. You are not authorized liberty off installation for a minimum of 30 days which will be re-evaluated to determine whether to decrease your liberty restrictions. Liberty will be limited to commissary visits. Also, you are not allowed to consume alcohol for a minimum of 30 days. A copy of the reference has been provided to you." [encl (73)]

321. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) letter is identical except it identifies (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) as the person he needs to contact as required. [encl (73)]

322. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) reporting senior. He was not notified of or consulted on (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) assignment to the FPC. [encl (9) and (18)]

323. When presented his FPC letter to sign, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) for a copy of the reference as stated in paragraph two of the letter. According to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) became defensive and asked him why he needed it.

told him that the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was always telling them to read their orders for themselves. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

told him to just sign the letter and he would get him a copy later. As of 28 August 2019, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had not received a copy. [encl (29)]

324. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) why the weekend duty wasn't listed on the FPC assignment letter. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) fumbled on his words and could not give (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) a clear answer. [encl (29)]

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

325. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) for a copy of the letter.

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) told him he couldn't have a copy because the CO had not signed it yet. He told (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) he would have a copy by the end of the day. As of 28 August 2019, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had not received a copy. [encl (29)]

326. After the meeting in his office, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) pulled (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) aside and told her she was only restricted on base for 15 days, not 30. [encl (11) and (17)]

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

327. Since the letter clearly stated 30 days, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) took (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) with her into (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) office and asked about the length of her restriction. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said it didn't matter what the letter said, what he told her is what mattered. He reiterated she was only restricted to on-base liberty for 15 days. [encl (11) and (15)]

328. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said her reduced punishment could have been because she was the junior Marine involved but that it could also be because (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) favored her. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) told her he thought it was because (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) favored her. [encl (15)]

329. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) he was going to receive a 6105 for his violation of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He presented (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) with a 6105 that was not signed by the CO. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) wrote a rebuttal to the 6105. As of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the 6105 has not been entered into (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) Official Military Personnel File and he has not been given a copy signed by the CO. [encl (11)]

330. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stood CDO on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[encl (12)]

331. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stood CDO on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) He also stood DNCO on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [encl (12)]

332. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stood DNCO on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[encl (12)]

333. Camp Mujuk Order 1500.1 paragraph 2 states: "Mission. Effective immediately, Camp Mujuk conducts a monthly Force Preservation Council (FPC) in order to raise force awareness concerns and identify "at risk" Marines and Sailors in order to provide proactive protection to our most critical resource – Marines and Sailors." [encl (65)]

334. Camp Mujuk Order 1500.1, paragraph 4.c. states "The FPC is not a disciplinary body nor is the FPC process a punitive proceeding." This is reiterated in CMO 1500.1 enclosure (1) paragraph 3. [encl (65)]

335. Reference (e), the Marine Corps Force Preservation Council Order, paragraph 4.b states: "Information generated from the FPC is for the commanding officer's use and for the purpose of force preservation and risk mitigation. It shall be kept in confidence and shall not be used for disciplinary action." [encl (18)]

336. Reference (b), US Navy Regulations, paragraph 1101.4 states: "Guard duty shall not be inflicted as punishment." [encl (18)]

337. The Camp Mujuk CDO is armed with an M9 pistol and conducts security and police call checks as part of his duty. [encl (75)]

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338. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were the two Camp Mujuk<sup>(b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup> at the time of their liberty violations on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Both were intoxicated during this incident. [encls (18), (45), (61) and (68)]

339. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was involved in two other liberty violations involving alcohol: a curfew violation on<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and the Bunker Incident on<sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</sup>. He has never been referred for alcohol treatment and has retained his collateral duty as<sup>(b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup>. [encl (61)]

340. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was not referred for alcohol screening; he is currently the<sup>(b)(3)(A)(ii)</sup> at Camp Mujuk. [encl (68)]

341. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) FPC assignment letter is based on his "recent liberty incident" and him "irresponsibly consuming alcohol." The letter offers no risk mitigation tools for alcohol misuse or abuse. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was not referred to the SACO or ASAP. [encl (11), (18) and (73)]

342. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received NJP and were reduced to their current ranks on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). They also received extra punitive duties (EPD) as part of their punishment. [encls (30), (31) and (76)]

343. Camp Mujuk recently renovated a maintenance facility and repurposed it to be used as the Camp headquarters (HQ). [encls (34), (57), (31), (76) and (77)]<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

344. On the first day of their EPD, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) assigned<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to pack up and move the CO's office from the old HQ building to the new one. [encls (31) and (76)]

345. Items packed up and moved included medals, coins, awards, pictures, a mini-fridge, snacks and drinks, furniture and paperwork. [encls (31) and (76)]

346. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> were initially assigned to be part of a larger working party but were then pulled out and directed to pack up and move the CO's office. [encl (76)]<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup>

347. The working party was released at 1700 but (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) called<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> and<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> back to continue moving the CO's office. They finished at approximately 2000 that night. [encl (76)]

348. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> were also directed to move (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) office to the new HQ, but most of (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) belongings were already packed. [encl (31) and (76)]

349. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said after completing the CO's office move, he and<sup>(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)</sup> reported to the CO. The CO said he didn't like the chair in his office so they had to switch it out two more times to find one he liked. [encl (31)]



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Command Climate

350. The command climate shifted dramatically when Colonel Karega took command in 2018. [encl (8), (38), (25), (28), and (57)]

351. Marines perceived that the prior command was much more relaxed and did not enforce standards as well as they probably should have. [encl (8), (38), (25) and (57)]

352. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said there was a culture of liberty violations and several Marines with unsatisfactory haircuts or uniforms under the prior command. [encl (8)]

353. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) stated GOVs were being used improperly across the command which he brought to the former CO's attention. [encl (57)]

354. Colonel Karega and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) made a concerted effort to reestablish discipline at Camp Mujuk and make sure Marine Corps standards were upheld. [encl (8), (38), (25) and (57)]

355. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) expressed concern that Colonel Karega and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) have no regard for troop welfare and have created a "toxic command climate." [encl (12)]

356. The Bunker Incident occurred in March 2019. As a result, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), the former (b)(3)(A)(ii) received NJP. [encls (8), (38), (47), (56), and (57)]

357. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received 6105 counselings and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received a Page 13 for the Bunker Incident. [encls (8), (38), (47) and (61)]

358. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) went to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) office to discuss his Page 13 with the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encls (8) and (47)]

359. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) expressed his opinion that he didn't deserve a Page 13. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) disagreed. The discussion devolved into a shouting match, with (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) getting out of his chair and yelling at (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encl (8) and (47)]

360. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) claims (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) came at him so quickly that he shoulder checked him, but admits he does not know if it was intentional. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) denies that there was any physical contact. [encls (8) and (47)]

361. The altercation was so loud, Colonel Karega pulled (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) into his office and asked what was going on. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) explained what happened. The CO said, "I expect everyone here to treat each other with respect and to act professionally at all time and that was not a proper way to handle things. It will be addressed and we can talk about it more later." (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) never heard about the issue from the CO again. [encl (47)]

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362. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said the above altercation was well-known throughout the command. [encl (77)]

363. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) said Colonel Karega counseled him and told him his actions were inappropriate. [encl (8)]

364. Multiple personnel report (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), while questioning them about an incident, has told them “if you don’t like this then we can just take it NJP.” [encls (11), (29), (34), (45) and (61)]

365. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) from PMO to give a class to Marines on why they should give a statement after they’ve been read their Article 31B rights. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) explained that he couldn’t do that because they absolutely had the right to remain silent. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was surprised that he would get that kind of a request from a (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encl (35)]

366. Multiple Marines and Sailors reported being berated by (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). [encl (11), (14), (38), (47), (48), (56), (46), (61), (68), (69), and (77)]

367. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) submitted an IG complaint regarding (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) PFT. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) statement, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) found out about his complaint, called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) into his office and berated him for submitting the IG complaint. [encl (47) and (56)]

368. Multiple personnel reported confusion about the Camp Mujuk Liberty Policy after USFK eliminated the 0100 curfew. Whenever (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was asked about it, he became defensive or angry and blamed the SNCOs for not properly briefing their people. [encls (8), (9), (11), (32), (34), (35), (41), (48), (61), (68), (71), and (77)]

369. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) has called mixed meetings of officers and SNCOs. This didn’t sit well with a lot of personnel, as more than one remarked, “(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) work for captains, not the other way around.” [encls (34) and (70)]

370. Multiple personnel expressed concern that the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had too much power and didn’t understand why the CO didn’t rein him in. [encls (9), (33), (34), (38), and (77)]

371. At one officer/SNCO meeting regarding the liberty policy, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) couldn’t clearly answer questions about the policy but instead relied on (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to explain it for him. When pressed to put the ever-changing details of the policy in writing he replied, “Oh, don’t worry, it will be in writing, we’ll do that if that’s what we need. If y’all need that just to follow the rules then we’ll do that,” and ended the meeting by walking out. [encls (9), (29), (32), (33), (34), (70) and (71)]

372. Multiple personnel expressed fear for their careers. Minor incidents are handled in an extreme manner. Several described it as walking on egg shells. [encls (9), (11), (13), (14), (33), (38), (45), (48), and (78)]

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373. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) received a 6105 from (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (that was not signed by the CO) for a minor, unintentional violation of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[encl (8), (13), (35), (44) and (69)]

374. Multiple personnel mentioned the CO's work ethic is extreme. He is often at the office until very late in the evening. [encls (8), (9), (11), (32), (34), (57) and (77)]

375. Multiple personnel complained the CO or (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) will call them to the office late in the evening to handle routine matters that could have been handled earlier or during the next work day. Examples include an S-6 Marine being called in at 2200 on a Friday to fix the CO's printer; S-1 Marines being called in to handle routine correspondence or DTS; and the Protocol Officer or Action Officers working until 0100 or 0200 to polish the Camp Mujuk Command Brief for a Distinguished Visitor brief the next day. [encls (8), (9), (11), (15), (29), (32), (34), (25), (38), (44), (57), (61), (71), and (77)]

376. Multiple personnel complained the command does not trust any of its personnel. Everything is signed by the CO, he does not grant "By Direction" authority except in rare cases. This slows everything down as the CO's desk becomes a choke point. [encls (8), (9), (11), (32), (33), (34), (38), (44), (46), (57) and (77)]

377. Due to lack of trust, officers and SNCOs are afraid of making decisions or do not feel empowered to do so. There is often a line of people waiting for a long time after hours on a Friday night to see the CO to get his guidance or approval on something. [encls (9), (11), (32), (34), (46), (69), (70) and (71)]

378. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) described the officers at Camp Mujuk as "just Marines with shiny things on their collars because they can't make any decisions." [encl (33)]

379. Officers are not consulted on punitive action considered on their Marines.

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) the (b)(3)(A)(ii), found out about (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) NJP a few minutes before it occurred. found out about it when he tried to use the conference room in the middle of the hearing. [encls (9), (32), and (71)]

380. Colonel Karega and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) publicly belittle officers SNCOs in the (b)(3)(A)(ii) command, often in front of junior Marines. Colonel Karega frequently refers to the former (b)(3)(A)(ii) sarcastically as "The Greatest Captain Ever." [encls (34), (46) and (71)]

381. Colonel Karega belittled (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) behind his back (or so he thought (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) actually overheard it) but in front of the SNCO and junior Marine on duty when the CO thought (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had made a mistake on the chain of command pictures. [encls (35) and (71)]

382. When presented a problem or issue, the common perception is that Colonel Karega does not look to solve the problem but rather first looks to assign blame. The HQ move didn't go as well as he would have liked and many perceive he is still looking for someone to blame for it. [encls (32) and (34)]

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383. Camp Mujuk has a very small staff with almost every officer and SNCO holding at least one collateral duty, most have more. Colonel Karega does not seem to recognize this, nor does he allow officers and SNCOs to prioritize their own work load or even provide priorities for them. Everything is a priority and perfection is expected in everything. [encls (9), (32), (34), (44), (71) and (77 )]

384. Several Marines stated “you just have to survive,” Camp Mujuk, or words to that effect. [encls (29), (34) and (46)]

385. Multiple Marines and Sailors, including many with 10 – 15 years of service, stated Camp Mujuk had the worst command climate they had ever seen. [encls (11), (33), (34), (37), (45), (47), (61), (68), (77) and (78)]

386. Due to the above concerns, the MCIPAC (b)(3)(A)(ii) and MCIPAC (b)(3)(A)(ii) (46) conducted focus groups to identify the root cause of the perceived toxic climate at Camp Mujuk. [encl (46)]

387. The EOA concluded “the common theme with every population (E-7/E-6, E-5/E-4, E-3 and below) is abuse of power by the CO and (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) more so by the (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C). The mere fact that the CO is aware of the (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) behavior and has not taken any action to correct it needs to be taken into consideration.” [encl (46)]

## Opinions

### Inappropriate Communication/Attempted Inappropriate Relationship

1. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) account of the inappropriate communication is detailed and consistent. It is corroborated by people she independently told directly such as (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C), (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C), (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C). It is backed up by two text messages and one phone call. She has no apparent motive to lie, her one liberty incident occurred after she told multiple people about the allegations. [FF (32), (37), (39), (44), (45), (46), (47), (48), (50), (52), (53), (55), (57), (58), (59), (60), (61), (63), (64), (65), (66), (67), (72), (73), (74), (75), (91), (93), (96), (98), (101), (104), (106), (116), (121), (122), (123), (127), (128), (129), (133) and (143)]

(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)

2. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) provided justification for one instance in which he texted (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) after hours – he needed her help on an NJP package. This explanation does not hold up to well to scrutiny. The text in question, “Are you going to come?” was received by (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) on 24 May 2019. The closest NJP occurred on 13 May 2019 with the Unit Diary entry being completed that day. Further, phone records show (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) calling the SNCO leadership of the two Marines who received NJP on 13 May 2019 at approximately 0910 on 12 May 2019. This is followed by a call to the DNCO. Three minutes later, (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) called (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) and 16 minutes after that (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) called the (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C). She was on the phone with him for three minutes (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) reported having to go into work after hours at some point to work on an NJP package, but stated she thought her former NCOIC, (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) called her in. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

departed Camp Mujuk in late so this would have been an easy mistake to make. There is no evidence to support the assertion that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) “Are you going to come?” while waiting for her to help him with an NJP package. [FF (32), (77), (78), (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91)]

3. Throughout the narrative and interview summaries there are minor inconsistencies. None are glaring and are likely the product of memory fading over time or individuals passing on second hand information; the only two individuals with direct knowledge are (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), though others did see phone calls or text messages. In contrast, one detail remained incredibly consistent throughout the discussion: (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) invited (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to have “Summer Coladas.” Based on this and Opinions 1 and 2, the IO believes (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) did invite (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to join him for drinks. These invitations persisted for the better part of a month and included phone calls and text messages regarding the same. [FF (25), (35), (37), (38), (41), (42), (43), (48), (57), (58), (59), (65), (66), (72) and (116)]

(b) (5), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

5. The allegations that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) had sent text messages to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and invited her for drinks were widely known throughout the command. The (b)(3)(A)(ii) conducted the equivalent of a PI though it wasn’t specifically identified as such. That de facto PI yielded ample, credible evidence that warranted further investigation. If the CO felt the allegations against the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) were not true, an alternate theory could be that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) was making a false official statement against the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), itself a serious offense. Given the widespread knowledge and serious nature of the allegations, it is inexplicable why the Commanding Officer did not initiate a Command Investigation (CI) or request assistance from MCIPAC if he thought he did not have an appropriate IO on his staff. [FF (10), (13), (14), (25), (58), (61), (72), (100), (101), (103), (104), (105), (113), (114), (116), (130), (132), (133), (134), (135), (136), (137), (139), (143), (144), (148), (149), (150), (151) and (152)]

6. Colonel Karega initiated multiple PI’s for much more minor incidents and allegations. By failing to initiate a CI, Colonel Karega created a perception that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) alleged misconduct was being “swept under the rug.” This reinforced speculation regarding (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) PFT scores and significantly degraded an already fragile command climate. [FF (139), (140), (141), (142), (146), (147), (148), (149), (150), (151), and (152)]

7. A NPLOC for the allegations against (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) is wholly disproportionate to a 6105 counseling for (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) minor ration policy violation. [FF (141), (142) and (371)]



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Physical Fitness Test

8. (b)(3)(A)(ii) ran a PPFT score for (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) without any medical documentation when he failed to complete the run portion of the test on 8 Mar 2019. While (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) said Colonel Karega was tracking (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) PFT issues, it is unclear whether the CO proactively approved (b)(3)(A)(ii) to enter that score into MCTIMS as required by MCO 6100.13A. If he did not, (b)(3)(A)(ii) should have removed that score when they corrected the other errors in (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) PFT record. If he did, (b)(3)(A)(ii) should memorialize that decision in the form of a memorandum for the record. [FF (9), (157), (158), (163), (164), (165), (166), (168), (169), (170), (175), (176), (180), (183), (185) and (186)]

9. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) never received medical treatment for the injuries he incurred on 8 March 2019. Marine Corps Order 6100.13A prohibits a Marine from running two consecutive PPFTs or PCFTs for the same injury. With no medical record of the injuries incurred on 8 March it would be impossible to determine next year if (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) is attempting to take a PPFT for the same injury. [FF (166), (168), (169), (170), (175) and (177)]

10. Just like (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) light duty chit, the light duty chit (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) got on 21 April did not explicitly state he could take PPFT in accordance with MCO 1600.13A. Allowing (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) to take a PPFT, even though it was by way of an injury during an attempt to complete a full PFT, while not allowing (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) to take a PPFT, set the appearance of a double standard. In this case, neither Marine should have been allowed to take a PPFT. Further, allowing (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) to attempt a full PFT while on light duty and giving him credit for a PPFT obviated the requirement for him to complete a full PFT no earlier than 30 days after and no later than 90 days after return to full duty. This could mask a condition which should rightfully put the (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) in a limited duty vice light duty status. [FF (154), (155), (156), (164), (168), (175), (176), (177), (178), (179), (190), (191), (192), (193), (194), (195), (196), (197) and (198)]

11. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the provisions of MCO 1600.13A. He stated that medical documentation does not need to be in place when a PPFT is run. He said the appropriate medical paperwork needed to be in place by the end of the semi-annual period. Taking his statement to the extreme, a Marine could run a PPFT on 1 January and show up with a light duty chit on 30 June. [FF (164), (166), (167), (168), (169), (170) and (194)]

12. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) PFT entries for 15 March 2019 and 12 April 2019 when personnel knew he did not take the PFT created the appearance of fraud. These scores were not fraudulent; they were improperly entered by (b)(3)(A)(ii) who later corrected their errors. [FF (9), (157), (158), (159), (160), (163), (164), (165), (166), (171), (172), (173), (174), (177), (179), (180), (181), (183), (185), (186), (187) and (188)]

13. (b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C) did not deliberately attempt to circumvent MCO 1600.13A. He made two good faith efforts to complete the PFT. A combination of lack of knowledge on his part, improper score entries, and poor SOPs and controls in (b)(3)(A)(ii) created this situation. [FF (153), (157), (158), (159), (163), (164), (165), (166), (168), (169), (170), (171), (172), (175), (177), (179), (181), (187) and (188)]

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Independent Duty Corpsman

14. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) knew he had some upcoming training requirements but had every reason to expect he would be able to practice medicine under a functioning IDC program until he was able to attend training. It would have been beyond his ability to predict that he would step into an IDC program with an expired MOU and no credentialed, privileged physician providing oversight. [FF (199), (200), (201), (202), (203), (205), (206), (207), (208), (210), (211), (212), (213), (214) and (215)]

15. When (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) determined the IDC program was not functioning, he made a good faith effort to rectify the situation at his level. When he determined he could not, he immediately brought it to the command's attention. The command reacted by attempting to assign blame for the problem, with the most obvious candidate being (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) [FF (212), (213), (214), (215), (216), (217), (218), (219), (220), (221), (222), (223), (224), (225), (226), (227), (228), (230), (232), (233), (234) and (238)]

16. The fact that (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) sought legal assistance indicates he legitimately felt he had been ordered to do something in contradiction of his governing directives and was concerned about the repercussions with his command. [FF (205), (206), (207), (208), (209), (210), (211), (212), (231), (232), (233), (234), (235), (236) and (237)]

17. Given the frustration the command felt with the IDC situation, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) request for legal assistance and the former (b)(3)(A)(ii) statement that he "believes Colonel Karega directed (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to see patients", it is very likely that Colonel Karega directed (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) to treat patients in violation of OPNAVINST 6400.1D/MCO 6400.1A. [FF (205), (206), (207), (208), (209), (210), (211), (212), (213), (214), (215), (216), (217), (218), (219), (220), (221), (222), (223), (224), (225), (226), (227), (228), (230), (231), (232), (233), (234), (235), (236) and (237)]

Inappropriate Punishment

18. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) improperly questioned (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and attempted to coerce him into signing ADSEP documents. [FF (252), (253), (254), (269) and (270)]

19. The purpose of the FPC is to identify Marines at risk of mishap or injury and develop appropriate risk mitigation strategies. The letters assigned to the Marines at Camp Mujuk are a gross perversion of the FPC program. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) assignment letters list irresponsible drinking as a reason for raising their risk level to high yet neither letter identifies any possible mitigation tools for alcohol abuse or misuse. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) only risk factor is a recent liberty incident, yet he is assigned a high risk category. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) assignment is the most egregious abuse of the FPC – her only violation was that she failed to follow a verbal policy to sign in from liberty and then back out again when she returned to Camp Mujuk between dinner and going out to a bar. She was placed on a high risk status, reserved for "individuals who pose immediate risk to self, others or the unit." In a completely illogical twist, (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), himself "high risk," is assigned to monitor and mentor (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C). There is nothing

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in the Camp Mujuk Force Preservation Order or MCO 1500.60 that identifies the restriction of liberty as a reasonable or legal risk mitigation strategy. Both orders clearly state that the FPC shall not be used for disciplinary purposes. [FF (9), (258), (259), (260), (261), (262), (263), (264), (265), (266), (267), (268), (271), (272), (273), (274), (275), (276), (280), (297), (307), (309), (310), (312), (313), (314), (315), (316), (317), (319), (320), (322), (323), (326), (333), (334), (335), (338), (339), (340), and (341)]

20. The Camp Mujuk FPC Order provides a method for convening an “Emergency FPC” in the event a Marine is deemed to fall into a high risk category between formal FPCs. That process was never used. Finally, several areas of CMO 1500.1 highlight the need for engaged leadership at the section level and cite the importance of section OICs and SNCOIC participation in the FPC process. There is no indication that section OICs or SNCOICs were ever consulted prior to the assignment of Marines to a high risk status outside of normal, monthly FPCs. [FF (260), (280), (307), (308), (309), (310), (316), (317), (318), (319), (320), (321), and (322)]

21. The FPC letters restricting Marines’ liberty at Camp Mujuk are almost certainly extrajudicial punishment or illegal pretrial restraint. [FF (9), (258), (259), (260), (261), (263), (265), (266), (268), (271), (272), (273), (275), (276), (278), (279), (280), (297), (298), (299), (300), (302), (309), (310), (311), (312), (315), (316), (317), (318), (319), (320), (323), (324), (328), (334), (335) and (341)]

22. The fact pattern shows (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) almost always assigned a Marine to an “FPC Status” verbally or via unsigned assignment letter. It is unclear if the Commanding Officer approved those assignments before the (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) provided them to the individual Marine or whether he approved the assignments after the fact. One thing is clear: the Commanding Officer signed several FPC assignment letters, indicating his knowledge of the use of the FPC to improperly restrict Marines’ liberty. [FF (258), (259), (261), (262), (263), (265), (266), (272), (274), (280), (309), (310), (312), (313), (314), (315), (316), (323), (325)]

23. Every Marine who discussed the weekend duties assigned to (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) identified it as punishment. There is no connection between the Marines’ deficiency – a liberty violation – and standing duty. The duty assignment was notably absent from the FPC assignment letters, indicating a reluctance to put it in writing. The Marines standing duty identified it as punishment. It was punishment. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and Colonel Karega violated United States Navy Regulations paragraph 1102.4 “Guard duty shall not be used as punishment.” [FF (9), (297), (298), (299), (300), (302), (303), (304), (305), (306), (307), (310), (311), (312), (323), (324), (325), (328), (329), (330), (331), (332), (336) and (337)]

24. The Manual for Court Martial affords wide latitude on appropriate extra punitive duties (EPD). The pack-up of an office and movement of furniture pursuant to a unit relocation would certainly be appropriate EPD under almost any circumstance. In most healthy units, having recently punished Marines singled out to pack up the CO and (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) offices might have raised some eyebrows but would likely not have been a major red flag. In the hostile command climate at Camp Mujuk, Marines questioned its propriety. It reinforced the belief that the command singled out those Marines and Sailors it saw as trouble makers. It also created the

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

appearance of personal servitude in support of the CO and on the part of Marines  
assigned EPD. [FF (343), (344), (345), (346), (347), (348), (349)]

Command Climate

25. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) created an environment of fear and intimidation. [FF (9), (254), (259), (269), (270), (300), (302), (303), (304), (305), (306), (312), (329), (353), (355), (359), (360), (361), (362), (364), (366), (367), (368), (370), (372), (373), (375), (380), (384), (385) and (397)]

26. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) either does not understand or does not care about Article 31B rights and the appropriate method to question a service member suspected of misconduct. [FF (254), (269), (270), (303), (304), (305), (306), (312), (364) and (365)]

27. Colonel Karega demonstrated a marked lack of trust in the officers and SNCOs at Camp Mujuk. [FF (280), (298), (308), (309), (322), (376), (377), (378) and (379)]

28. Colonel Karega, in failing to rein in (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) and through his own actions, created a toxic command climate at Camp Mujuk. [FF (9), (142), (152), (225), (234), (238), (281), (311), (312), (313), (314), (316), (327), (329), (330), (331), (332), (339), (340), (341), (355), (361), (364), (366), (367), (369), (370), (372), (373), (375), (376), (380), (381), (382), (383), (384), (385) and (387)]

Recommendations

1. (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C), (b) (5)

2. (b) (5)

3. (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (5)

4. (b) (5), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

5. (b) (5), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

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(b) (5)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS PACIFIC-MCB CAMP BUTLER  
UNIT 35001  
FPO AP 96373-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO  
5830  
CG  
26 Aug 19

From: Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations Pacific-MCB Camp Butler

To: (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) USMC

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MUJUK, KOREA

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F, Chapter 2

1. This appoints you, per the reference, to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of abuses of authority aboard Camp Mujuk, Korea.

2. Inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of abuses of authority aboard Camp Mujuk, Korea. Conduct your investigation and perform your duties pursuant to reference (a). Obtain witness statements only after conferring with the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, and ensure any statements obtained comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Confer with the Pacific Area Counsel Office before obtaining statements from civilian employees.

3. You shall report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form before 27 September 2019, unless you receive an extension of time. If you have not previously done so, read the reference before beginning your investigation.

4. You may seek legal advice from (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) U.S. Marine Corps, at DSN: (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

5. While assigned as the Investigation Officer, the conduct of this Command Investigation will be your primary duty and will take precedence over all other duties until this investigation is completed. I may authorize an extension to complete your investigative report. However, any extension request and my reply will be made in writing and become part of the completed investigative report

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

Copy to:  
IG

ENCLOSURE( 1 )







THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS



# Marine Corps Installation Camp Mujuk

## Marine Corps Installations Pacific

### Republic of Korea

#### MCI CAMP MUJUK EVENTS



The bond between the ROK and U-S Marines has spanned decades. One Korean city has decided to celebrate this bond every year. MC2 Charlotte Oliver takes us to Pohang South Korea for the 2nd annual Marine Corps festival.

#### MCI CAMP MUJUK INFO

Camp Mujuk is the only United States Marine Corps Installation in South Korea. It is located about an hour east of Daegu, just outside Pohang, and near the eastern shoreline. The installation is currently home to the Camp Mujuk Headquarters from MCIPAC.

[Skip to main content \(Press Enter\).](#)

**MCI CAMP MUJUK - LEADERS**



**Colonel Sekou S. Karega**  
Commanding Officer, Camp Mujuk  
[VIEW BIO](#)




**First Sergeant Eric J. Thompson**  
First Sergeant, Camp Mujuk  
[VIEW BIO](#)



Skip to main content (Press Enter).



# Camp Mujuk



같이 갑시다

We go together



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



# WELCOME ABOARD

COLONEL SEKOU S. KAREGA  
COMMANDING OFFICER



(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii)




(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)  
(b)(3)(A)(ii)





UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

# Organization







# Current Organization

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



(b)(3)(A)(ii)



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



# Mission

**Operate, maintain, and sustain the installation and outlying Cooperative Security Locations in support of Marine Corps Forces Pacific and follow-on joint and combined forces, in order to enable force projection and contingency response in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). Enhance combat readiness across the range of military operations for transient and tenant organizations, by providing facilities, facilities maintenance, materiel and services, community engagement, and coordination of combined training with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps and other military units.**





# Camp Mujuk Entrance



52S EE 38450 79683

**Fuel Farm/Wash Rack**

**PMO**  
24 hrs




**P.X. / Barber Shop / LG  
Store / Souvenir store**

**Snack Stand**

**Curfews**









# Ration Control



- Personnel aboard Camp Mujuk are to follow the guidelines that USFK has set in regards to rations. A more in-depth review into the policy can be found in USFK Regulations 60-1, 643-2, and 700-19.
- This is to ensure availability of goods and to combat potential black marketing.
- Any violations of these ration limits or of the policy will be documented and emailed to the Senior Enlisted Advisor.

## Commissary Limits

Monthly allowances based on family size:

**Individual: \$800.00**

**Plus \$300.00 for each additional family member**

## Alcohol Limits

**Wine is not counted against the liquor limits as long as its under 20% alcohol by volume.**

**Beer:**

**1 case = 24pk of 12oz bottle or can**

**½ case = 12pk of 12oz bottle or can**

**¼ case = 6pk of 12oz bottle or can**

**3.5 case = ½ barrel or ½ keg**

**Individual: Not to exceed 6 cases**

**Plus 2 cases for each family member age 21 or older**

**Hard liquor:**

**1 Unit = 0.75-1.0 Liter Bottle**

**2 Units = 1.75 Liter Bottle**

**4 Units = 1 Gallon**

**1 Unit = 12 miniatures**

**Individual not to exceed 3 units**

**Plus 2 units for each family member age 21 or older**



# MEDICAL



- For permanent personnel the Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC) is your primary medical care manager.
  - All injuries and illness will be treated/assessed by the IDC.
  - All medical Appointments will be made/approved by the IDC.
  - All dental appointments will be notified via email to the IDC.
  - If you receive any medical, dental treatment, immms or any type of tests from any one other then the Camp Mujuk IDC. You must notify the Camp Mujuk IDC.
  - All Medical and dental records will be kept at Camp Mujuk Medical. Records will only be released to the service member 24 hours before an APPT or PSC and will be returned to Medical with in 24 hour upon return to Camp Mujuk.

## DURING A TRUE MEDICAL EMERGENCY

- 1<sup>st</sup> call PMO at 767 4080. you need to tell PMO:
  - location of the victim.
  - Mechanism Of Injury (MOI) and types of injures.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> notify the IDC ASAP

A true medical emergency is any injures or illness that could cause loss of life, limb and or eye sight with a short amount of time.



# Medical



- Points Of Contacts:

- (b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C) (b)(3)(A)(ii)
  - DSN(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
  - Cell



Colonel Sekou S. Karega

### **Commanding Officer, Camp Mujuk**

Colonel Karega assumed command of Camp Mujuk on 10 August 2018.

Colonel Karega is from Benton Harbor, Michigan. He attended the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana and received a Bachelor of Science in Biology. He later completed a Juris Doctor from Western Michigan University - Thomas M. Cooley Law School. Additionally, he earned a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College.



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Colonel Karega was assigned to 1st Landing Support Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) from December 1995 to April 1997. There, he served as platoon commander, Beach and Terminal Operations Company, Detachment Commander, Landing Support Detachment, and Assistant S-2/S-3 Officer. In April 1997, he transferred to 1st FSSG (Fwd) where he was assigned as the Operations Officer and Training Officer. Colonel Karega was selected as Commanding Officer, Combat Service Support Detachment-14 (CSSD-14), El Toro, California from May 1998 to June 1999. There, his responsibilities included the complete migration and deactivation of the unit. After his command assignment at CSSD-14, Colonel Karega transferred to Marine Wing Support Group-47, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan where he served as the Support Operations Officer and Intelligence Officer from July 1999 to May 2001.

From July 2001 to June 2004, Colonel Karega was assigned to the Naval Post Graduate School where he studied National Security Affairs and Modern Standard Arabic at the Defense Language Institute. Prior to the completion of his training, Colonel Karega was assigned to the G-2, 1st Marine Division, as the Foreign Area Officer in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II from July 2004 to June 2005. He served as the Commanding General's envoy to the Al Anbar provincial government, tribal, and religious leadership. He transferred to the 1st Marine Logistics Group (1st MLG) in September 2005 and was assigned as the Executive Officer, Combat Logistics Battalion-7 (CLB-7), 1st MLG (Fwd) in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 5-07 from October 2005 to September 2006. Upon redeployment, he was assigned as the Executive Officer, Combat Logistics Regiment-1 from September 2006 to August 2007.

In August 2007, Colonel Karega transferred to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element and was assigned as the Plans Officer and Deputy AC/S G-4, I MEF (Fwd). In December 2007, Colonel Karega assumed command of CLB-7. He deployed with CLB-7 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 09.2 from February 2009 to September 2009. Upon redeployment, Colonel Karega was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency and then re-assigned as the Marine Attaché to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, and Cape Verde from January 2011 to February 2013. He

also acted as the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché to Burkina Faso from March to August 2012. In these countries, Colonel Karega served as advisor to the US Ambassador on military and defense issues and as liaison between the US Embassy and the host nation military service.

From February 2013 to June 2015, Colonel Karega served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM) and Head of Services Branch (LFS), Facilities and Services Division, Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. There, some of his responsibilities included oversight of MCICOM's regional contracting offices, Small Business Program Management, Marine Corps general property audit preparation, and oversight of the Marine Corps' largest service contract (the Regional Garrison Food Service Contract II).

Colonel Karega's most recent assignment was as the Commanding Officer of Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow from July 2015 to July 2018.

Colonel Karega's personal awards include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Purple Heart, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal.

ENCLOSURE (6)



First Sergeant Eric J. Thompson

### First Sergeant, Camp Mujuk

First Sergeant Thompson is a native of Washington, D.C. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in May, 1999 and, graduated from recruit training September 1999 at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina. Private Thompson completed Marine Combat Training in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, then transferred to Camp Johnson, North Carolina, and completed Basic Warehousing Course (MOS 3051) in October 1999.



[Download Hi-Res Photo](#)

Private Thompson reported to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Marines aboard MCB, Kaneohe Bay, HI November 1999 after completing his MOS school training. He then completed 1 Unit Deployment Program with 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Marines to Okinawa, Japan. In September of 2001, he was meritoriously promoted to the rank of Corporal.

In March of 2002, Corporal Thompson reported to Marine Security Guard Battalion S-4 aboard MCB Quantico as a Warehouse NCO. In November of 2002 he was selected to compete in the All-Marine Boxing Trials aboard Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. In January of 2003, Corporal Thompson reported to MWSS 373 aboard MCAS Miramar, CA as a Warehouse NCO and was deployed seven days later in support of Operation Southern Watch/ Operation Iraqi Freedom. In March of 2004, he was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. From April to May of 2004 he participated in Combined Arms Exercise 4 and 5 aboard 29 Palms, CA. In June of 2004, Sergeant Thompson participated at Desert Talon in Yuma, AZ and was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 in August 2004.

In July of 2005, Sergeant Thompson reported to Drill Instructor School, MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina. Upon completion of Drill Instructor School, he was assigned to Charlie Company, First Recruit Training Battalion. During his tour as a Drill Instructor he served as a Drill Instructor, Martial Arts Instructor and Senior Drill Instructor. Also, during his tour he was awarded 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, FY-06 DI of the Quarter. In January of 2008, he was meritoriously promoted to the rank of Staff Sergeant.

In October of 2008, he reported to MCB, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan for duty as the Base Range Detachment's Supply Chief. In October of 2009, he reported for duty as a Faculty Advisor for the SNCOA MCB, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan. During his tenure as a Faculty Advisor, he was the Physical Training Instructor and served as the Chief Instructor for Sergeant's Course. Also, in addition to his duties, he cutover the SNCOA account to the Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC).

In August of 2011, SSgt Thompson reported to 2D SupBn aboard Camp Lejeune, NC as the Admin/Training SNCOIC. In December 2011, he received TAD orders to Combat Logistics Battalion 26, 26<sup>th</sup> MEU and served as the Warehouse Chief/SNCOIC for the supply section. He embarked aboard the USS Kearsarge for a 7 month deployment from March to October 2013. In July of 2014, SSgt Thompson terminated his TAD orders and returned to 2D SupBn.

In August 2014, he was promoted to Gunnery Sergeant and received orders to Headquarters Regiment, 3D Marine Logistics Group, Okinawa, Japan where he served as the Company Gunnery Sergeant, Headquarters Company from October 2014 to December of 2015.

In January of 2016, GySgt Thompson reported to MCRD Parris Island as a Course Challenger for class 2-16 and was selected to become a staff member of Drill Instructor School. He served as a Squad Instructor, Recruit Training Order Instructor, Instructor of Squadbay Procedures and the Physical Training Instructor at Drill Instructor school.

In September of 2018, he was promoted to his current rank. Also, in September of 2018, he reported to Camp Mujuk, Republic of Korea to assume the billet as the Senior Enlisted Advisor.

First Sergeant Thompson's personal awards consists of the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (1 gold star in lieu of 2<sup>nd</sup> award), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement medal (1 gold star in lieu of 2<sup>nd</sup> award), Good Conduct medal (1 silver star in lieu of 6th award), and the Drill Instructor Ribbon (1 bronze star in lieu of 2<sup>nd</sup> award).

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Rcvd msg

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July			
Day	Date	CDO	SUP
Mon	1	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Tue	2	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Wed	3	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Thu	4	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Fri	5	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	HM-14
Sat	6	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Sun	7	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Mon	8	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Tue	9		
Wed	10		
Thu	11		
Fri	12		
Sat	13		
Sun	14		
Mon	15	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	HM-14
Tue	16		(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Wed	17		
Thu	18		
Fri	19	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Sat	20		
Sun	21		HM-14
Mon	22	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Tue	23	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	
Wed	24		
Thu	25		
Fri	26		
Sat	27		
Sun	28		
Mon	29		
Tue	30	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	HM-14
Wed	31	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)	

Weekend Duty

Holiday Duty

26  
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August		
Day	Date	CDO
Thu	1	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Fri	2	
Sat	3	
Sun	4	
Mon	5	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Tue	6	
Wed	7	
Thu	8	
Fri	9	
Sat	10	
Sun	11	
Mon	12	
Tue	13	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Wed	14	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Thu	15	
Fri	16	
Sat	17	
Sun	18	
Mon	19	
Tue	20	
Wed	21	
Thu	22	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Fri	23	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Sat	24	
Sun	25	
Mon	26	
Tue	27	
Wed	28	
Thu	29	
Fri	30	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)
Sat	31	

Weekend Duty  
Holiday Duty

*FPC assignments*

*List of names w/contact information*

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

August				
Day	Date	Rank	DNCO	Section
THU	1	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)		AVORD
FRI	2			S-1
SAT	3			S-6
SUN	4			S-4
MON	5			AVORD
TUE	6			S-4
WED	7			AVORD
THU	8			AVORD
FRI	9			S-4
SAT	10			AVORD
SUN	11	(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)		FISCAL
MON	12			S-4
TUE	13			AVORD
WED	14			S-4
THU	15			AVORD
FRI	16			S-1
SAT	17			S-3
SUN	18			S-1
MON	19			S-4
TUE	20			AVORD
WED	21			AVORD
THU	22			AVORD
FRI	23			AVORD
SAT	24			S-4
SUN	25			S-4
MON	26			S-3
TUE	27			AVORD
WED	28			S-6
THU	29			S-4
FRI	30			AVORD
SAT	31			S-4

Rank

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(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

BILLET	RANK	NAME	E-MAIL	DSN NUMBER	GALAXY S7	FLIP PHONE	PERSONAL
(b)(3)(A)(ii)		S-1	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	N/A	N/A
						N/A	N/A
						N/A	N/A
		PMO	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	N/A	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	
						N/A	N/A
						N/A	N/A
		S-4	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	N/A	N/A	N/A
						N/A	N/A
						N/A	N/A
						N/A	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)
		MESSHALL	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	N/A	N/A
		S-6	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)			N/A	N/A
						N/A	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)
						N/A	N/A
		BAS	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)		N/A	N/A
		EOR	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)			N/A	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)
		FACILITIES MAINTENANCE	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)			N/A	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)
		AVIATION ORDNANCE DETACHMENT	(b)(6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b)(7)(C)			N/A	N/A
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						N/A	N/A

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11:14am

Rcvd msg

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Are you going to  
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Rcvd msg

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3. Applicability and Scope. This instruction applies to all active duty and full-time support Service members. This instruction is limited to the delivery of health care approved by DON and clarifies the provisions of reference (a) as it pertains to IDCs. Reference (b) must be used to initiate the detachment for cause process, and references (c) and (d) must be used to request removal of an NEC.

4. Background. This instruction is in support of the historical and highly successful physician and IDC relationship in the delivery of quality health care.

a. The IDC NEC codes were established to identify highly motivated and specially trained hospital corpsmen to manage health programs and provide primary care under indirect supervision on shore, at sea, and on mission deployment. Independent duty means that the IDC is supervised indirectly, after diagnosis and treatment has taken place.

b. As physician extenders, it is necessary for IDCs to have a close relationship with their privileged clinical supervisors. This relationship is the bedrock of quality health care for Sailors and Marines. Certified by their clinical supervisor, the IDC can practice under indirect supervision and can be assigned the title of senior medical department representative (SMDR).

5. Acronyms and Definitions. See enclosure (1).

6. Policy

a. Program Elements. The ability of a Navy IDC to provide primary health care under indirect supervision requires:

- (1) assignment of an IDC NEC code,
- (2) certification by a clinical supervisor,
- (3) participation in a command sponsored IDC supervision program, and
- (4) the highest level of ethical standards in the provision of health care.

b. IDC Supervision. IDC supervision is either direct or indirect. During direct supervision, the IDC and the clinical supervisor are involved together in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient at the time service is rendered. During indirect supervision, the IDC determines the diagnosis and initiates the treatment of the patient without the clinical supervisor being present, but reports back to the clinical supervisor during scheduled reviews.

c. Supervision Program

(1) The IDC supervision program must be directed and managed by a program director, who is a licensed, credentialed and privileged physician. The program director will be assisted by a program manager who is an IDC, E-7 or above (preferably E-8), and has been designated by the program director.

(2) All Navy IDCs must be supervised by an assigned clinical supervisor. The supervision program must provide ongoing clinical training for the IDC and foster a supportive clinical relationship.

(3) IDCs participating in the program must be assigned a clinical supervisor, in writing, by the program director. The clinical supervisor will be responsible for ensuring the IDC, is supported and monitored for the delivery of quality health care. The clinical supervisor will be assisted by an assistant program manager designated, in writing, by the program director. Enclosure (2) shows the relationships between the program director, program manager, clinical supervisor, assistant program manager, and IDC.

(4) IDCs assigned to commands that do not have an IDC supervision program will be assigned to a supervision program of the medical department: a local immediate superior in command (ISIC), nearest Navy medical treatment facility (MTF) (preferably), or a Department of Defense (DoD) MTF.

(5) The utilization, training, supervision, and certification guidelines are delineated in enclosures (3) and (4). The NEC removal process is delineated in enclosure (5). Supporting documents and sample letters are provided in enclosures (6) through (11).

7. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)

(1) Appoint the Head, Undersea Medicine and Radiation Health or Head, Surface Medicine (BUMED-M95), under the Assistant Deputy Chief, Operational Medicine and Capabilities Development (BUMED-M9), as the DON focal point for this program.

(2) Monitor and ensure compliance with this program by designating this program as a medical inspector general review requirement.

b. The Medical Officer of the Marine Corps (TMO) Headquarters Marine Corps, (Code HS)

(1) Serve as the United States Marine Corps (USMC) focal point for this program.

## ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS)
2. Assistant Program Manager. An enlisted medical representative, who is a senior IDC with operational experience at an ISIC facility, who has been appointed by the program director to assist the management of the IDC supervision program.
3. Basic Life Support (BLS)
4. Budget Submitting Office (BSO) 18. BUMED is the BSO, unit identification code 00018.
5. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)
6. Clinical Supervisor. A licensed, credentialed and privileged physician. Clinical supervisors are assigned responsibility to supervise and certify responsibility for the IDCs, assuring their continued ability to provide quality health care independent of direct supervision. The clinical supervisor is responsible for the health care rendered by the IDC when under either direct or indirect supervision.
7. Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command COMUSFLTFORCOM
8. Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet COMPACFLT
9. Continuing Education Unit CEU . Authorized educational activities that serve to maintain IDC certification. See enclosure (4) for details.
10. Deployed. For the purposes of this instruction, any time an IDC leaves their primary duty station or home port to support operational missions.
11. Department of the Navy (DON)
12. Immediate Superior in Command ISIC
13. Independent Duty Corpsmen (IDC). IDCs are hospital corpsmen in pay grades E-5 through E-9 who have successfully completed IDC "C" School and have been awarded an associated NEC. An IDC is a healthcare provider who, when certified, may provide primary and emergency care for active duty service members under indirect supervision. IDCs perform their clinical, administrative, and logistical duties as the SMDR with the submarine forces, USMC, surface forces, special operations units, and for deep sea diving commands. IDCs may be assigned to fixed MTFs and to units of the operational forces.

14. IDC Supervision Program. Supervision is the process of reviewing, observing, critiquing, correcting, advising, and training IDCs. The IDC will be held responsible for unethical actions or deviation from accepted standards of care, or failure to maintain the core competencies. The clinical supervisor will be responsible for reviewing the diagnosis and treatment of the Service member via the health record review process. Supervision must consist of, at a minimum, quarterly review of medical records and a meeting between the IDC and their assigned clinical supervisor on the health care provided to Service members. The levels of supervision listed in subparagraphs 14a and 14b are pertinent.

a. Direct. The clinical supervisor is involved in the decision making process. This level of supervision is for all non-certified IDCs who are undergoing their evaluation period for recertification with their clinical supervisor after a lapse of certification; or those undergoing remedial training in primary care after suspension of certification. Direct supervision includes the aspects in both subparagraphs 14a(1) and 14a(2).

(1) Verbal. The clinical supervisor monitors the provision of care through direct conversation with the IDC while the patient is still present in the clinical space.

(2) Physical Presence. The clinical supervisor is present in the medical space where care is being provided through all or a significant portion of the clinical encounter.

b. Indirect. The clinical supervisor is not involved in the decision making process of diagnosis and treatment at the time patient care is rendered. This type of supervision is accomplished through retrospective review of medical records, evaluation of the appropriateness of consultations and referrals, evaluation of events identified through occurrence screens, and by quarterly meetings between the IDC and the clinical supervisor discussing health care provided to Service members by the IDC. This supervision is documented on NAVMED 6400/1 IDC Record of Medical Evaluation, Counseling, Case Study, and Training and by countersignature on the clinical notes, dated at the time of the review. Retrospective medical record reviews must assess the thoroughness and completeness of the history and physical examination; appropriateness of tests, studies, and diagnoses; and treatment plans, including use of drugs, minor surgical procedures, and the overall quality of care provided. Review of care also assesses the IDC's insight and judgment in terms of providing health care only according to their authorized scope of practice, and knowing when to refer a patient to the next echelon of care. This level of supervision is reserved for certified IDCs.

15. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

16. Medical Port. Medical home port is a patient and family-centered health care delivery primary care model that is team-based, comprehensive, and designed to fully meet the health and wellness needs of beneficiaries.



## GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL USE OF INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMEN

1. IDCs will only function clinically under the supervision of a licensed and privileged physician, either directly or indirectly.
2. IDCs will not practice clinical medicine unless they are enrolled in an IDC supervision program. An IDC's duty assignment should be commensurate with their skill, expertise, and supervision requirements.
3. Once certified and enrolled in an IDC supervision program, IDCs may assess, triage, and treat patients via indirect supervision. This includes writing consults and ordering medications within their scope of practice, preferably in an electronic medical record system (i.e., Military Health System Genesis, Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application, Theater Medical Information Program, or Shipboard Automated Medical System).
4. IDCs must wear an identification badge to ensure patients are aware of their name and role. It must be clearly visible with the words "Independent Duty Corpsman" imprinted below the name (applies to MTFs only).
5. IDCs must sign the medical record of each Service member examined, treated, or referred for treatment. They must print or stamp name, rate, title, and National Provider Identifier. If utilizing the electronic health record, the encounter will be electronically signed by the IDC.
6. The IDC quarterly record review, when in a deployed status, may be delayed until return to homeport. All IDC supervision program requirements must be resumed immediately upon return to homeport. The clinical supervisor must conduct a complete review of the medical care provided by IDCs returning from deployment within 2 months of return-to-homeport.
7. Certified IDCs may provide care to active duty Service members, including members of other Services and foreign military members, under indirect supervision. Care provided to all other patients, including family members and retired beneficiaries, requires direct supervision.
8. IDCs must discuss with the clinical supervisor, any patient who presents with worsening symptoms for two visits in a single episode of illness, or any patient whose condition is not improving and returns prior to scheduled follow-up. This does not apply either to patients returning for continuing treatment of previously documented, stable, chronic illnesses, or to patients returning as directed for follow-up evaluation of resolving acute illnesses.
9. IDCs are authorized to provide clinical advice virtually to include secure messaging, telephone consultation, and other virtual care modalities available in their clinical setting. All clinical advice that is provided via virtual or by means of telephone will be documented appropriately and is subject to review by the clinical supervisor.

INDEPENDENT DUTY CORPSMEN  
TRAINING CERTIFICATION AND SUPERVISION GUIDELINES

1. Initial Training

- a. The initial training for Navy IDCs is conducted at the NAVUSEAMEDINST, SURFWARMEDINST, and NAVSPECOPSMEDINST.
- b. Training supports the attainment of the clinical core competencies of the IDC. This includes, but is not limited to, basic medical science; pharmacology; basic laboratory investigation; medical, dental, and surgical training; clinical diagnosis and treatment of primary care disease; emergency medical and trauma management; familiarity with Navy and Federal public health policies; the management of Navy environmental and occupational health programs; understanding of medical data recording systems; management of medicinal stores; and medical record administration.
- c. Upon graduation, the IDC NEC recommendation is placed in Corporate Enterprise Training Activity Resource Systems (CeTARS) via SURFWARMEDINST, NAVUSEAMEDINST, or NAVSPECOPSMEDINST and forwarded to NAVPERSCOM, Placement Management (PERS-4013). PERS-4013 reviews the NEC recommendation and awards the NEC. NAVMEDEDTRALOGCOM monitors and approves the development of the IDC training programs to prepare and certify IDCs to perform duties under indirect supervision.
- d. The local personnel support detachment will make an entry in the IDC's service record such as, "(Name, rank) has successfully completed initial IDC training and has been certified on (Date)." The NAVPERS 1070/604 Enlisted Qualifications History entry will serve as the initial certification for the IDC program.

2. Certification and Trainin to Provide Clinical Care

- a. Upon arrival at a new command, the IDC must be assigned a clinical supervisor and an assistant program manager by the unit's designated program director or program manager. The clinical supervisor must review the IDC's NAVPERS 1070/604 entry and sign a NAVPERS 1070/613 Administrative Remarks documenting his or her initial meeting with the assigned IDC. The remarks will state that the IDC is "Qualified to perform clinical duties independent of direct supervision of a licensed independent practitioner when deployed on land or sea or as applicable for a period of 2 years from last certification."
- b. The IDC must be authorized in writing by the assigned clinical supervisor to prescribe or provide medications carried on the IDC specific MTF formulary or authorized medical

allowance list. Any restrictions or exceptions (e.g., controlled medicinal) must be plainly stated. A copy of the letter must be retained in the IDC certification and training record with a copy provided to the pharmacy; see enclosure (6).

c. Professional Requirements. The requirements in subparagraphs 2a(1) (figure 4-1) and 2a(2) (figure 4-2) must be obtained and maintained.

(1) Patient Care Requirements

<u>CERTIFICATIONS</u>	<u>8402</u>	<u>8403</u>	<u>8425</u>	<u>8494</u>
ACLS	X	X	X	X
BLS-instructor	X	X	X	X
Authorization letter to provide indirect care	X	X	X	X
Authorization to prescribe medication letter	X	X	X	X
Completed NAVMED 6400/2 within 2 years	X	X	X	X
Fifteen continuing medical education units annually	X	X	X	X
Quarterly review of patient encounters by clinical supervisor	X	X	X	X

Figure 4-1

(2) Operational Requirements

<u>CERTIFICATIONS</u>	<u>8402</u>	<u>8403</u>	<u>8425</u>	<u>8494</u>
Pest Management	X		X	X
Food Sanitation	X		X	X
Advanced Tactical Paramedic		X		

Figure 4-2

3. Certification and Training Record

a. The initial training record must be generated by the IDC's first receiving command after PCS from IDC school and must be maintained throughout the IDC's career as a record of his or her clinical competence and certification.

b. The program manager or assistant program manager must maintain a six-part training record on each IDC, which must contain at a minimum the items listed in subparagraphs 3b(1) through 3b(6).

(6) Service Members. Co-workers or fellow Service members have a responsibility to identify and make aware to the chain of command any stressors or potentially moderate or high-risk behavior of a fellow Service member.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Commanding officers or other persons designated in writing by the commanding officer may receive protected health information, in accordance with reference (b), for the purposes of determining the impact of the Service member's health status on the command's readiness and military mission.

(2) Subject Matter Expert (SME) support on the FPC process is available via the chain of command from the CMC SD. The scope of SME participation may be limited due to the existence of confidentiality and/or privileged information regarding Service members.

(3) Commands with effective programs should contact CMC SD via the chain of command with their ideas, suggestions and best practices. Additional support is available from the Marine and Family Programs Division, M&RA, via the chain of command.

(4) Human Factors Councils (HFC), required in aviation units, are an independent process established specifically by and for the aviation community. The FPC process is not intended to replace or interfere with the HFCs. Commands have the latitude to tailor the FPC process to be mutually supportive with the HFC, as long as the requirements and intent of both are met.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Per reference (g), completion of FPCs will be reported quarterly via the Warrior Preservation Status Report (WPSR) to the Director, SD via the chain of command. The intent is to capture the date of completion, not findings, on the WPSR.

b. Information generated from the FPC is for the commanding officer's use and for the purpose of force preservation and risk mitigation. It shall be kept in confidence and shall not be used for disciplinary action. Commanding officers may assign a record keeper to record the proceedings of the FPC.

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

Call Log

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

CALL LOG

## CALL LOG



## CALL LOG

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

## SMS TEXT MESSAGE LOG

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

# SMS TEXT MESSAGE LOG

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

# SMS TEXT MESSAGE LOG

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

SMS TEXT MESSAGE LOG

mms

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b)(3)(A)(ii), (b) (7)(C)





Date	Time	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Event	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
30-Apr-19			sends out a text regarding meal choice at mess night.	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) receives this text and replies that she wants beef.
2-May-19			Camp Humphrey's USMC Mess night. Seven Marines from Camp Mujuk attend.	
3-May-19			Marines heading back to Mujuk from Humphreys stop at Shoppette for drinks.	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) picks up two bottles of Ciroc Summer
			Estimated date - needs clarification	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tells (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) about the conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) at the shoppette.
6-May-19		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Departs for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	
10-May-19			[Estimated Date] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) states that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) once again asked her to "come by for some summer coladas." She says okay but has no intent to go.	
11-May-19		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	returns from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	
12-May-19	910	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	calls (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:00:31
	911		calls (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:00:26
	915		calls the DNCO.	Call lasts 00:00:22
	918		receives a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:00:25
	934		receives a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:03:03
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	receive NJP and are reduced to the rank of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	
	1457	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	receives a text (MMS) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	"What do you think (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) with a picture of a PMO vehicle.
	1526	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	forwards text from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) to Col Karega.	(b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
	1613		receives a text from Col Karega. "Looks good."	(b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
	1702		makes a call to Col Karega.	Call lasts 00:06:22
	1709		makes a call to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:00:53
	1730	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Checks out on liberty to "Emart"	
	1836	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	texts (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) at 6:36 PM: "Good Evening. give me a call when you get a chance".	
	1838	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	makes a call to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:06:14
	1848		makes a call to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:01:04
	1853	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Checks in from liberty (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	
	1857	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	receives a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:01:57
	1900	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	makes a call to the DNCO.	Call lasts 00:00:46.
	1901		receives text reply from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	no text - possible emoji?
	1902		makes call to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:01:20.
	1908		receives a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:02:17
	2019		receives a call from Col Karega.	Call lasts 00:05:41
			(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	
22-May-19	2038	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	calls (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	The call lasts 00:00:38
23-May-19	1643	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	calls (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	Call lasts 00:00:30

(b) (6), (b) (7)

(C), (b)(3)(A)

Date	Time	Event
		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
24-May-19	800	At approx 0800 when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) was turning in the morning report (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) told her she needed to come try the summer coladas. She said she couldn't that night due to the fact the she was going to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) going away. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) responded that "wouldn't last all day, so you could come by after." She replied, "Maybe if I'm not already drinking." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
	1800	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) Farewell Starts. Saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) at going away - no conversation there. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) sends an MMS text to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) 'Bro, Can you ensure that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and know that the CO approved their Special Liberty

	1817	based on the conditions of them having one of the Sgts with them and isn't drinking for that day. All 5 of your Marines were going to Seoul together for the holiday weekend."
	1943	Text from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) Phone: "Are you going to come?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
	2200	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) Farewell moves to fire pit (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) thought (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) went to the fire pit but wasn't sure. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
	2300	Approximate time (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) roommate (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tells her that she has two missed calls from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) on her phone. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) explains the situation to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) "becuase she didn't know how to feel about it." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)

		Estimated date - needs clarification - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tells (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) about the conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) at the shoppette.
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28-May-19		Day before he took leave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) said to her "You never came to try the drinks" to which she replied "oh well its fine". He responded, "no, its not, maybe when I get back." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) replied, "Okay."
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29-May-19	1630	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) departs for leave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
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1-Jun-19	Unk	Estimated Date - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tells (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) about communication. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and Corroborate
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3-Jul-19		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) Checks in
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4-Jul-19	830	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) returns from leave (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
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10-Jul-19		Estimated Date - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tells (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) about text messages and invitations
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		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) is selected to have lunch with a GO on the upcoming Monday and is asked to provide two written questions. She goes into the office at approximately 1930 to type up her questions and delivers them to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) They have a long conversation - she alleges he once again mentions the drinks. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) is the CDO and sees her departing the building (not the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) office). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) alleges that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) was in with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) for four hours - she says 20-30 minutes and that he wouldn't have seen her move from her office to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)

	1630	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) signs out on liberty to Mundeok with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) as her libo buddy
	1900	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) return from liberty

	1900	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) signs out on liberty to Bukbu with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) as her libo buddies. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) is the team leader
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		(b) (6), (b) (7) (C), (b)(3)(A)		(b) (6), (b) (7) (C), (b)(3) (A)(ii)
Date	Time	Event		
	Unk	types up questions for a CG's visit/lunch on Monday 22 Jul. She turns the questions into the _____ and ends up in his office for 20-30 minutes by her count. CDO estimates she was in the building for four hours. [May Follow up with (b) (6), (b) (7) her liberty buddy for the evening] _____		
	430	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3) _____ and (b)(3)(A)(ii) sign in from liberty _____		
31-Jul-19	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A) (ii)	(b) (6), (b) (7) _____ notifies (b) (6), (b) (7) _____ of allegations of inappropriate communication from (b)(3)(A)(ii) _____ to _____		
2-Aug-19	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C), (b)(3)(A) (ii)	conducts "XO Inquiry" at Col Karega's request _____		
3-Aug-19	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C), (b)(3)(A) (ii)	repots findings to Col Karega. Felt (b) (6), (b) (7) _____ statement was compelling and detailed.		



OUR VODKAS

## CÎROC LIMITED EDITION SUMMER COLADA

Introducing CÎROC Summer Colada, a pineapple-coconut collaboration that can't be denied.

Limited-time only – get it before it's gone. CÎROC Summer Colada is a rich tasting spirit made with vodka distilled five times from fine French grapes. The spirit is masterfully infused with a distinctive blend of coconut, pineapple, and other natural flavors, resulting in a taste experience that is lusciously different and elegantly smooth. Enjoy on the rocks or mixed in your favorite Summer cocktail.

## TASTING FEATURES

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### NOSE

Aromas of fresh pineapple abounds with a touch of coconut cream

### TASTE

Layered with juicy pineapple and coconut cream notes in the mid-palette, with a fruity tropical note that carries into the long smooth finish

**BUY NOW! (/EN-US/WHERE-TO-BUY-CIROC)**

## FEATURED COCKTAIL

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## PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**AUTHORITY:** 5 U.S.C. Section 301; Departmental Regulations; 37 U.S.C. Section 404, Travel and Transportation Allowances, General; DoD Directive 5154.29, DoD Pay and Allowance Policy and Procedures; Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DoDFMR) 7000.14.R., Volume 9; and E.O. 9397 (SSN), as amended.

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S):** To provide an automated means for computing reimbursements for individuals for expenses incurred incident to travel for official Government business purposes and to account for such payments.

Applicable SORN: T7333 (<http://privacy.defense.gov/notices/dfas/T7333.shtml>).

**ROUTINE USE(S):** Certain "Blanket Routine Uses" for all DoD maintained systems of records have been established that are applicable to every record system maintained within the Department of Defense, unless specifically stated otherwise within the particular record system notice. These additional routine uses of the records are published only once in each DoD Component's Preamble in the interest of simplicity, economy, and to avoid redundancy. Applicable SORN: <http://dpcl.dod.mil/privacy/SORNs/component/dfas/preamble.html>.

**DISCLOSURE:** Voluntary; however, failure to furnish the requested information may result in total or partial denial of the amount claimed. The Social Security Number is requested to facilitate the possible collection of indebtedness or credit to the DoD traveler's pay account for any residual or shortage.

## PENALTY STATEMENT

There are severe criminal and civil penalties for knowingly submitting a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sections 287 and 1001 and Title 31, Section 3729).

## INSTRUCTIONS

### ITEM 1 - PAYMENT

Member must be on electronic funds (EFT) to participate in split disbursement. Split disbursement is a payment method by which you may elect to pay your official travel card bill and forward the remaining settlement dollars to your predesignated account. For example, \$250.00 in the "Amount to Government Travel Charge Card" block means that \$250.00 of your travel settlement will be electronically sent to the charge card company. Any dollars remaining on this settlement will automatically be sent to your predesignated account. Should you elect to send more dollars than you are entitled, "all" of the settlement will be forwarded to the charge card company. Notification: you will receive your regular monthly billing statement from the Government Travel Charge Card contractor; it will state: paid by Government, \$250.00, 0 due. If you forwarded less dollars than you owe, the statement will read as: paid by Government, \$250.00, \$15.00 now due. Payment by check is made to travelers only when EFT payment is not directed.

### REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS

1. Original and/or copies of all travel orders/authorizations and amendments, as applicable.
2. Two copies of dependent travel authorization if issued.
3. Copies of secretarial approval of travel if claim concerns parents who either did not reside in your household before their travel and/or will not reside in your household after travel.
4. Copy of GTR, MTA or ticket used.
5. Hotel/motel receipts and any item of expense claimed in an amount of \$75.00 or more.
6. Other attachments will be as directed.

### ITEM 15 - ITINERARY - SYMBOLS

#### 15c. MEANS/MODE OF TRAVEL (Use two letters)

GTR/TKT or CBA (See Note)	- T	Automobile	- A
Government Transportation	- G	Motorcycle	- M
Commercial Transportation		Bus	- B
(Own expense)	- C	Plane	- P
Privately Owned		Rail	- R
Conveyance (POC)	- P	Vessel	- V

Note: Transportation tickets purchased with a CBA must not be claimed in Item 18 as a reimbursable expense.

#### 15d. REASON FOR STOP

Authorized Delay	- AD	Leave En Route	- LV
Authorized Return	- AR	Mission Complete	- MC
Awaiting Transportation	- AT	Temporary Duty	- TD
Hospital Admittance	- HA	Voluntary Return	- VR
Hospital Discharge	- HD		

#### ITEM 15e. LODGING COST

Enter the total cost for lodging.

#### ITEM 19 - DEDUCTIBLE MEALS

Meals consumed by a member/employee when furnished with or without charge incident to an official assignment by sources other than a government mess (see JFTR, par. U4125-A3g and JTR, par. C4554-B for definition of deductible meals). Meals furnished on commercial aircraft or by private individuals are not considered deductible meals.

### 29. REMARKS

- a. INDICATE DATES ON WHICH LEAVE WAS TAKEN:
- b. ALL UNUSED TICKETS (including identification of unused "e-tickets") MUST BE TURNED IN TO THE T/O OR CTO.

continued on subsequent pages...











































GENERIC TTC TRANSACTION 2YRS

ARUC	Cert ID	UD DATE	GRADE	Long Name	English Statement Text	History Data Text
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20180215. RED TO E-2 45 DAS RESTR/EPD. RESTR FOR 15 DAS SUSP FOR FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20180125. RED TO E-3 FORF OF \$88 FOR 2 MOS TOTAL FORF \$176. 45 DAS OF RESTR/EPD. FORF OF \$88 FOR 2 MOS TOTAL FORF \$176 SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: REDUCTION IN ONE PAY GRADE, RESTR. TO LIMITS OF PLACE OF MESS, BI, DU, AND WORSHIP AND THE MOST DIR ROUTE TO AND FR W/O SUSP FR DU FOR F5 DAS AND 45 DAS EXTRA DU. FORF OF 1/2 M SUSP.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: REDUCTION IN ONE PAY GRADE, AWARDED CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY UNIT FOR 30 DAYS WITH A DEFERMENT OF 1 DAY TO THE START DATE 20190807. FORF OF 1/2 MOS PAY FOR 2 MOS. TOTAL FORF O	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 92.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20180125. RED TO E-4 FORF OF \$201 FOR 2 MOS TOTAL FORF \$402. 45 DAS OF RESTR/EPD. FORF OF \$201 FOR 2 MOS TOTAL FORF \$402 SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20171016. VIOL OF ART 92. NJP RECD 20171016. RED TO E-4. FORF OF \$1267 FOR 2 MOS. TOTAL FORF \$2534. 30 DAS EPD. RED TO E-4. FORF OF \$1267 FOR 1 TOTAL FORF \$1267 SUSP FOR	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOL ART. 121 AND 129. FORF 1/2 MOS PAY FOR ONE MO 90 DAS RESTRICTION SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 92.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 92 (X2)	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: REDUCTION IN ONE PAY GRADE, RESTR. TO LIMITD OF PLACE OF MESS, BI, DU, AND WORSHIP AND THE MOST DIR ROUTE TO AND FR W/O SUSP FR DU FOR 45 DAS AND 45 DAS EXTRA DU. FORF OF 1/2 M SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20180215. RED TO E-1 45 DAS RESTR/EPD. RED TO E-1 AND 15 DAS RESTR SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 92.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20171016. VIOL OF ART 92. DTD RECD 20171016. RED TO E-3. 45 DAS RESTR/EPD. RED TO E-3. 30 DAS RESTR SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: BN NJP AWD 20171016. VIOL OF ART 92. DTD RECD 20171016. RED TO E-3. 45 DAS RESTR/EPD. RED TO E-3. 30 DAS RESTR SUSP FOR 6 MOS.	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)	HIST: VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 92.	

Summary  
Aug 28, 2019

ENCLOSURE 20





















































### III MEF/MCIPAC FY 2019 HOLIDAY ROUTINE

January						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	31 Dec	1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

February						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28		

March						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

April						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30				

May						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

June						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30						

July						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

August						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

September						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

October						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

November						
	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

December						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31	1 Jan	2 Jan		

Jan 1, 2019 New Year's Day\*

Jan 21, 2019 MLK Jr Day

**\*\*Feb 4, Super Bowl**

Feb 18, 2019 President's Day

May 27, 2019 Memorial Day,

July 4, 2019 Independence Day

Sep 2, 2019 Labor Day

Oct 14, 2019 Columbus Day

Nov 12, 2019 Veterans Day

Nov 28, 2019 Thanksgiving Day

Dec 25, Christmas Day

Dec 31, 2019 New Year's Day

96 hours liberty period

72 hours liberty period





































Sergeant Major Vincent F. Young

### **Sergeant Major MCIPAC**

Sergeant Major Young enlisted into the Marine Corps in June of 1992 and completed recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island on August 28, 1992. Following recruit training, Private Young attended Marine Combat Training at Camp Geiger and upon completion he was forwarded to his initial Military Occupation Specialty (M.O.S.) school at Naval Air Station Memphis in Millington Tennessee from October to June 1993.



Private First Class Young attended a follow-on course at Naval Aviation Maintenance Training Group Detachment in Cherry Point N.C. from July to Sept 1993, which was specific to his M.O.S.. Upon completion of the course, he obtained the M.O.S. as a 6332, an Aviation Electricians Mate for the AV-8B Harrier. [Download Hi-Res Photo](#)

Lance Corporal Young reported to VMAT-203 2nd Marine Air Wing in Cherry Point N.C. in September of 1993. While attached to VMAT-203, he was meritoriously promoted to Corporal. During his tenure with VMAT-203, he was also promoted to Sergeant as he exercised the billets of a work-center supervisor, collateral duty inspector, and leader of Marines.

Sergeant Young was then transferred to VMA-513 in Yuma, Arizona where he served as an Aviation Electrician, Collateral Duty Inspector, Low-power Certification Instructor, and the Night-Crew shift supervisor. Sergeant Young was hand selected to execute the duties of a Gunnery Sergeant by fulfilling the billet as the Detachment SNCOIC while embarked aboard the U.S.S. Essex with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit in support of Operation Southern Watch. During his last six months at VMA-513, he served as a night-crew lead maintenance controller and was promoted to Staff Sergeant.

Staff Sergeant Young was transferred to VMA-223 at 2nd Marine Air Wing, Cherry Point N.C. where he served as a Maintenance Controller. While serving with VMA-223, he embarked aboard the U.S.S. Bataan during the winter of 2001 to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom I. During the winter of 2003 Staff Sergeant Young embarked aboard the U.S.S. Kearsarge to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In February of 2003 he was promoted to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant.

Gunnery Sergeant Young was awarded the 2003 James E. Nicholson, Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership Award for his "remarkable leadership skills while preparing for and executing a combat deployment". As a Gunnery Sergeant, he executed the billet as the squadron's Maintenance Control Chief. "For his outstanding contributions to Marine Aviation as Maintenance Control Chief" he was

presented the 2004 Sergeant Major Frederick B. Douglass Award which was presented by the Commandant and Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps.

During the summer of 2005 Gunnery Sergeant Young deployed with VMA-223 to Al Anbar Province, Iraq and served as the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of the unit's Avionics Division. In the winter of 2006 Gunnery Sergeant Young was transferred to the Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (CNATT) in Cherry Point North Carolina. During his 16 months at CNATT, he discharged the duties as an Aviation Electrician Lead Instructor, followed by the billet as the Chief Instructor, and lastly the Unit Adjutant. In February of 2008 he was promoted to the rank of First Sergeant and immediately received and executed orders to Fort Leonard Wood Missouri to serve as the Military Police and Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Instruction Company First Sergeant from March 2008 to November 2009. He later served as the First Sergeant for Motor Transport Instruction Company.

In July 2011 First Sergeant Young received orders to Camp LeJeune North Carolina where he served as the Company First Sergeant for 2nd Bn, 9th Marines, Golf Company and quickly transitioned to serve as the Headquarters and Service Company First Sergeant. While serving as Headquarters and Service Company First Sergeant, he deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel and Operation Enduring Freedom IV from December 2011 to July of 2012.

In September 2012 First Sergeant Young was promoted to Sergeant Major and received orders to assume the duties as the Sergeant Major for Combat Logistics Battalion 22 (CLB-22). While assigned to CLB-22, he deployed with the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the U.S.S. Mesa Verde from February 2014 to October 2014 in support of Operation New Dawn.

In May of 2015 he received orders as was posted as the 3d Marine Raider Battalion, Marine Special Operations Command Sergeant Major until June 2016. His tour was cut short to serve as the Sergeant Major for Marine Aviation Training Support Group 22, Corpus Christi TX.

Sergeant Major Young will assume the duties as the Marine Corps Installations Pacific Sergeant Major in April 2018.

Sergeant Major Young's awards include Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of second award, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with three gold stars in lieu of fourth award and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with four gold stars in lieu of fifth award.















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**Executive Summary Report:  
Camp Mujuk Focus Group Results**

POC INFO: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)      DATE: 11 September 2019

<p><b><u>Purpose:</u></b></p> <p>In accordance with MCO 5354.1E, focus group surveys are a tool used to aid the Commanding General and subordinate commanders in gauging the command climate, organizational behavior, and effectiveness of a unit. Ultimately, a focus group is a systematic procedure to gather data about an organization and provide insight to how the organization is functioning to meet its mission. This climate assessment will provide you a "snap shot" in time about the key factors of Camp Mujuk as perceived by its members.</p>	<p>time and believe this is why documents are not getting signed on time</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• CO refuses to give any Officer or SNCO "By Direction" authority, which has created a perception that he doesn't trust his Officer/SNCO Corps</li><li>• Numerous complaints that the CO is not processing Fitness Reports on time</li><li>• Public counseling by the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) is very common. He often "yells" and "screams" at SNCOs in front of their Junior Marines, publicly humiliating them</li><li>• Numerous comments that the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) run the entire command. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) is not even viewed as a command leader. Small unit leadership does not exist because the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) question their every decision and every move (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</li><li>• Hard to read the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) due to inconsistent emotional behavior. Their mood changes all throughout the day, causing the entire command to "tip-toe" around them and avoid them as much as possible</li><li>• CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) often call Marines derogatory names by using disparaging terms such as "loser" or "pathetic." It happens so much that it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the entire command believes they are not good enough anymore</li></ul>
<p><b><u>Background:</u></b></p> <p>Due to recent command climate allegations at Camp Mujuk, the MCIPAC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and EOA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) decided to conduct focus groups in order to identify the root cause of the perceived toxic climate at Camp Mujuk. The MCIPAC EOA conducted focus groups on 9 September 2019 at the Camp Mujuk conference room. Additionally, the focus groups provided an anonymous platform for Marines and Sailors to provide feedback, input, and recommendations on ways to improve the command climate; not only for their sections, but for the organization as a whole.</p>	<p>often talks to Officers in an unprofessional manner</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) don't know their Marines. They never walks around and talk to them or show interest in them. "They have no interest in our morale or welfare whatsoever"</li><li>• Example that a Marine PCS'd 4-5 months ago, and the CO recently asked to see him last week</li><li>• Another example, a Marine who was assigned to Camp Mujuk for 15 months checked out with the CO, and the CO assumed he was checking in vice checking out because he had never seen him before</li><li>• They don't understand what the CO's intent is or what's expected of them because he has never articulated this to them</li><li>• Every person in the room feels that the command can only get better by the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) being relieved. They have poisoned that command to a point well beyond repair</li></ul>
<p><b><u>Discussion:</u></b> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</p> <p>The Marines and Sailors of Camp Mujuk were divided by their respective rank group/population to better facilitate open and honest dialogue. Only repetitive comments from each group or red flag issues will be discussed here (red flag items, even if only said by one person, usually falls along the lines of hazing, EO, fraud, waste, abuse, etc. or any other issue that may seriously detract from readiness or violate the UCMJ).</p>	
<p><b><u>E-7/E-6 comments</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• CO not signing documents on time such as reenlistments, PME packages, extensions. Paperwork either piles up on the CO's desk or gets lost in the routing process</li><li>• CGIP took a hit in many functional areas due to required documents not being signed on time. Marines know the CO is gone all the</li></ul>	

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**Executive Summary Report:**

**Camp Mujuk Focus Group Results**

POC INFO: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A) DATE: 11 September 2019

(A)(ii)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)

- often intimidates Marines by cracking his knuckles behind them, breathing on their neck, and saying "ha, I scared you didn't I"
- During a CO's inbrief to one Marine, the CO said "people only come to Camp Mujuk to be lazy and look for a place to skate." Told him not to trust his fellow SNCOs
- Allegations that the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) failed the run during the PFT and falsified a NAVMC document to reflect a different run time
- Allegations that the CO never took a CFT during 2018, but somehow a CFT score was run in 3270 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- Allegations that the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) often come onto base after liberty hours, without a liberty buddy
- Half the SNCOs have received NJP or a 6105 during their time at Camp Mujuk for issues that could have been resolved through informal counseling
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) often bullies Marines by shoulder checking them, bumping into them, or sometimes pushing them (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- Perceived favoritism that the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) treats African-American Marines different from other ethnicities. Will give them "dap," hugs, talk to them like friends; all the while disregarding other ethnic groups
- Marines not being afforded the opportunity to attend PME schools
- CO is not counseling the Marines that receive a 6105
- They feel like its "us (Officer/SNCO) vs. them (CO, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii))"
- Marines not being afforded the opportunity to write a statement or explain their story before being NJP'd or receiving a 6105 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- Duty gets assigned as punishment. Additionally, if the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) does not like you, he will constantly put you on weekend duty
- The physical appearance of the SNCOs were very obvious that they are stressed, overworked and miserable. Every SNCO had bags under their eyes (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- Marine refused NJP and CO threatened him that if he didn't accept it, he will find a way to ADSEP him (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- Allegations of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) making inappropriate sexual comments towards

several female Marines. In particular, the female (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) tried to get her to come to his room on several occasions to drink with him. Statement was given to the CO about it and nothing was done, "swept under the rug"

- Communication disconnect between the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and SNCOs (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) does not contact a junior Marines SNCO when he needs to speak to them, he will contact the individual Marine only and keep his/her chain of command out of it

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) sent two LCpl's to Yong-San to pick-up a suicidal GySgt from treatment always uses the CO's name as a power tool, i.e., "the CO wants this done"

E-5/E-4 comments

- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) are not engaged with the NCO Corps and never talk with them
- CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) appear to be selfish and make decisions in order to benefit them
- CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) told a female Marine that was previously sexually assaulted that she brought that upon herself because she drinks too much. This is blaming the victim, revictimizing them, and is completely unacceptable
- NCOs have zero trust and faith in the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and would rather die before asking them for help
- NCOs like working for their SNCOs, just "hate" the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- NCOs are terrified to make decisions or mistakes because they fear the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) will crush them
- CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) constantly spreading rumors throughout the command about certain Marines
- 75% of the NCOs have been NJP'd or received a 6105 since arriving to Camp Mujuk
- 'picks and chooses' who he likes
- Small unit leadership does not exist, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) controls everything" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)
- verbally berates NCOs in front of their junior Marines

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**Executive Summary Report:**

**Camp Mujuk Focus Group Results**

POC INFO: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3) DATE: 11 September 2019

(A)(ii)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• New Marines being told by everyone how toxic the command is because of the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and they buy into that statement because they immediately see it for themselves</li><li>• "Everyone is on edge right now"</li><li>• CO stated many times that he doesn't care how many IG complaints are made</li><li>• NCOs can see how much the Officers and SNCOs hate being at the command (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) doesn't greet Marines back when</li><li>• CO has two vehicles, while PMO is short on vehicles</li><li>• Nothing happens after IG complaints. Marines have lost trust in the process</li><li>• Human factors are non-existent. "CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) don't care about us and treat us all like criminals"</li><li>• 45% of the NCOs have shredded their (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) reenlistment packages due to the way they have been treated by the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) One Marine stated, "I never want the chance of having to work for them again, so I'm just going to get out to make sure it doesn't happen." Several marines said they would rather be at their worst command than here</li><li>• CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) go TAD all the time, but won't allow their Marines to go TAD</li><li>• Numerous comments that "we work so damn hard for the CO and he doesn't care about us"</li><li>• Marines making irrelevant medical appointments just to get away from the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</li><li>• Marine injured his shoulder and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) told him he will take the PFT regardless if its documented</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• PMO is not getting the full 8 hours of sleep in between shifts. Constantly being called in with minimal rest</li><li>• CO offers empty promises to the E-3 and below population</li><li>• Too many mandatory community relation events. Backing up the workload</li><li>• When the CO and/or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) are TAD, the morale in the command is extremely high</li><li>• New Marines aren't given a welcome aboard brief or what is expected of them from the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</li><li>• (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) has Marines cleaning dumpster cans in which hazard materials are present, without giving them gloves or masks</li><li>• (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) has put several Marines in a headlock in order to intimidate them</li><li>• Marines being NJP'd without being afforded the opportunity to speak to a lawyer</li></ul> |
|---|---|

**E-3 and below comments**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• They feel like the Camp Mujuk leadership is far gone because of the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</li><li>• They are scared of the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) and try to avoid them at all costs</li><li>• Equal punishment does not exist. CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) picks and chooses who they are going to punish based on favoritism</li><li>• SNCOs are scared to protect their Marines because they don't want to have to deal with the CO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</li></ul> |  |
|--|--|

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**Executive Summary Report:**

**Camp Mujuk Focus Group Results**

POC INFO: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii) DATE: 11 September 2019

Closing Comments

It is customary with military leadership to normally lash out at junior personnel or disregard their perceptions as "whining." This is an opportunity to re-build trust by addressing their concerns and making in-roads where appropriate. By rationalizing away each issue, Marines at Camp Mujuk in the future will not voice their opinions on any issues and will believe things like this (focus groups and surveys) are merely "checks in the box" and that leadership is not really concerned, but more on a "witch hunt." That does not mean capitulate to every issue, rather meaningfully look at the issues brought forward by personnel and see where improvements really are needed.

The common theme with every population is abuse of power by the CO and <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</sup> more so with the <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</sup> The mere fact that the CO is aware of the <sup>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)</sup> behavior and has not taken any action to correct it needs to be taken into consideration. The Commander is responsible for the pulse of the command climate, and when they are part of the reason why the command climate is so bad, it poisons the command from the top level on down. Although I didn't get a chance to speak with the Officer population as a whole due to the limited availability of their demographic, I did have the chance to speak to several of them individually and they made similar comments and statements as made above. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (3)(A)(ii)














































# DEFENSE SERVICE OFFICE PACIFIC



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ENCLOSURE ( 4 )





# DEFENSE SERVICE OFFICE PACIFIC

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I understand this means that while I am receiving legal defense services via remote means (i.e., telephonically, Defense Connect Online (DCO), e-mail, or other means not conducted face-to-face in a DSO office), the above confidentiality also applies. I further understand that the use of technology to communicate with DSO personnel carries an inherent risk of third party interception. Although DSO will take all reasonable measures necessary to ensure privacy in remote attorney-client communications, DSO cannot guarantee privacy as remote communications rely upon providers outside of the Department of Defense (i.e., cell phone signals/providers, NMCI or commercial internet provider, or any other electronic medium).

I also understand if any unauthorized or nonessential third party is present or can overhear any portion of the conversation, confidentiality and the applicability of the attorney-client privilege may be compromised. In other words, parties outside of DSO are not bound by ethical rules to maintain the confidence of the communication and could potentially testify regarding what they have intercepted. This includes Region Legal Service Office (RLSO) personnel working adjacent to DSO remote offices.

By signing below, I acknowledge that I understand this disclosure and have had the opportunity to discuss this with a DSO attorney before commencing any confidential discussions. I consent to receiving legal advice by remote, electronic means and that DSO will take all precautions within its control to ensure the confidentiality of our communications.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

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Signature

Date

# DEFENSE SERVICE OFFICE PACIFIC

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## LIMITED SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT PERSONAL REPRESENTATION

1. The purpose of this form is to inform you of the limited scope of representation that the attorney is authorized to provide you during this meeting.
2. The nature of this meeting is informational. Anything you tell the attorney during this meeting will be confidential, meaning that the attorney may not disclose that information without your permission or as otherwise required by law.
3. **This meeting does not form an ongoing attorney-client relationship.** In meeting with you today, the attorney is authorized to advise you on the matter for which you seek assistance, including:
  - a. Reviewing any documentation that you may have and analyzing the facts and law related to your situation. The attorney will answer your questions and provide advice on possible outcomes and options;
  - b. Assisting you in understanding any forms or other documents that the government may have provided you with and explaining those forms and their attendant consequences;
  - c. Assisting you to understand relevant law, remedies, or avenues of redress.
4. The attorney is not authorized to take steps beyond advising you on the matter you are here for today.
5. This letter is meant to specifically limit the scope of the attorney's representation of you to the current situation giving rise to this appointment. While all of your communications with the attorney concerning this matter will remain confidential, the formation of any attorney-client relationship will extend only so far as the current PERSREP situation and will not extend to any future administrative or criminal proceeding without necessary authorization.

**I acknowledge the limited scope of the advice which I will receive in this counseling session.**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

Your signature and date

Printed Name \_\_\_\_\_







































4. Administrative Actions. Table 1-1 contains a summary of required administrative actions as a result of a PFT/CFT/PPFT/PCFT failure, in accordance with references (i) through (p).

Table 1-1. -- Administrative Summary.

Administrative Action	PFT Failure		CFT Failure	
	1st	2d	1st	2d
Page 11 6105 Entry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<del>Mandatory RCP</del>	<del>Yes</del>	<del>Yes</del>	<del>Yes</del>	<del>Yes</del>
Adverse Fitness Report	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Substandard Proficiency Mark	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promotion Restriction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Eligible for PCS Transfer	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Eligible for Reenlistment	No	No	No	No
Eligible for Special School Assignment	No	No	No	No
Process for AdSep	No	Yes	No	Yes

5. Medical Considerations. When a Marine is unable to complete a PFT/CFT due to an underlying physical or medical condition, an evaluation by a Privileged Health Care Provider (PHCP) must be conducted in accordance with references ~~(e)~~ (q) and ~~(t)~~ (r). A PHCP for purposes of this Order is a medical officer, nurse practitioner, independent duty corpsman, or a physician's assistant. The PHCP will make a medical status determination regarding the Marine's ability to complete the PFT/CFT/PPFT/PCFTs, or if referral to a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)/Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) is warranted. A medical determination is required to excuse a Marine from participating in a particular event or an entire test, but a PEB finding is required for a semi-annual/annual exemption. Marines assigned to a light/limited duty status are not exempt from the semi-annual/annual PFT/CFT requirement and are still required to perform those events not affected by the condition, unless otherwise specified by the PHCP.

For example, a Marine may be placed on light duty for 30 days and excused from performing a PFT/CFT in March due to a training injury in February, but is not exempt from completing a PFT and CFT for the January to June semi-annual period.

If the condition becomes extended or is considered permanent in nature, then a determination by a formal MEB, PEB, or both must be conducted to determine the Marine's medical qualification for continued active service. A Marine may not be repeatedly excused from participation in the PFT/CFT without a MEB determination and is not exempt from the semi-annual/annual requirement without a PEB determination.

a. PPFT/PCFT. Marines who are medically excused from performing a particular event of the PFT or CFT as certified by a PHCP, are still required to perform a PPFT/PCFT.

(1) Marines will perform a PPFT/PCFT when a PHCP determines they are physically incapable of performing a particular event of the PFT/CFT. The PHCP will document the medical condition, expiration date, exercise limitations, and PPFT/PCFT events a Marine can perform during the light/limited duty period. If a Marine is unable to take a full PFT/CFT, every consideration should be taken by the PHCP for Marines to take a PPFT or PCFT, with the health of the Marine the foremost consideration. For Marines



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who are incapable of performing any portion of a PFT/CFT, their inability will not be considered a failure and an appropriate fitness report Section I Directed Comment will be made, in accordance with reference (j). COs/OICs will ensure assistance is provided to Marines in order to facilitate their return to full duty.

(2) To meet PPFT requirements, Marines must complete two of the three PFT events. Marines will be required to obtain at least the minimum acceptable performance requirements for the two events, as well as earn the additional points needed to achieve ~~a 3d class PFT score~~ the score of 100 points or better. Event times/repetitions will be awarded points the same way the PFT awards points. As with a PFT, failure to meet the minimum requirements in either event constitutes a test failure. For Marines requiring a composite score for promotion purposes, commands will use the aggregate score (points) achieved during the last semi-annual/annual PFT for the event missed. For events that are no longer available, such as the flexed arm hang, commands will run the equivalent score or minimum passing score for that event in order to produce a composite score. Similarly, if a Marine received a low passing score previously that is now a failed score per the new standards, the closest passing score for that event should be ran. See table 1-1 for a summary of administrative actions warranted as a result of PFT failure and table 2-1 for PFT classification scores.

(3) To meet PCFT requirements, Marines must complete at least one of the three CFT events. Marines will be required to obtain the minimum acceptable performance requirements for the single event. As with a CFT, failure to meet the minimum requirement will constitute a test failure. In most cases, musculoskeletal limitations will allow for the conduct of either the Movement To Contact (MTC) or Ammunition Lift (AL). Considering the all-encompassing nature of the Maneuver Under Fire (MANUF), musculoskeletal limitations may limit participating in this event as the one selected when performing a PCFT. For Marines requiring a composite score for promotion purposes, commands will use the aggregate score (points) achieved during the last semi-annual/annual CFT for the event missed. COs/OICs will run the equivalent score or minimum passing score for each event in order to allow a composite score to post. See table 1-1 for a summary of administrative actions warranted as a result of PFT failure and table 2-1 for CFT classification scores.

b. Consecutive Partial Physical Fitness, and Partial Combat Fitness Tests (PPFT/PCFTs). Marines who perform a PPFT/PCFT for two consecutive annual periods, for the same medical condition, will be referred to a PHCP for MEB/PEB evaluation, in accordance with reference (k).

c. Injury. Marines injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT may be given credit for a PPFT if two out of three events were completed, or for a PCFT if one out of three events were completed prior to the injury. A Marine injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT, may be afforded the opportunity to retake a PFT/CFT once returned to full duty by a PHCP. For Marines who elect to retake the PFT/CFT, their new score will replace the previous score and is final. Only COs/OICs can authorize PPFT/PCFT credit or a retest for Marines injured during the conduct of a PFT/CFT. Marines completing only one event prior to the injury will receive neither a PFT score nor PPFT credit. If assigned light duty status as a result of the injury, the Marine will be required to retake the PFT/CFT no earlier than 30 days, and no later than 90 days from return to full duty status. Marines who are evaluated and not assigned a light duty status, will retake the PFT at the COs/OICs discretion.



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d. Illness. Marines encountering a rapid onset illness prior to conducting a PFT/CFT must obtain a light duty chit. Light duty chits will be submitted to the command prior to the scheduled PFT/CFT. Only the CO/OIC can decide if a Marine will be authorized to take a missed PFT/CFT or if an RDNT determination is required.

e. Post-Light/Limited Duty

(1) Marines who did not take a PPFT or PCFT for the annual requirement due to physical/medical reasons, will be administered a PFT/CFT no less than 30 days and no more than 90 days after return to full duty. COs/OICs should be attentive that Marines returning to full duty status following an extended limited duty period will require a progressive training routine in returning to pre-injury/disease fitness levels. If the grace period crosses over into the next semi-annual period, the Marine must take the test that was missed. While NMED will be utilized to categorize the test during the period for which the Marine was unable to take a PFT/CFT, the make-up test must be passed or adverse administration actions will result as in a PFT/CFT failure in normal circumstances.

(2) Marines who were able to perform a PPFT/PCFT and are able to complete a PFT/CFT after returning to full duty will have the option to either keep the PPFT/PCFT score or conduct a PFT/CFT. Marines will be given a minimum of 30 days and no more than 90 days to complete a PFT/CFT. The new score will replace the previous PPFT/PCFT. If the grace period crosses over into the next semi-annual interval, the new PFT/CFT score will satisfy the current requirement and the PPFT/PCFT score will be utilized for the previous semi-annual/annual period. The new score will not be considered a remedial score.

f. Pregnancy/Post-Partum

(1) Marines who are confirmed pregnant by a PHCP are exempt from taking the PFT/CFT. After delivery, Marines will participate in an exercise program, as soon as medically authorized, to prepare for the PFT/CFT. The Marine has to be prepared to take the PFT/CFT, no earlier than ~~six~~ nine months after the birth event and being returned to full duty by the PHCP. Following this nine-month exemption, a Marine birthparent is expected to meet physical fitness standards at the next regularly scheduled unit physical fitness evaluation. Additional time may be recommended by the PHCP and granted, if necessary, due to unique medical circumstances.

(2) For pregnancies that do not come to full term, Marines will be required to meet semi-annual/annual PFT/CFT requirements in a time period determined by a PHCP or Obstetrics (OB) healthcare provider. Time limits will not exceed those that are prescribed for a full term pregnancy.

(3) Although rare, difficult pregnancies, Cesarean sections, or still births present unique challenges that may require greater recovery time. Therefore, in pregnancies where complications develop, PHCPs will determine the time needed to return to full duty (RTFD) and complete a PFT/CFT.

g. 46 Years and Older Risk Factor Screening. Marines age 46 years and older must have a current Periodic Healthcare Assessment (PHA) and shall conduct a self-validation utilizing NAVMC 11639 "Risk Factor Worksheet" no more than 60 days prior to conducting a PFT/CFT. Marines will submit the completed and signed (to include PHCP signature if required) form to their



























































































UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
CAMP MUJUK, REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
UNIT 15017  
APO AP 96218-0173

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1500  
CO  
26 Jul 16

CAMP MUJUK ORDER 1500.1

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: CAMP MUJUK FORCE PRESERVATION COUNCIL (FPC) ORDER

Ref: (a) MCO 1500.58 Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP)  
(b) MCO 5100.29B  
(c) DoD 6025.18R, DoD Health Information Privacy, 24 January 2003  
(d) Privacy Act of 1974  
(e) <http://www.safety.marines.mil/Resources/Forcerepservationcouncil.aspx>

Encl: (1) Force Preservation Council Procedures  
(2) Force Preservation Council Meeting Worksheet  
(3) Risk Indicators  
(4) Force Preservation Mitigation Plan  
(5) Monthly Counseling Worksheet  
(6) Mentor Engagement Log  
(7) Honor Courage Commitment Worksheet  
(8) New Join Milestone Checklist  
(9) Mission and Goals Worksheet

1. Situation

a. Reviews of non-battle deaths, injuries, health issues and/or legal incidents demonstrate that some events could have been avoided or mitigated if a comprehensive evaluation of the member was conducted. Too often we are not aware that a Marine or Sailor is suffering from significant issues until a tragic incident occurs. Leaders must know their Marines and Sailors and establish a climate where people can communicate issues personally or on behalf of another without fear of retribution.

b. Human factors continue to be a leading cause of mishaps, incidents leading to suicidal events, and reckless behavior associated with operational stress. Marines and family members are often under stress from personal or professional factors that are not apparent to the command leadership. In many instances, the individual's risk factors are unobserved from a comprehensive view point. Commanders, subordinate leaders, and peers must reinforce engaged leadership in order to gain the whole picture of each Marine's situation. This will assist in the identification of underlying problems or behavior that may lead to mishap or injury. This will also assist the command in providing assistance and reference to external resources in order to improve personal and unit readiness.

2. Mission. Effective immediately, Camp Mujuk conducts a monthly Force Preservation Council (FPC) in order to raise force awareness concerns and identify "at risk" Marines and Sailors in order to provide proactive protection to our most critical resource - Marines and Sailors.

ENCLOSURE(6)

### 3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. To preserve the force by establishing a formalized process to elevate awareness and identification of at-risk Marines. This program will be executed using the existing Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP), augmented by a monthly Force Preservation Council and reporting requirements that will allow for the identification of trends and patterns. The end-state is a disciplined, methodical approach to understanding all the issues affecting our Marines and Sailors and armed with that information, the capability to intervene when necessary. This program and its effectiveness hinge upon leadership knowing their Marines and Sailors.

b. Concept of Operations. The Installation's Force Preservation efforts will be executed on an enduring basis, and recurring Force Preservation Councils will be conducted monthly through a tiered approach that reflects organizational structure and engaged leadership at all levels.

(1) Section Level. Force preservation begins at the section level through use of the MCMP and involved leadership. Mentoring is the very foundation of leaders knowing their Marines and guiding them to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct.

(a) In accordance with reference (a), Mentors are the primary counselors, guides, and teachers to the Marines under their direct care. Mentors will assess their Marines enclosures (3-8). Mentors will discuss their assessment with the mentee and together develop an action plan. The mentoring program guidebook, reference (a), provides an excellent list of resources for each HCC assessment question.

(b) The purpose of mentoring sessions remains unchanged. Mentors will continue to focus their efforts on ensuring Marines understand the mission of the team and their role in accomplishing the mission. Mentors must gain an understanding of their mentee's individual strengths and weaknesses and help them establish a plan to develop strengths and improve in weak areas. Mentors will use their judgment after counseling their Marine to elevate only those issues needing assistance that exceed the mentor's ability to connect to the right resource; there is no "risk scale" or calculation performed.

(c) Section Officers in Charge (OIC) and Section Chiefs will meet with mentors and mentees individually to discuss and review each Marine in the section. The section OIC/Chief will make a determination for Marines needing assistance if the next level of support is needed. Not every Marine needing assistance or dealing with stressors needs to be discussed at the FPC. In fact, most cases can and should be dealt with at the lowest level possible.

(2) Camp Level. Council members will evaluate each individual and focus on what treatment, intervention, and resources are in the individual's best interest. Evaluation and follow-on actions will be executed in accordance with the guidance provided by the Commanding Officer. The FPC shall provide individual recommendations tailored to mitigate identified problems, provide treatment, and make relevant resources available utilizing enclosure (4)

#### c. Tasks

(1) Camp Mujuk Safety Officer

(a) Provide Subject Matter Expert (SME) support during FPCs as required.

(b) Consolidate and provide Warrior Preservation Status Report (WPSR) to MCIPAC Safety Division.

(2) Chaplain. Provide additional guidance to the Commander as required.

(3) Section OIC's and Section Chiefs

(a) Mentor, supervise mentoring and recommend Marines to the Force Preservation Council.

(b) Participate in monthly FPCs.

(c) Ensure all Marines are familiar with the Marine Intercept Program (MIP)

(4) S-3. Provide date, location and time for the FPC.

(5) IDC. Attend FPCs and provide medical advice as required. Serve as a Point of Contact (POC) and liaison for medical and counseling services.

(6) Senior Enlisted Advisor

(a) Serve as action officer for the FPC, to include the following: Coordinate date/time and location of FPC with S-3, ensure the presence of key personnel, provide required documents and materials necessary for FPC.

(b) Document the conduct and proceedings of FPCs using enclosure (2) and maintain for two years.

(c) Provide Safety Officer with appropriate documents for WPSR.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Members being briefed will not be present at the council.

(2) FPCs are not intended to transfer leadership development responsibilities and accountability of at-risk Marines and Sailors. The responsibility for executing the plan, tracking progress, and providing updates to the FPC is a leadership responsibility and rests with the individual's chain-of-command under the guidance of the Commanding Officer.

(3) FPCs will be reported in the quarterly WPSR.

(4) All FPCs will include (but are not limited to) the following risk factors:

(a) Ratio of unit leaders to Marines

(b) Alcohol abuse (admitted or perceived)

(c) Drug use/abuse

(d) Financial issues



- (e) Domestic issues
- (f) Operational stress
- (g) Depression, anxiety or any mental health issues
- (h) Prior suicidal ideations, gestures, or attempts
- (i) Marital problems
- (j) Legal, disciplinary, or administration actions
- (k) Non tactical vehicle safety
- (l) Association with bad influences
- (m) Issues resulting in physical impairment

(5) Stakeholders in a Marine's well-being should be consulted to connect the dots, limit the absence of information, and help identify all the factors to shape an appropriate action plan to help commanders really know their Marines. FPC membership should include, at a minimum:

- (a) Commanding Officer
- (b) Senior Enlisted Leader
- (c) Section OIC and/or Section Chiefs
- (d) Camp Mujuk Independent Duty Corpsman

Additional council members may include:

- (a) Executive Officer
- (b) Chaplain
- (c) SACO
- (d) Legal Officer
- (e) Safety Officer
- (f) Suicide Awareness Officer
- (g) Uniformed Victim Advocate

#### 4. Administration and Logistics

(a) Information developed by the FPC should be used by leaders as deemed appropriate for the enhancement of safety and for referral/assistance to the appropriate resource. Information discussed by the FPC will frequently involve sensitive, private issues that may be protected by references (c) and (d). FPC members are accountable for protecting the provided information and limiting its dissemination.

(b) FPC members must ensure medical information is handled in accordance with references (c) and (d) to ensure confidentiality. Information provided to Section OIC's/Chiefs pursuant to references (c) and (d) are restricted to

personnel with a need for the information. FPC members are accountable for protecting the provided medical information and limiting its dissemination.

(c) The FPC is not a disciplinary body nor is the FPC process a punitive proceeding.


(d) This order is primarily targeted towards Marines, however it is encouraged to apply the provisions to Navy personnel and civilian employees assigned to the unit as well.

(e) Due to the sensitive nature of the information discussed, a copy of this Order will not be prominently displayed in command spaces.

5. Command and Signal

(1) This Order is applicable to all personnel assigned to Camp Mujuk.

(2) This Order is effective the date signed.

  
G. E. THOMAS

## FORCE PRESERVATION COUNCILS (FPC) PROCEDURES

Ref: (a) DoD Instruction 6490.08 of {Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing mental health Care to Service Member}  
(b) DoD Instruction 6025.18-R of {DOD Health Information Privacy Regulation}  
(c) NAVMC DIR 2795 USMC User's Guide to Counseling  
(d) NAVMC DIR 1500.58 {USMC Mentoring Handbook}  
(e) MCO 1500.58 {USMC Mentoring Program Order}  
(f) MCO 1500.60 (draft) {Force Preservation Councils}  
(g) MCO 1500.XX (draft) {Marine Corps Leadership}  
(h) MCO 5390.2D {Leadership Training and Education}  
(i) MCO 5351.1 Combat and Operational Stress Control Program (COSC)  
(j) MARADMIN 240/11 {24th EFPB Results}  
(k) MARADMIN 363/10 {23rd EFPB results}  
(l) MCWP 6-11 {Leadership}

1. The intent is to provide Camp Mujuk Marines with a clear, formalized process to identify and evaluate at-risk Marines and Sailors for increased Command attention by leveraging reference (d) and (e) or , upon publication, the Marine Corps Leadership Development Program (MCLCD), combined with advice from key staff and senior leaders. The key to the FPC process is decisive, engaged leadership with an emphasis on leaders truly knowing their Marines and Sailors.

2. An outlined FPC framework is described below that has proven successful. Leaders should execute FPCs with the goal of protecting and supporting Marines and Sailors while empowering the leader/mentor's mitigation efforts. FPCs should be thought of as a proactive strategy to provide Marines and Sailors access to resources and assistance and to prevent unnecessary mishaps, fatalities, and suicides. Leaders at all levels must be able to recognize and convey cases in which they are not trained or experienced enough to provide the appropriate assistance through the chain-of-command. An effective FPC is intended to facilitate meaningful interaction between junior and senior Marines and Sailors across the entire spectrum of leadership by focusing on the core leadership functions of strengthen, mitigate, identify, treat, and reintegrate (SMITR). The desired end-state is improved leadership engagement throughout the Command. This requires Commands to take a thorough look at all of their Marines and Sailors, not just those who have been identified as at-risk.

Enclosure (1)

3. The FPC is not a disciplinary body, nor is it another form of the Commanders' legal brief. It is a conduit for issues and concerns that helps leaders/mentors form one composite picture of a Marine or Sailor, enabling the tailored leadership and engagement of external resources, as needed. Not every Marine or Sailor needing assistance or dealing with risk indicators needs to be discussed at an FPC. In fact, many risk indicators can and will be dealt with at the lowest level through engaged counseling using enclosure (3) of CMO 1500.1.

4. Force Preservation Council Strategy:

a. Section/work center level. The FPC progression begins at the section or work center level by leveraging the tools provided in references (c) and (i). Enclosure (5) of CMO 1500.1 provides the monthly counseling form for sections center level mentors'/leaders' use. These tools, along with OSCAR training, are to encourage leadership interaction that is the very foundation of leaders knowing their Marines and Sailors and guiding them to the highest standards of personal and professional readiness. Mentors/leaders should focus their efforts on ensuring their Marines/Sailors understand the mission of their unit, know their part in accomplishing the mission, understand their individual strengths and weaknesses and have a plan to grow their strengths and improve in weak areas; set achievable, measurable goals for improvement and track progress. Force Preservation is an understanding that the unit's successes are based on each individual Marine and Sailor's success and that every positive or negative action impacts unit readiness. Marines and Sailors who require assistance through the development of a mitigation plan and/or additional resources beyond the immediate capabilities of the lower echelons mentors/leaders should be elevated through the chain of command to the Command's FPC, as necessary.

b. Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs). NCOs assigned as mentors should focus their efforts and OSCAR training on ensuring Marines and Sailors understand their strengths and weaknesses to help them develop into integral members of the unit. A good mentor must, first and foremost, have and display genuine concern for their Marines/Sailors. Five skills important for a mentor to be effective are self-awareness and discipline, questioning techniques, listening skills, empathy, and feedback skills. Mentors have the responsibility to forward their concerns about their Marines or Sailors to their next level of Command if it is identified that the required assistance exceeds their ability.

c. Officers-in-Charge (OICs), Staff Non-Commissioned-Officers-in-Charge (SNCOICs). These next level leaders should meet with subordinate mentors individually and regularly, but at a minimum monthly, to discuss and review the status of every Marine and Sailor, in the section or work center, and review/sign counselling and mentor jackets to ensure efficacy. The OIC shall make a determination about whether the individual Marine or Sailor requires additional assistance, and if a formal mitigation plan should be developed by the immediate mentor/leader and forwarded to the next level of leadership.

d. The Commander, First Sergeants, and Section Leaders should convene a monthly to review and discuss all members in their Command, with the emphasis on New Joins using the New Join Milestone checklist per enclosure (8) of CMO 1500.1 and Marines or Sailors needing additional assistance. At this Command level, it is at the discretion of the Department OIC whether the Marine or Sailor should be forwarded to the next level of leadership to increase their risk level and implement a mitigation plan.

e. The actual body of the FPC convenes monthly at the Camp level. At this level, the Commander, aided by the leadership representation from the chain-of-command and subject matter experts, evaluate the Marines or Sailors that have been recommended for discussion at the FPC or are currently at an increased risk level and approve appropriate assistance, using enclosures 3 and 4 of CMO 1500.1. The FPC will be chaired by either the Commanding Officer or the Executive Officer. Additional members will include the First Sergeant, and the Marine's OIC/Staff NCOIC. Commands should also strongly consider having the mentor/leader for the Marine or Sailor being assessed available for the FPC to encourage an open and transparent dialog of the Marine or Sailor's issues. Marines/Sailors under discussion would not normally be present at the FPC.

(1). Additional key staff members that can be included in the FPC are:

- (a) Chaplain
- (b) Medical Officer
- (c) Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) Officer
- (d) Substance Abuse Control Officer (SACO)
- (e) Safety Officer (optional)
- (f) Prevention Analyst/Specialists
- (g) Marine and Family Life Counselor (MFLC)
- (h) Suicide Prevention Program Officer (SPPO)
- (i) Violence Prevention Officer (VPO)

(2). Additional personnel may be included; if the Commanding Officer deems it necessary to ensure that all available care options are considered. In addition to key staff members, units should assign a designated record keeper for each FPC meeting, as FPC minutes are inspected per the Commanding General's Inspection Program (CGIP) and must be maintained for 3 years.

5. The FPC should provide individual recommendations tailored to mitigate, and if possible, eliminate identified risk indicators to successfully re-integrate the Marine or Sailor. The responsibility for executing the risk mitigation plan per enclosure (4) of CMO 1500.1, reassessing, and providing updates to the FPC is a mentor's responsibility and rests with the individual's chain-of-command. The FPCs are not intended to transfer leadership development responsibility and accountability of at-risk Marines or Sailors to the Commanding Officer or Prevention Analyst/Specialists. The FPCs establish the framework within which mentors/leaders can gain access to appropriate resources, with the Marine or Sailor being afforded appropriate levels assistance and supervision. Follow-on action and evaluation should be executed by the chain-of-command under the guidance of the Commanding Officer and the FPC.

#### 6. Force Preservation Risk Levels:

(a) High Risk. Unit FPC will classify individuals as "High Risk" when they pose immediate risk to self, others, or the unit. Examples include, personnel identified as suicidal, severely depressed, are known to have substance abuse issues, manifest violent tendencies, are pending court martial, or have committed serious violations of civil law or UCMJ. For individuals deemed "High Risk," the Commander will ensure that individuals receive all proper care, treatment, and assistance.

(1) If the command concludes that a Marine/Sailor's risk level needs to be increased to "High Risk" prior to the monthly unit FPC, an "Emergency FPC" shall be convened for those cases considered "High Risk" to ensure the commander has the benefit of the appropriate subject matter experts (SMEs) in the development of the at-risk Marine/Sailor's immediate mitigation plan. OIC's are encouraged to involve unit and installation resources in the development of the at-risk Marine/Sailor's mitigation plan to ensure comprehensive outreach and support. A Commander's SMEs include unit Chaplain, medical officer, prevention staff, Family Readiness Officer, unit Military Family & Life counselors, Substance Abuse & control officer, Family Advocacy Program and/or Community Counseling Program representative.

(2) If the commander determines a Marine/Sailor as "High Risk" via the Force Preservation Counsel process, even without a referral, the commander will inquire immediately with the appropriate available agencies such as Community Counseling Programs (CCP) and/or Military Treatment Facility (MTF) if that Marine/Sailor has been seen and begin the dialogue of what information can and cannot be shared. If disclosure is warranted under reference (a), MTF providers will provide the minimum amount of information necessary to satisfy the purpose of the disclosure. In general, this shall consist of the diagnosis; a description of the treatment prescribed or planned (including medication prescribed); impact on duty or mission; recommended duty restrictions; the prognosis; any applicable duty limitations; and implication for the safety of self or others; and two ways the command can support the Marine/Sailor's treatment.

(3) "High risk" personnel shall engage with their mentor/leader, NCOIC, or SNCOIC at a minimum, verbally via phone or in person once per day during weekend and special liberty. Leave may be granted to "High Risk" personnel; however, "High Risk" individuals shall maintain contact with their chain of command daily during leave.

(4) Leaders/Mentors of "High Risk" personnel shall continuously assess the total fitness of the Marine/Sailor, their mitigation plan, per enclosure (4), and continue to communicate with the treating professionals to focus on the reintegration of the Marine/Sailor. Provide structure, limits, rules, monitoring, and predictability with clear expectations for behavior and values, per reference (h). Daily engagement with the Marine/Sailor and the assignment of appropriate tasks will build their sense of purpose, contribution, competence, and confidence during recovery/reintegration. Do not allow retribution or harassment of the Marine/Sailor related to their stress reaction or treatment. Daily engagement can include: informal dialogue, physical fitness, and/or training development, per reference (i).

(b) Medium Risk. Unit FPC will classify individuals as "Medium Risk" if for example, they manifest significant personal or professional risk indicators that adversely impact performance, unit and individual readiness, and that requires a mitigation plan per enclosure(4). At a minimum, personnel identified for poly-pharmacy or for an alcohol related incident will be classified as "Medium Risk."

(1) Individuals deemed "Medium Risk" shall engage their NCO mentor, NCOIC, or SNCOIC at a minimum, once during weekend

9. Per reference (j), Completion of FPCs will be documented in writing and reported on the Warrior Preservation Status Report (WPSR) quarterly.



## Force Preservation Board (FPB) Meeting Worksheet

The FPB shall review personal and professional circumstances and direct particular attention toward uncovering underlying medical physiological, social, behavioral and/or psychological factors which affect personal safety and judgment. The FPB is convened in the interest of force preservation and shall make no recommendations which are disciplinary in nature.

During FPB deliberations, considerations shall be given to current battalion OPTEMPO, workload, command communications, and other factors that may influence unit personnel.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Members present:

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

All members should discuss the following as related to each individual:

1. OpTempo. How is training and OptempO affecting the Marine?
2. All members should discuss the following related to each individual:
  - a. Risk-taking behavior (including alcohol and/or drug screening)
  - b. Professional discipline (pending legal issues)
  - c. Career development and other job performance factors?
3. Critical indicators:
  - a. Declining performance --failure to meet required standards or qualifications progress
  - b. Known violations or instances of poor discipline
  - c. Presence of major life stressors
4. Medical Concerns.
  - a. Chronic conditions or mental health issues
  - b. Limited duty or awaiting a Physical Evaluation Board
  - c. Medication concerns

Encl (2)

ENCLOSURE 65

## Risk Indicators

1. For the purposes of this order "risk indicators" is the set of personal and professional circumstances which may interfere with an individual's readiness. To prevent loss of life and diminished functioning, it is critical to identify and address at-risk behavior, or events that may lead to at-risk behavior, as soon as possible. Identifying those behaviors and events that may lead to at-risk behavior through the FPC can assist leadership in developing effective interventions.

2. Leaders at all levels must be familiar with the professional and personal lives of their service members. Service members who recently joined a unit shall be assessed to identify any conditions that might have been carried over from the previous command.

3. Below are some potential at-risk indicators, this list is not inclusive, but does provide some of the more common risk factors;

### a. Relationship Issues

- Engagement, marital separation or divorce
- Deteriorating relationships with friends or family
- Frequent change of roommates
- Recent break-up with a boyfriend or girlfriend
- Inability to establish or execute a current Family Care Plan.
- Dysfunctional intimate partner relationship characterized by frequent conflict (but not including domestic dispute/violence- see indicator b)
- Recent loss of a loved one
- Legal issues concerning dependents (spouse and/or children have legal issues)
- Expecting a child
- Family Care concerns

### b. Domestic Violence/Child Abuse Issues

- Involvement with Family Advocacy Program (FAP)
- Domestic disputes
- Legal issues concerning dependents (spouse and/or children)

ENCLOSURE(3)

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- Involvement with Department of Social Services (DSS)
- Involvement with law enforcement officials regarding DV or CA cases.

c. Family History

- History of family discord
- Family history of mental illness and/or substance abuse.
- Family history of suicide attempts or successful suicides.

d. Drug Related Incidents

- Current and/or past drug abuse history
- Taking high risk prescription medications (psychotropic/narcotic) or a high number of prescription medications in an un-prescribed manner
- High risk or high number of medications from a civilian health care provider
- Current and/or previous drug related rehabilitation
- Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) or any other drug related offense

e. Alcohol Related Incidents

- Past or current alcohol use/abuse history
- Using alcohol and high risk or high number of prescription medications at the same time.
- Current and/or previous alcohol related rehabilitation
- Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) or any other alcohol related offense

f. Behavioral Health

- Behaving or acting differently (abnormal patterns) at work or off duty
- Recent (since last deployment or within the last calendar year) mental health evaluation by either a civilian or military health care provider

- Post-Traumatic stress illness or other stressors identified
- Any disqualifying condition listed in MANMED (NAVMED P-117), Chapter 15, Article 15-58, Psychiatric and Behavioral Disorders
- History of psychiatric hospitalizations or rehabilitations
- Current or prior self-inflicted harm without intention of killing oneself.
- History of psychotropic medication use for treatment of mental health condition
- Mental aptitude waiver
- History of childhood abuse (emotional, sexual and physical)
- Continuous light duty chits
- Suicidal Ideation/attempt that did not require a Serious Incident Report (SIR)

g. Suicide Ideation/Attempt

- History of prior suicide ideation that required a serious incident report (SIR)
- History of prior suicide attempt(s) that required a serious incident report (SIR)

h. Manifestation of Violent Tendencies

- Current or previous homicidal ideation/attempt(s)
- Communication of threat to self or others
- Actual intended physical harm to self or others

i. Medical

- Placed on Medical Board
- Continuous light duty chits
- Medical conditions/issues with dependents (spouse and/or children)
- Serious medical conditions within family unit
- Medical illness/condition requiring constant medical attention

j. Financial

- Money-related concerns
- Inability to provide or stay current on dependent, spousal or child support

- Mortgage delinquency, foreclosure or excessive personal loan and/or credit debt
- Recently purchased vehicle, motorcycle or any major purchase

k. Performance Issues

- Unable to perform to potential
- Passed over for promotion
- Pending administrative or medical separation
- Physical Fitness Test/Combat Fitness Test failure
- Out of compliance with Marine Corps body composition and/or military appearance standards
- Psychosocial and/or performance issues from previous unit
- Enlistment waiver
- Disciplinary issues (civilian or military)
  - o History of NJPs from previous unit
  - o Pending NJPs
  - o Pending court martial
  - o Pending court actions
  - o Legal involvement (i.e. assault charges)

l. Personal Safety

- High-risk recreational hobbies or activities
- Ownership of a personal firearm
- Lack of driver improvement training
- Two or more recent traffic violations
- License suspended or revoked
- Tickets for excessive speeding (over 15mph)

m. Guidance Issues

- Change in spirituality (spirituality refers generally to that which gives meaning and purpose in life. The term specifically refers to the proactive of a philosophy, religion, or way of living.)
- Demonstrating lack of prudence to know right from wrong
- Lack of courage or character in action
- Lack of self-control
- Demonstrating lack/loss of ethical/moral compass
- Having a sense of hopelessness.

## Protective Factors

This category is for the positive aspects/risk mitigating factors in the Marine's life. Protective Factors and engaged leadership help mitigate risk and keep the Marine ready. Further guidance is available in reference (e) of MLGO 1500.60 NAVMC Directive 1500, MCMP Guidebook. The Marine Corps develops totally fit leaders resilient in body, mind, spirit and social areas of life; enabling them to assume progressively greater responsibilities. Below are some examples of protective factors.

### Body

- Meets/exceeds PFT/CFT standards, meets body composition standards
- Medically/dentally cleared for full duty
- Lifestyle decisions support health, fitness and readiness
- Positive/healthy hobbies

### Mind

- Self confidence
- Strong coping and decision-making skills
- Perseverance
- Mission focus
- Hopefulness
- Healthy, supportive relationships
- Assists others in need

### Spirit

- Engaged in life's meaning/purpose/core values/beliefs
- Hopeful about life/future
- Makes sound moral decisions
- Fully engaged with family, friend and community
- Able to forgive self and others

### Social

- Strong family support system
- Socially confident
- Strong coping and decision making skills
- Sense of community
- Involvement in fitness and community activities to include riding or driving clubs
- Healthy Relationships, Respects themselves and others

## Core Leader Functions

Focus on the proactive steps you can take as a leader of Marines/Sailors. These functions combined with protective factors form the risk mitigation plan. Know your resources and tools available. The five Core Leader Functions promote principles of wellness, prevention, early intervention, identification, reintegration, and reduction of stigma. The five Core Leader Functions are:

### Strengthen: Build resilience

- Repeated controlled exposure to stress, recovery, and motivation builds strength and resilience. The result is a stronger Marine, better able to manage stress.
- Provide mentoring and support for development of skills and interests to shape future attitude and create internal motivation toward achievement.

### Mitigate: Control what you can control

- Mitigate is about controlling stressors when you can and lessening the effects of stress for your Marines.
- Help them develop their own coping strategies in order to empower decision making, effective planning and build resilience.
- This will also help Marines prepare for future stressors. Provide structure, limits, rules, monitoring, and predictability with clear expectations for behavior and values.
- Retain balance of independent action and group interrelation by encouraging Marines to work in areas for improvement.

### Identify: Watch for signs of stress

- Promptly identifying and addressing signs of stress in your Marines before they escalate is critical for leaders.
- Know and use the Stress Continuum and stress decision flowchart.
- This is an important aspect of good small unit leadership and combat skills.

### Treat: Take Action

- Treatment is about taking action. "Treat" is not about being a Corpsman or doctor, it's about early intervention.
- It begins with self-care and peer support.

- Engage unit, installation, and/or community resources to provide support and create a risk mitigation plan if needed.

Reintegrate: Addresses the reality of reintegration

- Regardless of the level of a Marine's treatment, they will be assisted during the process and will be received into the unit completely and respectfully once recovered.





## FORCE PRESERVATION RISK MITIGATION PLAN

1. Risk Indicators to Mitigate:

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2. Protective Factors to Strengthen:

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3. Method for Completion:

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4. Purpose (Training(s)/Appointment(s)):

*Date/time:*

*Location:*

*Agency:*

5. Desired Endstate:

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Enclosure (4)

ENCLOSURE (5)

# COUNSELING WORKSHEET

References: NAVMC 2795 (Guide to Counseling), MCI 8002, MCI 7104, IRAM, MCO P1610.7E (PES)

## A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Marine Counseled On:

Last Name	First Name	MI	EDIPI	Rank	DOR	PMOS	BILMOS

Occasion: (Initial, scheduled, event related, etc.)

	Month	Day
--	-------	-----

Marine Performing Counseling (Counseling Mentor)

Last Name	First Name	MI	EDIPI	Rank	Billet

## B. BILLET TITLE (description if required)

## C. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS / SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THIS PERIOD

## D. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE THIS PERIOD

## E. TASKS ASSIGNED NEXT PERIOD / GOALS

## F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

## G. CERTIFICATION


Signature of Marine Performing Counseling	Date
Signature of Marine Counseled On	Date
Signature of SNCOIC	Date

Enclosure (5)

ENCLOSURE( 65)



## MENTOR ENGAGEMENT LOG

[illegible]

ENCLOSURE (6)

ENCLOSURE( 65)

## Sample honor, Courage, Commitment (HCC) Assessment

Mentee Name:	Date:
Mentor Name:	Individual CRP%:

N = Needs Assistance E = Effective

<b>Honor: Integrity, Responsibility, Accountability</b>	
H1 Leads by example	
H2 Upholds the reputation of the Marine Corps & acts Marine-like at all times (24/7)	
H3 Seeks responsibility and accepts responsibility for success / failures of Marines	
H4 Respects self and others	
H5 Maintains high levels of mental development	
H6 Maintains high level of emotional stability	
H7 Maintains high level of physical readiness	
H8 Maintains high level of spiritual strength	
H9 Does the right thing when no one is looking	
<b>Courage: Do the right thing, in the right way, for the right reasons</b>	
C1 Does the right thing even when unpopular or difficult	
C2 Holds others accountable to Marine Corps standards (24/7)	
C3 Takes ownership of difficult situations even if beyond the scope of regular duties	
C4 Admits to shortcomings and mistakes	
C5 Obeys all lawful orders and regulations	
C6 Refuses to participate in inappropriate behavior despite social pressure on leave / liberty	
C7 Takes ownership of and seeks assistance in dealing with difficult personal situations	
C8 Assists subordinates in taking on difficult personal situations	
C9 Obeys the law at all times	
<b>Commitment: Dedication to mission. Devotion. Always makes a positive impact.</b>	
Co1 Shows enthusiasm in being a Marine and inspires others	
Co2 Demonstrates situational awareness and sound judgment	
Co3 Is prepared for deployment and redeployment	
Co4 Sharpens common combat skills	
Co5 Pursues professional development by utilizing the MOS Roadmap	
Co6 Acts responsibly in the use and care of equipment and assets	
Co7 Accomplishes tasks in a timely manner, no matter what the conditions	
Co8 Provides for support and welfare of family	
Co9 Ensures family is prepared for separations and reunions	
Co10 Lives within means (budgeting, spending, saving)	
Co11 Operates PMV / POV responsibly	
Co12 Acts responsibly during recreational activities	
Co13 Avoids alcohol abuse and has zero tolerance for drug use	
Co14 Looks after the welfare of other Marines on leave or liberty	
Co15 Develops game plans, takes needed steps to minimize risks	

# New Join Milestone Checklist

Prior to arrival	Assigned Sponsor & Mentor	Section
Pre-1st Liberty	Verify Driver Improvement, and Vehicle License	Section
Pre-1st Liberty	Off Limits & Liberty Restrictions	Section
Pre-1st Liberty	Local Orders & Directives	Section
Pre-1st Liberty	SACO/Arrive Alive Card	SACO
Pre-1st Liberty	NCO Core Values (Hazing & SA) Discussion	Section
Check in + 1	OIC/SNCOIC Interview	Section
Check in + 2	Chain of Command Introductions	Camp
Check in + 2	Command Welcome Aboard Brief	Camp
Check in + 7	Financial Worksheet	Section
Check in + 7	Med/Den Screening	Section
Check in + 7	MOL/BTR/Company Data reconciliation	Section
Check in + 7	Base Resources/Area Tour	Section
Check in + 30	SARC/UVA-SAPR Training	UVA
Check in + 30	Uniform Inspection	Section
Check in + 30	Family Care Plan (If applicable)	Section
Check in + 30	MCIs & Education Resources	Section
Check in + 30	SMP Introduction	SMP President
Check in + 30	MOS Road Map and T&R Standards	Section
Check in + 30	Inventory PFT/CFT	Section
Check in + 90	MCMAP Grey Belt	Section
Check in + 365	Annual Marine Net Training	Section
Monthly	Mentorship Counseling	Section

NAVMC DIR 1500.58  
13 Feb 06

**Mission and Goals Form**

**Paragraph 1: Situation**

Mentor Name:	RUC:
Marine mentee Name:	UIC:
Unit Address:	

**Paragraph 2: Mission**

Unit Mission. What is the mission of the unit:
Marine mentee's critical role in support of the unit's mission:

**Paragraph 3: Execution**

Goals (3 or 4: specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, time-bound)

Professional Goals:
Personal Goals:
Combat Skills/Readiness Goals:

Tasks (action plan for accomplishing goals)

Action Steps	Deadline



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
CAMP MUJUK, REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
UNIT 15017  
APO AP 96218-0173

IN REPLY REFER TO  
1000  
CO  
JUN 14 2019

MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION CAMP MUJUK BULLETIN 1050.1B

From: Commanding Officer, Camp Mujuk  
To: Distribution List

Subj: UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF OFF-  
INSTALLATION CURFEW

Ref: (a) General Order Regarding Off-Installation Curfew (19 Dec 14)  
(b) USFK Tasking Order 19-58, Temporary Suspension of Off-Installation Curfew (7 Jun 19)  
(c) USFK Regulation 190-2, Off-Limits Areas and Establishments (8 Dec 17)  
(d) USFK Regulation 27-5, Individual Conduct and Appearance (9 July 15)  
(e) Camp Mujuk Order 1050.1B, Leave and Liberty (21 Dec 18)

Encl: (1) Camp Mujuk Temporary Suspension of Off-Installation Curfew Brief (11 Jun 19)  
(2) Camp Mujuk Holiday Accident Reduction Program (HARP) Form

1. Purpose. To inform all permanent/semi-permanent personnel, training unit personnel, and temporarily assigned personnel aboard Camp Mujuk, to include any member of the United States Armed Forces when in the Republic of Korea on Temporary Additional Duty/Temporary Duty (TAD/TDY) orders, that the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) intends to initiate a 90-day suspension of the USFK-wide curfew for all personnel subject to the General Order Regarding Off-Installation Curfew (19 Dec 14). Department of Defense (DoD) civilians and DoD invited contractors/technical representatives are highly encouraged to abide by this policy. This suspension will serve as an evaluation period in order to assess the appropriateness of maintaining a USFK-wide curfew. Factors which will be considered include behavior, morale, and unit readiness.

2. Action

a. All leaders are empowered to maintain good order, discipline, and unit readiness that meet our obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty and implementing agreements.

b. The 90 day trial period of the temporary suspension of off-installation curfew will begin at 0800 on 17 June 2019 and terminate on 15 September 2019 (Time to be determined.). All other policies and rules governing off-installation behavior remain in effect, including USFK Regulation 190-2, Off-Limits Areas and Establishments (8 Dec 17).

c. Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers will ensure accurate accountability of their personnel during designated work hours of 0730-1630.

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Subj: UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF OFF-  
INSTALLATION CURFEW

d. There will be no alcohol consumption 12 hours prior to conducting duty changeover as the Command Duty Officer or Duty Noncommissioned Officer which occurs at 0730 daily. Additionally, alcohol should not be consumed less than eight (8) hours prior to the next scheduled work day.

e. Random alcohol screening will be conducted.

f. The Camp Mujuk Leave and Liberty Order requires all personnel E-5 and below to have a liberty buddy during their first 30 days of joining the command. A liberty buddy is mandatory for all military personnel for off-base liberty during the hours of 2200-0500. A designated liberty buddy is intended to enhance individual force protection requirements, ensure better care for our team mates, improve self-policing behavior, and minimize risk. A liberty buddy can be a service member, family member, or friend.

g. If consuming alcohol off-installation, between 2200-0500, when conducting unofficial, off-installation activities, or during periods of heightened vulnerabilities, a designated liberty buddy that will not consume alcohol before, during, or at any time during the liberty event is required. Exceptions to this policy will be considered on a case by case basis.

h. Leader-led courtesy patrols will be conducted between 2200-0500 during holidays and weekends; when feasible, joint patrols with Korean National Police will be conducted.

3. Applicability. This bulletin is applicable to all Camp Mujuk permanent/semi-permanent personnel, training unit personnel, and temporarily assigned (TAD/TDY) personnel. It is effective the date signed.

4. Point of Contact. For inquiries on this bulletin, please contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)  
at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii) or DSN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b)(3)(A)(ii)

  
S. S. KAREGA



































































UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
CAMP MUJUK, REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
UNIT 15017  
APO AP 96218-0173

CMO 1601  
CO  
7 Jan 2019

MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION, CAMP MUJUK ORDER 1601.2E

From: Commanding Officer, Camp Mujuk  
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION CAMP MUJUK COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND  
COMMAND DUTY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (CDNCO) ORDER

Ref: (a) MCO 5500.6H w/ Ch 1 Arming of law enforcement & Security Personnel  
(b) MCO 3574.2L Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Programs  
(c) MARADMIN 323/16 Weapons Conditions for Personnel Performing Law  
Enforcement and Security Duties  
(d) Marine Corps Installation Camp Mujuk Policy Letter 18-2  
(e) MCO P10520.3B Marine Corps Flag Manual

Encl: (1) CDO Checklist  
(2) Camp Mujuk CCIRs  
(3) Acknowledgement of M9 Pistol Loading/Unloading Procedures  
(4) OPREP-3 Serious Incident Reporting Guidance  
(5) Morning Report

1. Situation. Camp Mujuk's Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Command Duty Non-Commissioned Officer (CDNCO) serve as the direct representatives for the Commanding Officer (CO) while they stand a 24 hour post of duty; they will strictly enforce all orders and regulations, and are responsible to the CO for everything that occurs aboard Camp Mujuk after normal working hours.

2. Cancellation. Marine Corps Installation Camp Mujuk Order 1601.2D.

3. Applicability. This Order is applicable to all active and reserve component Marines stationed aboard Camp Mujuk as permanent personnel and resident on the Camp Mujuk table of organization (T/O). It also includes personnel in a temporary duty/temporary additional duty (TDY/TAD) status, specifically, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14) Sailors and Combat Logistics Detachment (CLD) Marines.

4. Mission. At 0730 each day, designated personnel will post in the Camp Mujuk Executive Officer's office as the CDO. The CDO will take charge of all Camp Mujuk facilities, equipment, and personnel in order to ensure accountability and good order and discipline within the Camp. This Order promulgates policy and sets specific guidance for responsibilities of the Camp Mujuk CDO, CDO Supernumerary, and Duty Noncommissioned Officer.

5. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. The CDO is the direct representative of the Camp Mujuk CO and is expected to be able to handle all situations that may arise. The CDO and CDNCO must be thoroughly familiar with the contents of this order and the additional duty binder within the duty hut. The end state is a safe and productive operating environment for all personnel aboard Camp Mujuk.

Subj: MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION CAMP MUJUK COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND  
COMMAND DUTY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (CDNCO) ORDER

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Eligibility for CDO and CDNCO. All company grade officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) (E-6 to E-7) working aboard Camp Mujuk on permanent or semi-permanent orders are eligible to stand CDO. All E-5s and below working aboard Camp Mujuk on permanent or semi-permanent orders are eligible to stand CDNCO. All CDOs must have qualified on the M9 pistol in accordance with reference (b), completed the rules for the use of force acknowledgement form (only required the first time you stand duty as CDO) found in enclosure (3), and completed the acknowledgement of M9 pistol loading/unloading procedures form found in enclosure (4). First time duty standers shall not stand on the weekend or during holidays, regardless of rank.

(2) Armed Duty. The CDO will be armed with an M9 service pistol. The M9 will be holstered with a lanyard, on a duty belt, and in Condition (3) (magazine inserted, chamber empty, slide forward and safety on). One loaded magazine, with 15 rounds, will be inserted in the M9 pistol. One additional magazine, with 15 rounds, will be carried in a magazine pouch on the duty belt. Any use of force must be in strict compliance with references (a) through (d). Weapons are not authorized in privately owned or rental vehicles. Duties must utilize the government vehicles to move around base. The Provost Marshal's Office remains the primary responder to situations requiring law enforcement. The CDO is not authorized to enter their personal BOQ room at any time while armed with the M9 service pistol during their tour of duty.

(3) Tour of Duty. The CDO and CDNCO watch is a 24 hour, armed post (from 1530 to 0730) during the work week and (0730 to 0730) on weekends and holidays. Armory will be open at 0700 for M9 and equipment turn in. The CDO and CDNCO shall be posted for 24-hour periods during weekdays, weekends and holidays. Although it is a 24-hour post, the CDO or CDNCO may conduct a rest plan in the duty hut, allowing for one of the duty standers to rest while the other is on duty. One of the two duty standers will be awake and ready to respond to any incident immediately during the tour of duty.

(4) CDO Post and Relief Procedures

(a) On normal workdays, both the on-coming and off-going CDOs will report to the Camp Mujuk Executive Officer (XO) at 0730 for post and relief. In the absence of the Camp Mujuk XO, they will report to the Camp Mujuk Company Commander. For weekend and holiday periods, all CDOs will report to the Camp Mujuk XO at 0730 the day prior to the weekend or holiday for posting and special instructions (i.e. on a Friday, the CDO for Friday, Saturday, and Sunday will report). After the formal check-in with the Camp Mujuk XO, the CDOs will execute informal posting procedures throughout the weekend or holiday.

(b) Officers assigned as CDO for the first time will spend adequate time with the off-going CDO to ensure familiarity with all orders and responsibilities pertaining to the post and will read this order and review the CDO binder in its entirety prior to assuming the watch.

Subj: MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION CAMP MUJUK COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND  
COMMAND DUTY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (CDNCO) ORDER

c. Tasks

(1) Command Duty Coordinator

(a) Publish the monthly CDO, CDO Supernumerary, and CDNCO duty schedule no later than the 20th of each month. Review the list of Marines to ensure they possess a valid United States Forces Korea issued driver's license in order for them to stand CDO/CDNCO. Additionally, review dates of non-availability provided by the Headquarters Staff, Aviation Ordnance Detachment, and publish a monthly Camp Mujuk CDO duty roster via email for the following month. Place a printed copy in the CDO Duty Binder.

(b) Ensure the watch standing burden is fairly and equitably distributed throughout a Marine's entire tour aboard the installation. Specific care will be attributed to newly joined personnel as they build points towards overall watch standing to ensure Marines are not unreasonably burdened to a point that impedes individual effectiveness and/or mission accomplishment.

(c) Track and fair share the CDO and CDNCO by a point system to ensure that the duties are being spread amongst the eligible population fairly.

(d) The Command Duty Coordinator and CO's driver shall be exempt from standing duty due to the high volume of events he/she must assist the Commanding Officer and Senior Enlisted Advisor. Additionally, The Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC) is exempt from standing CDO.

(2) S-3/Executive Officer (XO)

(a) Post and relieve the oncoming/off-going CDO watch standers. Review all logbook entries made during the CDO tour of duty during post and relief and ensure all items, incidents and activities identified by the CDO are properly addressed with the Camp Mujuk staff or appropriate personnel. Initial in red ink in the upper right corner of each logbook page to ensure review has been conducted.

(b) Report to the Commanding Officer any non-routine issues that require involvement, engagement, and/or situational awareness of the Commanding Officer, or meet the criteria for Commander's Critical Information Reporting (CCIRs).

(c) Ensure that all armed duty personnel are fully knowledgeable and trained in the rules for the use of force, up to and including, deadly force prior to standing duty.

(d) Provide special orders/instructions to the CDO prior to the assumption of duties to ensure that the security, good order and discipline of Camp Mujuk is maintained at all times.

(e) Review the monthly CDO roster generated by the Command Duty Coordinator prior to its publication to ensure qualified personnel are assigned to CDO duty in an equitable manner and resolve any scheduling conflicts.

(f) Brief the CDO on the status of daily operations and training aboard the Camp. Information will include, but is not limited to: points of

Subj: MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION CAMP MUJUK COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND  
COMMAND DUTY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (CDNCO) ORDER

contact for training units, major movements, special events or activities, Force Protection Condition (FPCON) status, and any impending destructive weather.

(g) Review this order and CDO reference material quarterly to ensure compliance with commander's intent and mission accomplishment.

(h) Ensure all armed duty personnel are properly trained to provide security for all personnel, buildings, equipment and material, to include classified material aboard Camp Mujuk.

(3) S-4

(a) Provide all materiel support, administrative supplies, and equipment for the CDO and CDNCO.

(b) Provide appropriate non-tactical vehicle (NTV) support to the CDO and CDNCO for execution of their duties.

(c) Ensure clean linens are stocked in the duty hut gear locker, and that dirty linens are collected for cleaning on a weekly basis. Resupply the CDO logbook as needed.

(d) Provide the CDO with an M9 service pistol, duty belt, lanyard, pistol holster, (2) magazines, and (30) rounds.

(e) The armory shall conduct a limited technical inspection on the first Wednesday of each month for the CDOs weapon.

(f) The armory shall inspect the CDO's weapon, magazines, and rounds each Wednesday by 0800 for cleanliness, serviceability and functionality.

(4) S-6

(a) Provide the CDO with a laptop, duty cell phone, charger, radio, and two batteries. Provide the Duty Noncommissioned Officer with a duty cell phone and charger.

(b) Ensure email distribution lists are up to date for all reporting requirements.

(5) Camp Mujuk Staff Section Heads

(a) Provide a monthly non-availability list to the Command Duty Coordinator for all eligible duty watch standers for CDO and CDNCO. Non-availability is defined as official duties that will conflict with being able to stand CDO, leave that is pre-approved in Marine Online (MOL), and temporary additional duty (TAD) that is approved in the Defense Travel System (DTS).

(b) Be prepared to coordinate section replacement watch standers in the event of an emergency. An emergency is defined as an unforeseen or unplanned event that takes place within eight hours of a watch stander assuming post as either CDO or CDNCO.



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(6) Senior Enlisted Advisor

(a) Ensure all CDNCO's have read and understand all the contents of this Order.

(b) Post and relieve the oncoming/off-going CDNCO's. Review all logbook entries made during the CDNCO tour of duty. Initial in red ink in the upper right corner of each logbook page to ensure review has been conducted.

(c) Provide copies of completed special liberty chits to the CDO prior the beginning of their tour of duty.

(d) Report to the Commanding Officer any non-routine issues that require involvement, engagement, and/or situational awareness of the Commanding Officer, or meet the criteria for CCIRs.

(e) Assign Marines in the grade of E-5 and below to Duty Non-Commissioned Officer. Marines will not stand duty while on restriction as a result of non-judicial punishment. All CDNCOs must have a valid Korean driver's license with a status of forces agreement (SOFA) stamp.

(7) CDO

(a) Serve as the direct representative for the Commanding Officer of Camp Mujuk after normal working hours, on weekends, and during holiday periods.

(b) Maintain and answer the duty phone at all times during the post.

(c) Provide oversight and guidance to the CDNCO.

(d) Review all Marine Corps Installations Pacific (MCIPAC), Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK), and Camp Mujuk CCIRs, this Order, and the CDO Duty Binder prior to assuming post.

(e) Identify CCIRs, make proper notifications, and track through final disposition. Ensure the CO is notified regarding reporting of all CCIRs.

(f) Receive, track and notify appropriate staff sections of any Requests for Information (RFIs) received from MCIPAC, MARFORK, III MEF, and any other higher, adjacent, or tenant activities associated with Camp Mujuk.

(g) Be prepared to initiate and execute Emergency Command Operation Center procedures, Destructive Weather procedures, and Natural Disaster procedures. All procedures are located in the CDO Duty Binder.

(h) Familiarize yourself with MCO P10520.3B (Marine Corps Flag Manual) in order to enforce policies and procedures regarding the appropriate use and display of all flags aboard the installation.

(i) Represent the Commanding Officer Camp Mujuk in any case not covered by instructions and assigned tasks.

(j) Check the Camp Mujuk Watch Officer account daily for any message traffic. Notify the XO in cases not of a routine nature.

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(k) Check with the Protocol Officer and stay abreast of all General Officer visits. Raise and lower the flags in accordance with MCO P10520.3B.

(l) During working hours (Monday-Friday 0730-1630) the CDO and CDNCO will conduct their normal duties within their respective work stations upon being posted by the Executive Officer and Senior Enlisted Advisor; however, both duties will remain on call to support any requirements placed upon the installation.

(m) During non-working hours on weekdays (Monday-Friday 1630-0730) and weekends (Saturday and Sunday 0730-0730), the CDO will post with the CDNCO at the BEQ building 1102 to ensure good order and discipline is being enforced aboard the installation. Only one duty (CDO or CDNCO) is required to be posted in the duty hut at all times, unless security tours are being conducted.

(n) Ensure all Marines who have signed out of the liberty logbook are accounted for and have not violated curfew. At 0045, the CDO will wait at the main gate to ensure Marines not in a leave or special liberty status are returning after curfew. At 0100, the CDO will make a note in the logbook for all Marines who are signed out on liberty but do not have a curfew exemption, are not in a special liberty or leave status, and may be in violation of the established United States Marine Corps Forces Korea curfew policy.

(o) The Senior Enlisted Advisor will ensure the CDO has copies of authorized curfew exemptions, as well as leave and special liberty paperwork. Once a Marine is identified as possibly violating curfew, the CDO will contact his/her immediate chain of command to find out the whereabouts of the Marine. The CDO will then notify the XO and Senior Enlisted Advisor of all curfew violators.

(p) The CDO checklist (enclosure 1) provides guidance on areas to tour during the tour of duty.

(q) Once per hour between the hours of 1630 - 0630, check the highly trafficked areas to ensure that they are in a high state of police at all times. These areas include: behind the Bachelors Enlisted Quarters, bunkers, mini mall pavilion, recreation center and the adjacent pavilion, and the front gate.

(r) Publish a morning report in accordance with enclosure (5) to the CO no later than 0600 every day.

(8) Duty Non-Commissioned Officer

(a) During working hours (Monday-Friday 0730-1630) the CDNCOs will conduct their normal duties within their respective work stations upon being posted by the Senior Enlisted Advisor; however, the CDNCO will remain on call to support any requirements placed upon the installation.

(b) During non-working hours on weekdays (Monday-Friday 1630-0730) and weekends (Saturday and Sunday 0730-0730), post with the CDO at the BEQ building 1102 to ensure the United States Forces Korea and Marine Corps Forces Korea curfew is being enforced. Only one duty (CDO or CDNCO) is

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required to be posted in the duty hut at all times, unless security tours are being conducted

(c) Conduct MTF operations support on and/or off base as directed by the CDO.

(d) Represent the Commanding Officer, XO, Senior Enlisted Advisor, and CDO in any other cases not covered by instructions and assigned tasks.

(e) Familiarize yourself with MCO P10520.3B (Marine Corps Flag Manual) in order to enforce policies and procedures regarding the appropriate use and display of all flags aboard the installation.

(f) Once per hour, check the highly trafficked areas to ensure that they are in a high state of police at all times. These areas include the fitness center, behind the Bachelors Enlisted Quarters, barbershop, mini mall pavilion, recreation center and the adjacent pavilion, and the front gate.

(g) Serve as a rover in the BEQ in order to maintain a constant presence in the permanent personnel living quarters. While conducting your rover duties you will be in the uniform of the day and will annotate in the Duty Non-Commissioned Officer logbook that you have conducted a walk through and your findings. Once the tour is complete the rover will text the CDO cell phone with the following; "DNCO tours Camp Mujuk, nothing unusual to report at this time" unless there is something significant to report. The same will be written in the logbook.

(h) Make a logbook entry for any unserviceable lights, hatches, or damage to property while on duty. Report these findings to the S-4 SNCOIC prior to duty changeover.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Command Duty Officer Assignment

(a) Rank. The CDO will be a Marine company grade officer, Gunnery Sergeant, or Staff Sergeant.

(b) Qualifications and Requirements. The CDO must have been in the command a minimum of 14 consecutive days.

(c) Personnel will not stand duty if assigned sick-in-quarters (SIQ) or on a "no-duty" status by competent medical authority.

(d) Assigned CDO will not consume alcohol within 12 hours of standing post, nor will he/she consume alcohol while on post.

(2) Duty Non-Commissioned Officer Assignment

(a) Rank. The CDNCO will be a Marine Sergeant, Corporal, Lance Corporal, or Private First Class.

(b) Qualifications and Requirements. The CDO must have been in the command a minimum of 14 consecutive days and possess a valid USFK issued driver's license.

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(3) CDO Supernumerary. A section will be assigned as supernumerary on a weekly basis. This will appear on the duty roster published by the Command Duty Coordinator. In the event that a supernumerary is required, the section head will be required to provide a qualified Marine to stand duty.

(4) Posting for duty. Post and relief will be conducted in the following manner with the XO. Off coming CDO: Good morning Sir, Rank Last name reports in as the off going CDO. Special instructions are (cover special instructions), the forecasted weather is (mentions any reports of possible destructive weather), currently we have (name units and anyone in the grade of O6 and above) on deck training, the FPCON level at this time is (get this info from PMO), major muscle movements for today are, the areas that are frequented by Marines have been police called by the Duty Non-Commissioned Officer and I have inspected these areas. Oncoming CDO: Good morning Sir Rank Last name reporting in as the oncoming CDO.

(a) Weekdays. The XO will post and relieve the CDO at 0730 on weekdays. The XO will relieve the outgoing CDO and pass any special instructions to the oncoming CDO. The off-going CDO will then close out the CDO logbook and pass all duty materials to the oncoming CDO. The Senior Enlisted Advisor will post and relieve the CDNCO at 0730 on weekdays. The Senior Enlisted Advisor will relieve the outgoing CDNCO and pass any special instructions to the oncoming CDNCO. The off-going CDNCO will then close out the CDNCO logbook and pass all duty materials to the oncoming CDNCO.

(b) Weekends and Holidays. All CDOs for Saturday, Sunday, and/or designated 72 or 96-hour liberty period will report to the XO for posting on the last day preceding the weekend or holiday period. All CDNCOs for Saturday, Sunday, and/or designated 72 or 96-hour liberty period will report to the Senior Enlisted Advisor for posting on the last day preceding the weekend or holiday period. During weekends and holiday periods, informal post and relief will occur at the Camp Mujuk Flag Poles at 0730 prior to morning Colors. All special orders and/or instructions are to be passed between each CDO and recorded in the CDO logbook appropriately.

(5) Rest Plan

(a) The CDO and CDNCO may execute a rest plan which allows one of the two duty standers to rest while the other is awake and posted in the duty hut or conducting a tour of the area. A rack is provided in the duty hut for the CDO and CDNCO to utilize in conducting a rest plan. The CDO is not authorized to enter their personal BOQ room at any time while armed with the M9 service pistol during their tour of duty.

(b) Prior to executing a tour of the area, a sign with the contact information (name, phone number, room #) of both CDO and CDNCO will be displayed on the duty hatch.

(6) Performance of Duties. Detailed instructions for the CDO and CDNCO are contained in enclosure (1) of this order.

(7) Serious Incident and Operational Report 3 (OPREP-3) Reporting

(a) Serious Incident Reporting (SIR) is covered by Marine Corps Order 3504.2 which describes the requirements in which incidents are reported to Headquarters Marine Corps, as well as which circumstances, and any specified time limits to make the required reports. Enclosure (4) describes

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the reportable events in detail along with the reporting timeline. The CO must be notified of all serious incidents and OPREP-3s. In general, an OPREP-3 is required any time an incident occurs that may be of great interest to HQMC or has the potential to create significant media coverage. Prior to launching an OPREP-3, it must be determined what command will conduct the reporting. Often OPREP-3 incidents involve units training in the ROK and as such their operational chain of command should release the report. Do not delay reporting, if it appears that a unit will not be able to release the report or make the proper notifications then make the phone calls for them and ensure they know what you have told HQMC.

(b) Any OPREP-3 report should also be reported to the USFK Emergency Operations Center (also called Command Center Seoul, "CC Seoul") and MARFORK. OPREP-3 reports may also need to be reported to MARFORPAC, and/or III MEF as appropriate. It is again important to note that not all of the MCIPAC Commander's CCIRs will warrant a report to USFK in the event they are tripped. The current set of USFK CCIRs is available on the USFK CENTRIX-K portal. While these CCIRs are classified and the chance that the Camp Mujuk CDO would need to report the tripping of one of these CCIRs is low, all CDOs should be familiar with them.

(8) Red Cross Messages. When a Red Cross Message is received after normal working hours, the CDO will first verify that the person the Red Cross Message is for is in fact a member of Camp Mujuk or with one of the Training Units at Camp Mujuk. The CDO will reference the Alpha Roster in the CDO binder or contact the respective training unit's duty or designated point of contact. The CDO must obtain a Red Cross case number. If notification is received from a source other than the Red Cross, the CDO must verify the information with the Red Cross. Regardless of the source of information, the CDO will call the Red Cross at Camp Henry DSN 768-7993 or commercial +1-877-272-7337 and confirm the validity of the message. Once the CDO has obtained all pertinent information, understands the situation and has validated the authenticity of the message, he/she will then begin the notification process. The CDO will notify the following personnel: XO, 1stSgt and Chaplain. The chain of command will determine the best way to notify the individual Marine or Sailor of the Red Cross message. The CDO will record the Red Cross Message in the CDO Logbook to include case number, actions taken and chain of command contacted. The CDO will ensure S-1 receives a copy of the Red Cross Message and any associated Emergency Leave Request as soon as possible.

(9) Gate Openings. Requests to open the Camp Mujuk vehicle gates after hours should be coordinated ahead of time with PMO. After hours requests will be directed by the CDO and conducted by PMO. Appropriate logbook entries will be made concerning the emergency request to open the gate.

(10) Extra Duty and Restriction. The CDO will supervise Marines who have been assigned extra duties or restriction based on NJP or other judicial action. Extra duties will be reviewed with the 1stSgt prior to execution. The CDO will maintain a copy of the Restriction and Extra Duty muster and will return them to the 1stSgt on the last day of punishment assigned.

(11) Colors. The CDO will supervise the conduct of morning and evening colors at 0800 and sunset, respectively (solar/lunar data is contained in the CDO binder). The oncoming CDO will also observe morning colors. Morning and evening colors are programmed in the audio system

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console along with instructions on the use of the camp audio system. The CDO is responsible for ensuring that members of the colors detail are properly trained in their duties. The Provost Marshall's Office maintains a roster of personnel assigned to support morning and evening colors.

6. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration

(1) Publish and disseminate this Order along with CDO, CDO Supernumerary and Duty Non-Commissioned Officer Assignments will be accomplished by the aforementioned Command Duty Coordinator.

(2) CDO and CDNCO assignment changes. The XO remains the sole authority permitted to approve CDO assignment changes and/or the next senior commissioned officer in his/her absence. The First Sergeant is the sole authority permitted to approve CDNCO assignment changes and/or the next senior staff non-commissioned officer in his/her absence.

b. Logistics. The uniform for the CDO and CDNCO will be the uniform of the day. The CDO and CDNCO will wear the Duty arm-band on his/her left arm. The CDO will determine the off-base uniform for each situation. Warming layers and cold weather gear are permissible to the appropriate level at the discretion of the CDO.

7. Command and Signal

a. Command. The Camp Mujuk XO is the point of contact for all matters pertaining to the CDO Order. This order applies to all Marines and Sailors assigned to Camp Mujuk whether permanent party or in a TDY/TAD status.

b. Signal. This Order is effective from the date signed.

  
S. S. KAREGA

DISTRIBUTION LIST:  
Camp Mujuk Officers, SNCOs, E-5 and below













